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This thesis investigates how Māori knowledge and language articulate with 
current discourses of Pūtaiao education, and possible alternative articulations. A 
Kaupapa Māori version of critical discourse analysis methodology is developed 
and applied to discourses relevant to Pūtaiao, or Māori-medium science education. 
This topic represents an intersection between language, science, education, and 
culture - fields which are all highly politically charged. Therefore, it is essential 
that a politically robust Kaupapa Māori position be taken in relation to the 
research topic. Not only the issues being investigated but the underlying research 
paradigm must be interrogated using Kaupapa Māori theory at each stage of the 
project. 
 
The goal is to study the range of possible meanings for the notions of ‘Pūtaiao’ 
and ‘Māori science’ by exploring the relevant dialectical issues, critiquing the 
assumptions and positions taken on language, knowledge, identity and ethos, in 
order to inform further Pūtaiao curriculum development. The research project is a 
narration of the larger story of Pūtaiao education: what is the current situation, 
how did it come about, what theoretical issues have been influential in this 
process, and what possibilities are there for further development of Pūtaiao 
curriculum and pedagogy?  
 
The thesis research consists of a series of discourse analyses of varying levels of 
focus and intersection with Pūtaiao: 
Wāhanga 1: Translated NCEA L1 science and mathematics examinations, and a 
traditional Taitokerau oral text; 
Wāhanga 2: Māori science curriculum policy; 
Wāhanga 3: Multicultural science education research; 
Wāhanga 4: Curriculum politics, preventive linguistics, language of science; 
Wāhanga 5: Mātauranga, rationality, philosophy of science. 
 
Each analysis takes the form of a narrative history, based on a selected corpus of 
previously published scholarship (in Wāhanga 1, including numerical data and 
oral tradition) on the issue under examination, from a Kaupapa Māori perspective. 
 iii
Mainly in the first two chapters, analysis at times also draws on ‘personal 
narrative’ accounts of previously unpublished details relating to Pūtaiao. 
  
Additionally, an investigation of various qualified notions of ‘science’ is 
undertaken, beginning in Wāhanga 2, concluding in Wāhanga 5, in order to 
explore the nature and boundaries of science as a system of knowledge, and its 
relationship to other types or systems of knowledge.  
 
Synopses are included of the following concepts and theoretical issues impacting 
on the discourses under analysis:  
Wāhanga 1: Ethnicity, ‘race’, critical theory, Kaupapa Māori theory.  
Wāhanga 2: Science, scientism, science ideology and anti-science. 
Wāhanga 4: Identity, linguistic purism, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 
 
Informed by this research, in Wāhanga 5 an original model for the relationship 
between mātauranga and science is proposed, and the notion of Kaupapa Māori 
science/epistemology is explored. An analogy between the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis and multicultural science is used to draw together the cultural debates 
in language and knowledge, which are surmised to intersect at the level of 
discourse.  
 
The final chapter presents a re-articulation of Pūtaiao as the notion of Kaupapa 
Māori science education, and some recommendations for language and content 
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This personal ‘whakapapa kōrero’ (T. Smith, 2000) illustrates some complexities, 
clashes and uncomfortable cultural, socio-economic and gender boundaries 
permeating contemporary Māori identity. These have been defining issues in my 
life, since well before it began. The title, borrowed from the traditional karakia 
(prayer, incantation) widely known in Kura Kaupapa Māori1, reminds me of Peter 
McLaren’s thought that ‘where are you?’, not ‘who are you?’, is the most 
important ethical question (Borg, Mayo et al., 1998). I was born in Auckland in 
1961, the middle child of three, of parents both having Māori as well as Pākehā 
heritage. 
 
Born in 1927, my father, William Stewart (named after the Scottish seaman - see 
below) was among the first generation of Ngāti Kura children from Matauri Bay, 
Taitokerau Northland, to attend school under national state provision, where he 
and his peers were ‘given the supplejack’ for ‘swearing’, which was the term used 
by their teachers for speaking Māori. When he was 12 and in Standard Two his 
father required his help for a contract to break a road through to the next bay 
around the coast (Te Ngāere to Wainui) so he left school. My father is a native 
Māori speaker - he recalls being well into adulthood (married to my mother, his 
second wife) before he was able to think in English, without translating in his 
head.  
 
His mother, my grandmother Tangiaranui, was born in around 1900 with no 
Pākehā ancestry. She could understand and speak only a small amount of English 
by the time I remember her in the 1970s, after decades of radio, television, 
tamariki and in-laws speaking it around her. Tangiaranui was a major inheritor of 
ancestral hapū land rights in the area, and her mother, Makanihi, disapproved of 
her choice of husband, my grandfather Nuku Stewart, whom she considered 
socially inferior in whakapapa terms. This was because Nuku Stewart’s father, 
Paraika, was the issue of a casual union between a Scottish ship captain’s son and 
Merekuia, from Tauranga, brought to Northland for early mission schooling 
opportunities. Furthermore, neither was Paraika married to Nuku’s mother, Ema, 
                                                 
1 ‘Tēnei au, tēnei au, ko te hōkai nei...’ concerning Māori notions about the origins of human 
knowledge.  
 viii
whose parents were a local woman and a Pacific Island tauiwi (foreigner), perhaps 
a ship hand. In Pākehā terms, however, Nuku Stewart proved very successful, 
opening the first shop in Matauri Bay, running a trucking contract for the Tipene 
porcelain clay quarry, which is still in the family (operated today by my brother), 
and successfully turning part of his wife’s land at Otoroa into a dairy farm, also 
still a whānau (extended family) operation today. 
 
Probably due in part to this ongoing animosity with his mother-in-law, Nuku 
Stewart encouraged my father and his 15 siblings to ‘marry Pākehā’ in order to 
better themselves, and to disdain the aspects of traditional culture still operating 
around them. As a result of these attitudes, and his school experience, my father 
became reluctant to speak in Māori to his children, and traits of self-denigration 
indelibly marked his thoughts concerning society, norms and culture.  
 
Born in 1936, my mother was the only child of a single professional woman, my 
grandmother Dorothy, who was a secondary teacher of English, French, Music, 
Sport, and the new subject Social Studies. Grandma Dorothy defied the norms of 
her upbringing by leaving her husband, rather than submit to his patriarchal ideas 
of marriage. Thus forced into independence, she taught for many years in Opotiki, 
receiving 2/3 the salary of her male peers, and it was there my mother became one 
of the first students of te reo Māori as a Scholarship subject (a ‘foreign’ language) 
in 1952, for which the school arranged a local kaumātua, Peter Baker, as teacher. 
 
My mother earned a scholarship which enabled her to attend Auckland University 
in 1953, where she was the palest face in the inaugural kapa haka (or ‘concert 
party’ as it was termed). She boarded at O’Rorke Hall. In 1954, my mother met a 
girl from Matauri Bay (my father’s sister), who eventually became my aunt. 
Though she passes for Pākehā, (‘unmarked’; McKinley, 2003), my mother is 1/16 
Māori, the fifth female in a maternal descent line from my ancestress, 
Merekaimanu, of the Coromandel hapū (Ngāti Hei, Ngāti Whanaunga) o Ngāti 
Maru ki Tainui.2  
 
In marrying Merekaimanu, settler Edward Davis acquired her ancestral land, and 
hence wealth. One of their grandsons, Ned Hally, became the mayor of 
                                                 
2 These proper nouns identify the kin groups of Merekaimanu, i.e. her two hapū (‘sub-tribes’), iwi 
(‘tribe’), and waka (‘canoe’ or ‘confederation’). 
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Cambridge, Waikato; and the Māori heritage was suppressed. Generations later, 
one residual acknowledgement was in the form of a racist patriarchal science 
family myth. The story, as told to my siblings and me, was that when our mother’s 
father asked for Dorothy’s hand in marriage, he was warned by her father of 
mental instability in the women of the family, caused by the ‘mixed blood’ - a 
useful explanation of why Dorothy’s mother had committed suicide when 
Dorothy and her brother were teenagers. 
 
So teaching was ‘in my blood’, but it was not my first career choice - that became 
to help save the Takahē from extinction, after reading ‘Two in the Bush’ by 
Gerald Durrell. That idea eventually led to enrolling after Form 6 in a BSc at 
Auckland University, where I completed an MSc in Organic Chemistry. After that 
I worked in Auckland for several years, first as a research technician in the Cancer 
Research Laboratory in the Auckland Medical School, and later in sales and 
customer support of chemical analysis equipment. At the end of 1988, I left 
Auckland and my job and went to Matauri Bay to reconnect with ‘my Māori side’. 
From there I went to live with Mangu Awarau in Waimanoni, near Kaitaia, where 
I heard about Kura Kaupapa Māori, and extended my limited earlier knowledge of 
te reo me ōna tikanga.  
 
I returned to Auckland, needing to support myself and my pēpi Nuku, and 
completed secondary teacher training at Auckland College of Education in 1991. 
After one year teaching Te Reo Māori at Onehunga High School, in 1993 I 
became the first teacher of Pūtaiao and Pāngarau at Te Wharekura o Hoani Waititi 
Marae in Waitakere City, until a renewed wish to live in Te Taitokerau drew me 
in 1996 to the HOD Māori position at Tikipunga High School in Whangarei, 
where I have since resided. 
 
Ko Whakarārā te maunga 
Ko Matauri te moana 
Ko Te Tāpui te marae 
Ko Ngāti Kura te hapū 
Ko Ngāpuhi-nui-tonu te iwi 
Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā anō tātou katoa. 
 x
 
Mt Eden housewife, Mrs Trixie 
Stewart, and her 10-year-old 
daughter, Georgina, have become 
keen astronomers after attending an 
astronomy course in Auckland, run by 
retired secondary school science 
teacher, Lionel Warner. They're more 
starry-eyed than ever now. Georgina topped the girls in their end-of-term examination 
and Mrs Stewart was top mother and top parent. They are pictured above working on an 
assignment at home. 
Teacher’s dream 
Mr Warner began his course in 1967. He knew he was close to retirement, yet he wanted 
to maintain the teaching contact. But there were three prerequisites for children wishing 
to attend. They had to be keen; they had to be from a “fairly superior intellectual stream”; 
they had to have a written character reference from a head teacher and be accompanied 
by an adult. It was a teacher's dream,” he said. “And the first course was so successful 
that I continued.” 
Two years ago pictures and an article by Mr Warner on his project had a double-page 
spread in United States astronomy magazine, “The Sky and Telescope.” Said Mr Warner: 
“They recognized the intellectual companionship between child and parent here as being 
of social significance.” The pupil-parent course was held at the observatory in the 
Auckland War Memorial Museum once a week last term, and will continue this term.  
Mrs Stewart has long been interested in astronomy. She used to take her three children to 
the Observatory on public viewing nights and has read as much as she could on the 
subject. “So when Georgie was keen to attend the course, it was a marvellous excuse for 
me to go too,” she said. “It's such an all-embracing subject. It lifts you right out of 
everyday life.” Son Charles (7) is mad keen to attend too - “he hopes the course will still 
be on when he's old enough to  go,” Mrs Stewart said. 
Stars in Maori 
She and Georgie work together on homework assignments, and Georgie prepared and 
delivered a lecturette to the class on the astronomy of the ancient Maori. She is part-
Maori - her father is Bill Stewart, a garage and taxi business owner - and spent hours 
making diagrams and giving constellations on the star chart Maori names.  
Astronomy is only one of many interests. Georgie plays the piano, takes creative dance 
lessons, is a Brownie, soon to graduate to a Girl Guide, and she likes to write. She took 
two years to save $27 to buy a secondhand portable typewriter, to put out a children's 
magazine with the help of her sister Julie (13). She was one of the youngest at the 
astronomy course, generally for pupils from Form II to Form IV.  
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This thesis investigates how Māori knowledge and language articulate with 
current discourses of Pūtaiao education, and possible alternative articulations. A 
Kaupapa Māori version of critical discourse analysis methodology is developed 
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research topic. Not only the issues being investigated but the underlying research 
paradigm must be interrogated using Kaupapa Māori theory at each stage of the 
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The goal is to study the range of possible meanings for the notions of ‘Pūtaiao’ 
and ‘Māori science’ by exploring the relevant dialectical issues, critiquing the 
assumptions and positions taken on language, knowledge, identity and ethos, in 
order to inform further Pūtaiao curriculum development. The research project is a 
narration of the larger story of Pūtaiao education: what is the current situation, 
how did it come about, what theoretical issues have been influential in this 
process, and what possibilities are there for further development of Pūtaiao 
curriculum and pedagogy?  
 
The thesis research consists of a series of discourse analyses of varying levels of 
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traditional Taitokerau oral text; 
Wāhanga 2: Māori science curriculum policy; 
Wāhanga 3: Multicultural science education research; 
Wāhanga 4: Curriculum politics, preventive linguistics, language of science; 
Wāhanga 5: Mātauranga, rationality, philosophy of science. 
 
Each analysis takes the form of a narrative history, based on a selected corpus of 
previously published scholarship (in Wāhanga 1, including numerical data and 
oral tradition) on the issue under examination, from a Kaupapa Māori perspective. 
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Mainly in the first two chapters, analysis at times also draws on ‘personal 
narrative’ accounts of previously unpublished details relating to Pūtaiao. 
  
Additionally, an investigation of various qualified notions of ‘science’ is 
undertaken, beginning in Wāhanga 2, concluding in Wāhanga 5, in order to 
explore the nature and boundaries of science as a system of knowledge, and its 
relationship to other types or systems of knowledge.  
 
Synopses are included of the following concepts and theoretical issues impacting 
on the discourses under analysis:  
Wāhanga 1: Ethnicity, ‘race’, critical theory, Kaupapa Māori theory.  
Wāhanga 2: Science, scientism, science ideology and anti-science. 
Wāhanga 4: Identity, linguistic purism, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. 
 
Informed by this research, in Wāhanga 5 an original model for the relationship 
between mātauranga and science is proposed, and the notion of Kaupapa Māori 
science/epistemology is explored. An analogy between the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis and multicultural science is used to draw together the cultural debates 
in language and knowledge, which are surmised to intersect at the level of 
discourse.  
 
The final chapter presents a re-articulation of Pūtaiao as the notion of Kaupapa 
Māori science education, and some recommendations for language and content 
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This personal ‘whakapapa kōrero’ (T. Smith, 2000) illustrates some complexities, 
clashes and uncomfortable cultural, socio-economic and gender boundaries 
permeating contemporary Māori identity. These have been defining issues in my 
life, since well before it began. The title, borrowed from the traditional karakia 
(prayer, incantation) widely known in Kura Kaupapa Māori1, reminds me of Peter 
McLaren’s thought that ‘where are you?’, not ‘who are you?’, is the most 
important ethical question (Borg, Mayo et al., 1998). I was born in Auckland in 
1961, the middle child of three, of parents both having Māori as well as Pākehā 
heritage. 
 
Born in 1927, my father, William Stewart (named after the Scottish seaman - see 
below) was among the first generation of Ngāti Kura children from Matauri Bay, 
Taitokerau Northland, to attend school under national state provision, where he 
and his peers were ‘given the supplejack’ for ‘swearing’, which was the term used 
by their teachers for speaking Māori. When he was 12 and in Standard Two his 
father required his help for a contract to break a road through to the next bay 
around the coast (Te Ngāere to Wainui) so he left school. My father is a native 
Māori speaker - he recalls being well into adulthood (married to my mother, his 
second wife) before he was able to think in English, without translating in his 
head.  
 
His mother, my grandmother Tangiaranui, was born in around 1900 with no 
Pākehā ancestry. She could understand and speak only a small amount of English 
by the time I remember her in the 1970s, after decades of radio, television, 
tamariki and in-laws speaking it around her. Tangiaranui was a major inheritor of 
ancestral hapū land rights in the area, and her mother, Makanihi, disapproved of 
her choice of husband, my grandfather Nuku Stewart, whom she considered 
socially inferior in whakapapa terms. This was because Nuku Stewart’s father, 
Paraika, was the issue of a casual union between a Scottish ship captain’s son and 
Merekuia, from Tauranga, brought to Northland for early mission schooling 
opportunities. Furthermore, neither was Paraika married to Nuku’s mother, Ema, 
                                                 
1 ‘Tēnei au, tēnei au, ko te hōkai nei...’ concerning Māori notions about the origins of human 
knowledge.  
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whose parents were a local woman and a Pacific Island tauiwi (foreigner), perhaps 
a ship hand. In Pākehā terms, however, Nuku Stewart proved very successful, 
opening the first shop in Matauri Bay, running a trucking contract for the Tipene 
porcelain clay quarry, which is still in the family (operated today by my brother), 
and successfully turning part of his wife’s land at Otoroa into a dairy farm, also 
still a whānau (extended family) operation today. 
 
Probably due in part to this ongoing animosity with his mother-in-law, Nuku 
Stewart encouraged my father and his 15 siblings to ‘marry Pākehā’ in order to 
better themselves, and to disdain the aspects of traditional culture still operating 
around them. As a result of these attitudes, and his school experience, my father 
became reluctant to speak in Māori to his children, and traits of self-denigration 
indelibly marked his thoughts concerning society, norms and culture.  
 
Born in 1936, my mother was the only child of a single professional woman, my 
grandmother Dorothy, who was a secondary teacher of English, French, Music, 
Sport, and the new subject Social Studies. Grandma Dorothy defied the norms of 
her upbringing by leaving her husband, rather than submit to his patriarchal ideas 
of marriage. Thus forced into independence, she taught for many years in Opotiki, 
receiving 2/3 the salary of her male peers, and it was there my mother became one 
of the first students of te reo Māori as a Scholarship subject (a ‘foreign’ language) 
in 1952, for which the school arranged a local kaumātua, Peter Baker, as teacher. 
 
My mother earned a scholarship which enabled her to attend Auckland University 
in 1953, where she was the palest face in the inaugural kapa haka (or ‘concert 
party’ as it was termed). She boarded at O’Rorke Hall. In 1954, my mother met a 
girl from Matauri Bay (my father’s sister), who eventually became my aunt. 
Though she passes for Pākehā, (‘unmarked’; McKinley, 2003), my mother is 1/16 
Māori, the fifth female in a maternal descent line from my ancestress, 
Merekaimanu, of the Coromandel hapū (Ngāti Hei, Ngāti Whanaunga) o Ngāti 
Maru ki Tainui.2  
 
In marrying Merekaimanu, settler Edward Davis acquired her ancestral land, and 
hence wealth. One of their grandsons, Ned Hally, became the mayor of 
                                                 
2 These proper nouns identify the kin groups of Merekaimanu, i.e. her two hapū (‘sub-tribes’), iwi 
(‘tribe’), and waka (‘canoe’ or ‘confederation’). 
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Cambridge, Waikato; and the Māori heritage was suppressed. Generations later, 
one residual acknowledgement was in the form of a racist patriarchal science 
family myth. The story, as told to my siblings and me, was that when our mother’s 
father asked for Dorothy’s hand in marriage, he was warned by her father of 
mental instability in the women of the family, caused by the ‘mixed blood’ - a 
useful explanation of why Dorothy’s mother had committed suicide when 
Dorothy and her brother were teenagers. 
 
So teaching was ‘in my blood’, but it was not my first career choice - that became 
to help save the Takahē from extinction, after reading ‘Two in the Bush’ by 
Gerald Durrell. That idea eventually led to enrolling after Form 6 in a BSc at 
Auckland University, where I completed an MSc in Organic Chemistry. After that 
I worked in Auckland for several years, first as a research technician in the Cancer 
Research Laboratory in the Auckland Medical School, and later in sales and 
customer support of chemical analysis equipment. At the end of 1988, I left 
Auckland and my job and went to Matauri Bay to reconnect with ‘my Māori side’. 
From there I went to live with Mangu Awarau in Waimanoni, near Kaitaia, where 
I heard about Kura Kaupapa Māori, and extended my limited earlier knowledge of 
te reo me ōna tikanga.  
 
I returned to Auckland, needing to support myself and my pēpi Nuku, and 
completed secondary teacher training at Auckland College of Education in 1991. 
After one year teaching Te Reo Māori at Onehunga High School, in 1993 I 
became the first teacher of Pūtaiao and Pāngarau at Te Wharekura o Hoani Waititi 
Marae in Waitakere City, until a renewed wish to live in Te Taitokerau drew me 
in 1996 to the HOD Māori position at Tikipunga High School in Whangarei, 
where I have since resided. 
 
Ko Whakarārā te maunga 
Ko Matauri te moana 
Ko Te Tāpui te marae 
Ko Ngāti Kura te hapū 
Ko Ngāpuhi-nui-tonu te iwi 
Tēnā koutou, tēnā koutou, tēnā anō tātou katoa. 
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Mt Eden housewife, Mrs Trixie 
Stewart, and her 10-year-old 
daughter, Georgina, have become 
keen astronomers after attending an 
astronomy course in Auckland, run by 
retired secondary school science 
teacher, Lionel Warner. They're more 
starry-eyed than ever now. Georgina topped the girls in their end-of-term examination 
and Mrs Stewart was top mother and top parent. They are pictured above working on an 
assignment at home. 
Teacher’s dream 
Mr Warner began his course in 1967. He knew he was close to retirement, yet he wanted 
to maintain the teaching contact. But there were three prerequisites for children wishing 
to attend. They had to be keen; they had to be from a “fairly superior intellectual stream”; 
they had to have a written character reference from a head teacher and be accompanied 
by an adult. It was a teacher's dream,” he said. “And the first course was so successful 
that I continued.” 
Two years ago pictures and an article by Mr Warner on his project had a double-page 
spread in United States astronomy magazine, “The Sky and Telescope.” Said Mr Warner: 
“They recognized the intellectual companionship between child and parent here as being 
of social significance.” The pupil-parent course was held at the observatory in the 
Auckland War Memorial Museum once a week last term, and will continue this term.  
Mrs Stewart has long been interested in astronomy. She used to take her three children to 
the Observatory on public viewing nights and has read as much as she could on the 
subject. “So when Georgie was keen to attend the course, it was a marvellous excuse for 
me to go too,” she said. “It's such an all-embracing subject. It lifts you right out of 
everyday life.” Son Charles (7) is mad keen to attend too - “he hopes the course will still 
be on when he's old enough to  go,” Mrs Stewart said. 
Stars in Maori 
She and Georgie work together on homework assignments, and Georgie prepared and 
delivered a lecturette to the class on the astronomy of the ancient Maori. She is part-
Maori - her father is Bill Stewart, a garage and taxi business owner - and spent hours 
making diagrams and giving constellations on the star chart Maori names.  
Astronomy is only one of many interests. Georgie plays the piano, takes creative dance 
lessons, is a Brownie, soon to graduate to a Girl Guide, and she likes to write. She took 
two years to save $27 to buy a secondhand portable typewriter, to put out a children's 
magazine with the help of her sister Julie (13). She was one of the youngest at the 
astronomy course, generally for pupils from Form II to Form IV.  
 
Extracted from ‘The Auckland Star’ newspaper, 17 May 1971, p.15. 
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WĀHANGA TUATAHI 
Introduction and Methodology 
1.1 Thesis outline 
WĀHANGA TUATAHI: Introduction and Methodology (p.1-37) 
This chapter introduces the research topic, then discusses and develops the research 
methodology. This is applied in two contrasting contexts, with the aim to further 
illuminate the research nexus: first, inspection of initial results (2002-4) for NCEA Level 
1 Pūtaiao and Pāngarau examinations, and second, analysis of a traditional Taitokerau 
saying. 
WĀHANGA TUARUA: He Aha te Pūtaiao? (p.38-67) 
This chapter reviews debates over the nature of science, and the relationship between 
science and other types of knowledge, as a background against which to examine major 
phases of Māori science curriculum development in the 1980s and 1990s.  
WĀHANGA TUATORU: Multicultural Science Education (p.68-89) 
This chapter contains an account of the international debates in multicultural science 
education research literature, summarising the major unresolved issues, and discussing 
how these apply to Pūtaiao curriculum development. 
WĀHANGA TUAWHĀ: Language, Identity and Representation in Science, 
Education and Pūtaiao (p.90-138) 
This chapter explores the literature linking language and science, science and culture, and 
language, culture and representation. The fields of identity politics and language planning 
are reviewed from the perspective of Pūtaiao before discussion of two relevant language 
debates, namely linguistic purism and the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. A linguistic 
examination of science discourse is related to the language (lexicogrammar) of Pūtaiao.  
WĀHANGA TUARIMA: Mātauranga Māori Motuhake (p.139-196) 
This chapter examines discourses of mātauranga Māori (traditional Māori knowledge) 
and its relationship to Western science knowledge. Notions of space-time and 
classification are used to explore the ‘philosophy of Māori science’ in order to develop 
and apply the notion of ‘Kaupapa Māori science’ to a critique of science and science 
curriculum. 
WĀHANGA TUAONO: Pūtaiao Hei Kaupapa Māori Science? (p.197-206) 
This chapter contains recommendations for Pūtaiao curriculum development, and key 
findings about Kaupapa Māori research, science, and science education. 
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1.2 Introduction: Knowledge and Language Issues in Pūtaiao  
The word ‘pūtaiao’ has been accepted as the Māori term for science within the last 
few decades.3 Pūtaiao is understood to be translated Western science, or 
traditional knowledge (mātauranga Māori) equated with science, often with little 
or no distinction made between usage of the two meanings. The tension between 
Pūtaiao as ‘science in Māori’ and Pūtaiao as ‘Māori science’ forms the central 
dialectic with which this thesis is concerned, particularly as it impacts on learners, 
teachers, and curriculum policy in Pūtaiao for primary and secondary Māori-
medium schooling. 
 
Māori science education research constitutes a significant power/knowledge nexus 
(McKinley, 1995): each of these words, used to delineate the topic, represents a 
site of intense political and ideological struggle (Walker, 1996; Harding, 1998; 
Coxon, Jenkins et al., 1994; Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). From a global perspective, 
such research contributes to the ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ 
(Foucault, cited in Webster, 1996), and to a cogent critique of Western 
knowledge, imperialism (Young, 1990) and the neo-liberal emphasis on 
economistic and market theory in social and education policy (Apple, 2000). 
 
Over the last 20 years or more, the increase in the number of children throughout 
Aotearoa New Zealand attending primary and secondary Māori-medium schools, 
particularly Kura Kaupapa Māori, has entailed a commitment by the state to 
support and resource Māori-medium education, a commitment mandated in statute 
by the section on Te Aho Matua in the Education (Amendment) Act 1999. In 
terms of curriculum policy, the production of curriculum statements in te reo 
Māori (marautanga Māori) was part of the development of the National 
Curriculum Framework/Te Anga Marautanga o Aotearoa4 in the 1990s, and 
included in subsequent curriculum initiatives. The development of Māori science 
                                                 
3 Coined in ca.1980, possibly by Toby Rikihana, from pū (essence) + taiao [=ao] (world, 
traditional, see Williams, 1971 or environment, modern, see Ryan, 1995). So in the word 
‘pūtaiao’, ‘world/environment’ is adjectival to ‘essence’ (i.e. ‘essence of/from the 
world/environment). Competing accounts include puta (to appear) + i ao (from the world) (Kapua, 
1997). Another early term used by Rikihana for Science in the curriculum was ‘Te Ao Tūroa’ (the 
manifest world), a traditional term, unlike ‘pūtaiao’.  
4 The National Curriculum Framework (Te Anga Marautanga o Aotearoa), published in 1993, was 
the first ‘national curriculum’ to be defined (and partially regulated) for Aotearoa New Zealand. It 
comprised 7 ‘essential learning areas’, each with a Māori ‘parallel’, as follows: Language and 
Languages (Te Reo me Ngā Reo), Mathematics (Pāngarau), Science (Pūtaiao), Social Science 
(Tikanga-ā-Iwi), Technology (Hangarau), The Arts (Ngā Toi), Health and Physical Well-being 
(Hauora). An 8th learning area of Languages (separated from English/Te Reo Māori) has been 
created in the updated draft NZC (M.O.E., 2006). 
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education as the subject ‘Pūtaiao’, and of the Pūtaiao document (M.O.E., 1996), 
have been part of this overall Māori-medium curriculum process. The re-
development of the National Curriculum Framework/Te Anga Marautanga o 
Aotearoa is currently (2006) underway in the Curriculum Marautanga Project 
(www.cmp.ac.nz). 
 
The problem with an undifferentiated dual concept of Pūtaiao is that it encourages 
and masks elision of the two meanings - Māori science, and science in Māori. As 
a result, the dialectical issues related to language, knowledge, philosophy and 
politics, which are inherent in the field of Māori science education, become less 
visible, and more difficult to address, in the design and implementation of Pūtaiao 
teaching/learning/assessment programmes. This thesis concerns itself with how 
Māori language and knowledge have been incorporated within past and current 
policies and practices in Pūtaiao education, and with possible alternatives.  
 
To speak of ‘knowledge and language issues’ indicates the assumption that 
knowledge and language can be separated, at least to the extent that issues can be 
identified as one or the other. However, since knowledge is carried (in 
classrooms) mainly by language, and since any use of language involves 
knowledge, clearly any issue of language is also an issue of knowledge, and vice 
versa. But a language is a system of codification of meaning, not a system of 
knowledge, which is how the term ‘a science’ is generally understood (see p.39). 
At the same time, according to Michael Halliday,  
[t]he grammar of every natural language is a theory of human experience: a 
theory that we hold unconsciously, but that is all the more potent for that 
very reason. (Halliday, 2004, p.9).  
 
These are significant distinctions and inter-relationships in forming the nexus 
where this thesis research topic is located. 
  
Based on my personal experience, and in common with other published views, 
(Gilbert, Hipkins et al., 2005; McPherson Waiti, 1990), I would describe Pūtaiao 
teaching as ‘problematic’, for several different reasons: knowledge and worldview 
clashes between ‘science’ and ‘Māori’; the exploding number of kupu hou 
(science vocabulary) that teachers and students need to master as the class level 
increases, especially after about Year 8; and the lack of teaching resources, 
facilities, professional development, and so on - what I refer to below (p.61) as a 
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‘vacuum’ of professional practice. Low achievement in Science is reported as the 
only negative ‘key finding’ (out of 4) concerning the achievement of Māori-
medium students, in a recent Ministry of Education (MOE) report based on 
NCEA data (Murray, 2005). This finding is consistent with the survey of Level 1 
NCEA data for Pūtaiao and Pāngarau presented below in Wāhanga 1.4 (p.24).  
 
My starting point, therefore, is that state-funded Pūtaiao policy development and 
implementation must be undertaken so as to provide every possible assistance to 
teachers and students of Pūtaiao, in order to improve and enhance successful 
teaching and learning. This thesis explores past, present and possible discourses 
from this perspective. At the same time, in adopting a Kaupapa Māori standpoint, 
I am also concerned with the interests of ‘authentic’ Māori knowledge 
(differentiating between this and translated ‘Pākehā knowledge’), and its role in 
Pūtaiao. One recent paper looks at this question through a narrative pedagogy 
lens, asking if and how stories can support science learning, based on analysis of 
some Pūtaiao readers (two MOE-funded ‘Tōtika’ series, one on birds, one on 
rocks). ‘How then can science be taught so that it doesn’t displace mātauranga 
Māori or continue the process of colonisation?’ (Gilbert, Hipkins et al., 2005, 
p.13, original emphasis). Analysis of the Tōtika readers exposes the narrative 
weakness of the science-based stories therein, with the suggestion the genre might 
be better termed ‘faction’ rather than ‘fiction’. Acknowledging the ‘trap’ of 
‘relativism’ (see p.102) into which the Totika texts fall, by simply juxtaposing 
science narratives with examples from iwi traditions, the authors suggest 
treat[ing] mātauranga Māori and science, not as ‘the facts’, but as 
discourses, systems of stories told in particular contexts for particular 
purposes, that - and this is important - construct people in certain ways. 
If we do this, then dealing with mātauranga Māori and Western science isn’t 
a problem. Having access to two different knowledge systems becomes a 
resource, an asset... (ibid, original emphases). 
 
One response to this is to say that Māori people have ‘known about’ both 
mātauranga Māori and Western science for a long time, to no apparent advantage, 
but the suggestion is worth further exploration, as attempted in this thesis. 
The Current Status of Pūtaiao 
The Pūtaiao curriculum document has been in place for a decade (M.O.E., 1996). 
Since then, an increasing amount of science teaching material in te reo has 
become available, mostly at lower curriculum levels. At NCEA level, translated 
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science texts are starting to be made available via Te Kete Ipurangi 
(www.tki.govt.nz), a state-funded educational website. Pūtaiao can be assessed for 
certification with either Pūtaiao Unit Standards or translated NCEA assessments 
(www.nzqa.govt.nz). Since there are insufficient teachers of Pūtaiao, a state-
funded video conferencing system (KAWM, see p.24) currently provides an 
important curriculum delivery option for NCEA-level Pūtaiao in Wharekura.  
 
Despite these successes, greater difficulties in the provision of Pūtaiao, compared 
to the other Māori-medium curriculum areas (Irwin, 1999), are still commonly 
acknowledged. These have often been phrased in terms of lack: of vocabulary, 
teaching resources and teacher knowledge (McPherson Waiti, 1990); and are 
considered more severe at higher curriculum levels. While these issues in Pūtaiao 
are to some extent being addressed by Ministry and teacher training initiatives, the 
‘language issue’ of science terminology remains a significant barrier to teachers 
of Pūtaiao, in terms of availability (lack of kupu hou or Māori terms for the 
science words required) as well as unfamiliarity (the requirement for Pūtaiao 
teachers to learn the kupu hou in order to teach with them). The current 
dominance of English as the language of science, and the links between this and 
the debates over revitalisation and modernisation of te reo, are the focus of 
Wāhanga 4.2 (p.109). 
 
Besides the extra difficulties of teaching science in te reo, Pūtaiao teachers must 
also think about the dialectic between ‘Māori science’ and ‘science in Māori’, in 
order to clarify the nature of Pūtaiao, regarded here as a knowledge issue, 
represented by the question of whether or not the content of Pūtaiao teaching 
programmes is the same as the national norm of mainstream Science. The 
epistemological dominance (in worldview, philosophy and knowledge base) of 
science over mātauranga, or at a more general level, indigenous knowledge (IK), 
is able to be considered to some extent independently of language, although not 
entirely. These debates are also discussed in more depth in the following chapters.  
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Whika 1: Knowledge and Language Issues in Pūtaiao 
 





  ‘other’ curriculum     
Pūtaiao <   English   
  mainstream curriculum <   borrowing 
    Māori <  
      neologism 
 
In Kura Kaupapa Māori, language in the sense of ‘medium of instruction’ is 
usually treated as a non-issue, since te reo is the lingua franca of the kura (school). 
As indicated above, however, language is a crucial issue in secondary level 
Pūtaiao, particularly beyond Year 10. The issue of medium of instruction bears 
investigation at a more detailed level, as part of the question of whether Pūtaiao 
involves inherent language difficulties that are qualitatively or quantitatively 
different from other Māori-medium curriculum areas. So in Whika 1, ‘language 
issues’ are sub-divided into ‘medium of instruction’ and ‘vocabulary policy’. 
 
In Whika 1, these three issues are heuristically posited as decisions to be made in 
Pūtaiao, in sequence from left to right, with either/or choices shown by vertical 
separation at each stage. This arrangement indicates these issues to be inter-
related, but does not imply contingency – the possibilities shown could be 
arranged in many different ways. The trajectory of current praxis leads, in this 
diagram, towards the lower right option, namely: a lexical development policy of 
neologism, in order to develop te reo Māori into a medium of instruction suitable 
for mainstream Science curriculum delivery. The two bolded ‘end-points’ 
represent other alternative pathways for development of Pūtaiao, which this thesis 
will argue bear re-considering, in order to improve outcomes and to better align 
with the purposes of KKM. The fourth end-point (‘English’) on the diagram 
represents mainstream Science education. The questions raised in Whika 1 are 
returned to at the end of Wāhanga Tuatoru, in the case of ‘knowledge issues’, and 
the end of Wāhanga Tuawhā, in the case of ‘language issues’. 
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1.3 Methodology: Kaupapa Māori Discourse Analysis 
One reason why so much research into the issues in Māori science education has 
been called for, but not yet completed (McKinley, 1992; McKinley, McPherson 
Waiti et al., 1992; McKinley, 1999), may be that the act of research, or the 
framing of research questions, is in itself an act arising from a modernist paradigm 
that is tauiwi (alien) to mātauranga Maori. It is a challenge, therefore, to engage in 
research into epistemological issues in Māori-medium science education that 
moves beyond the limitations of modernist paradigms - a challenge to which a 
fruitful response may be found in the principles of Kaupapa Māori research.  
Kaupapa Māori and Critical Theory 
Kaupapa Māori research has emerged within the last few decades, as part of the 
‘Māori renaissance’ (Bishop, 1996; but see Wāhanga 4.1, p.104), motivated by a 
quest for self-determination, and fuelled by the urgency of the need to retrench 
and revitalise te reo Māori me ōna tikanga as a living language and culture. 
Recent wider acknowledgement of historical injustices against Māori people, 
language, culture, and material economic bases, and wider knowledge about past 
and present institutional racism practices in Aotearoa New Zealand, such as in the 
education system, have contributed towards more conducive conditions for its 
development.  
 
The term ‘Kaupapa Māori’ is best known in relation to Kura Kaupapa Māori, 
which is a school movement that began in approximately 1984, building on the 
success of Te Kohanga Reo (Nepe, 1991). More recently, the term ‘Kaupapa 
Māori’ has begun to appear in wider social discourse such as job advertisements 
and institutional policies, signalling pro-Māori policies and strategies in other 
spheres such as health, justice, media, etc (Smith, 1995, p.119). 
 
The development of Kaupapa Māori research occurred when greater numbers of 
Māori people began to attain academic positions, particularly outside Māori 
Studies/Anthropology. To date, Education has been the most important discipline 
within which Kaupapa Māori research has developed. The following discussion 
draws on the scholarship of prominent Kaupapa Māori education researchers such 
as Russell Bishop (1996), Kathie Irwin (1999), Graham Hingangaroa Smith 
(2002), and Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999).  
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While these authors emphasise its uniqueness compared with both traditional and 
contemporary approaches to research, Kaupapa Māori research aligns with other 
international research traditions such as indigenous, feminist and postcolonial 
social science. These traditions share an historical origin that includes a critical 
examination of how the notion of the ‘other’ in research reproduces the existing 
disparities in societal power of the historically-researched group, as a basis for 
emergence. Thus a critical, emancipatory stance is built into each of these 
traditions by virtue of its reason for being (Ladson-Billings, 2000). 
 
Kaupapa Māori theory as a research paradigm is argued by some to be a localised 
version of critical theory:  
Kaupapa Māori theory therefore aligns with critical theory in the act of 
exposing underlying assumptions that serve to conceal the power relations 
that exist within society and the ways in which dominant groups construct 
concepts of ‘common sense’ and ‘facts’ to provide ad hoc justification for 
the maintenance of inequalities and the continued oppression of Māori 
people. (Leonie Pihama, cited in Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.185-6)  
 
In contrast, Bishop describes Kaupapa Māori as a ‘resistance to critical theory’, 
and a response to the ‘failure of critical pedagogy in relation to its emancipatory 
goals’ (cited in Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.186). This apparent contradiction possibly 
reflects varying individual perspectives on Marxism and critical theory. 
 
The term ‘critical theory’ originated in the Frankfurt School, founded in 1923, and 
refers to a tradition of critique of modernity at all levels, including empiricism, 
positivism, and Marxism. Leading names in the Frankfurt School include Max 
Horkheimer (1895-1973), Theodor Adorno (1903-69) and more recently Jürgen 
Habermas (Honderich, 1995, p.290). Habermas (and others) argue that science 
already embodies value judgements, such as the desirability of technological 
domination of nature, and resulting ideological thinking. In response, Habermas 
introduced the notion of the ideal speech situation (ISS) as a ‘methodological 
standard of critique’ (Young, 1989, p.75). The ISS ‘is a critical reconstruction of 
the assumptions of everyday speech communication’. It was part of Habermas’ 
effort to ‘found critique in the postulation of a counter-factual process of reaching 
uncoerced consensus among inquirers’ (p.79). While later acknowledging its 




The ‘central problem for critical theory’ arises from ‘Habermas’ acceptance that 
the ISS cannot provide a basis for judging whole ways of life’ (p.170). To 
overcome this, Young argues, a ‘meta-decision’ must be made, through which an 
‘aesthetic and moral vision [with] genuinely theological content might be 
reinstated. If so, the possibility of a Jewish, Christian or Muslim critical theory 
must be taken seriously’ (p.171). In this sense, Kaupapa Māori theory can be 
viewed as modifying the philosophical basis of traditional critical theory, limiting 
its scope, and hence strengthening its emancipatory potential. This interpretation 
accommodates the comments of both Pihama and Bishop, cited above. 
 
According to Graham Hingangaroa Smith, Kaupapa Māori research: 
• is related to ‘being Māori’; 
• is connected to Māori philosophy and principles; 
• takes for granted the legitimacy of Māori, the importance of Māori 
language and culture; and 
• is concerned with ‘the struggle for autonomy over our own cultural 
well being’. (cited in Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.185) 
 
Thus, Kaupapa Māori research is defined in terms of its political stance (rather 
than, say, data collection methods) in a very similar way to ‘standpoint theories in 
the USA for example African-American, El Movimiento Chicano, American 
Indian Tribal Nations, etc’ (López, 1998, p.226). The political orientation of 
Kaupapa Māori research is an anti-racist one of emancipation from the historical 
oppression of Māori people, knowledge and culture that is inherent in mainstream 
social science research philosophies and practices. As such, Kaupapa Māori 
research could be said to arise out of ethical and political concerns relating to 
traditional mainstream research on or about Māori people (Bishop, 1998). The 
emergence of Kaupapa Māori research is linked to the specific socio-historical 
circumstances described above, in that it is a response and a protest made by 
Māori against dominant detrimental stories told by Pākehā research about Māori. 
 
One central principle of empowerment recognised in Kaupapa Māori research, 
then, is that Māori people ‘should regain control of investigations into Māori 
people’s lives’ (Bishop, cited in Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.185). Who, though, are 
‘Māori people’? Does this mean only Māori researchers should conduct research 
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on Māori? Or does it mean that ‘iwi’5 should be in charge of all research on 
Māori? Or the people whose lives are being investigated? Tuhiwai Smith reflects, 
with the following two questions, on researcher positioning: ‘Can a Māori 
researcher who is anti-Māori carry out Kaupapa Māori research?’ for which the 
answer given is ‘definitely not’; and ‘can a non-indigenous researcher carry out 
Kaupapa Māori research?’ for which two possible answers are given: the ‘more 
radical’ (ibid) response: ‘by definition, no, Kaupapa Māori research is Māori 
research exclusively’; and the alternative response, which is a qualified yes, as 
long as there was collaboration with others, and on the condition that such a 
researcher had ‘ways of positioning themselves as a non-indigenous person’ 
(p.184).  
 
According to some international scholars, who responded to Bishop’s (1998) 
description of Kaupapa Māori research, such discussion of who is authorised to 
conduct and control research is ‘essentialist’ in the tendencies both to 
‘homogenize a population’ (López, 1998, p.227), and cling to ‘dualistic notions of 
insider and outsider’ (p.228). 
Because a culture is not homogeneous, a society is differentiated, and a 
professional identity that involves problematizing lived reality inevitably 
creates a distance ... the extent to which anyone is an authentic insider is 
questionable. (Narayan, 2003, p.285) 
 
These considerations highlight the need for discourses of Kaupapa Māori research 
to address the multiple positioning of individuals as Māori (McKinley, 2003), as 
Tuhiwai Smith does for non-Māori, in the paragraph above.  
Ethnicity and Kaupapa Māori Research 
With this in mind, Tuhiwai Smith’s question about Māori identity bears closer 
examination:  
Can a Māori researcher who is anti-Māori carry out Kaupapa Māori 
research? (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.184) 
  
According to the principles of Kaupapa Māori research cited above (p.9), anyone 
who is ‘anti-Māori’ (putting aside the question of how, and by whom, being ‘anti-
Māori’ might be decided), by definition cannot conduct Kaupapa Māori research. 
In this sense Tuhiwai Smith’s question is rhetorical, serving to provoke thought 
on the complexity of contemporary Māori identity. It also indicates a need to 
                                                 
5 The ‘scare quotes’ signal the debates over the definition of an iwi and the status of groups such 
as urban Māori. (C. Smith, 2000, p.47) 
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evaluate, rather than simply accept, claims made by Māori researchers (as well as 
non-Māori) to conduct Kaupapa Māori research. In later chapters, concerning 
claims that Māori knowledge has the status of science, some arguments will return 
to these pro-Māori/anti-Māori terms. In such matters, the methodology (i.e. 
Kaupapa Māori research) enables the analysis, but at the same time, the methods 
are (in my case at least) also learned and refined through conducting the research 
on discourses of Pūtaiao. 
 
Being a Māori today inevitably entails grappling with the ‘primordial/situational 
dichotomy of ethnicity’ (May, 2003, p.107). The dissonance between these two 
positions, which are explained in the following paragraphs, is often experienced at 
a personal level as ‘fragmented subjectivities’, or conflicting aspects of self-
identity (McKinley, 2003).  
 
Primordialism views ethnicity as inherited, more or less immutable categories of 
identity, based ultimately on biological kin groups and evolutionary arguments. 
The relevance of ‘biological kin groups’ to Māori notions of identity based on 
whakapapa can hardly be denied. It is also the first mention of evolution, a science 
notion which develops a central role in this thesis. Stephen May (2001) notes that 
‘the primordialist position has been widely dismissed’, due to its tendencies 
towards both determinism, i.e. where ethnicity determines group and individual 
behaviours (and therefore culture), and essentialism, which sees ethnic groups as 
internally homogeneous, and rigidly separated from each other. These views are 
contested (and closely linked to outdated notions of ‘race’, see p.20), because they 
tend to overlook the ubiquitous processes of cultural change, and underplay the 
role of individual choice. Nevertheless, the endurance and importance of such 
positions, in identity debates relevant to Māori (and hence Pūtaiao), is explored 
further in Wāhanga 4.1 below (p.98).6  
 
Situational understandings of ethnicity, on the other hand, view the ethnic group, 
or ethnie (a synonym adopted in Fenton and May, 2002), as defined entirely by its 
sociohistorical relationship to others. According to this position, ‘shared culture 
                                                 
6 May (2001, Ch.1) cites, as examples of primordialism, the Herder - von Humboldt German 
Romantic tradition (influential on the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, see p.117 below) and the 
sociobiology programme (a contemporary case of scientism, see p.50 below), both of which have 
relevance, of different sorts, for Pūtaiao, as discussed in later chapters.  
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[is] best understood as generated in and by the processes of ethnic-boundary 
maintenance, rather than the other way around’ (May, 2001, p.31). These views, 
in turn, have been criticised for understating the social and cultural constraints on 
an individual’s ethnic choices, choices which ultimately become reduced to those 
of ‘a market, or cafeteria’ (p.32). Situational views on ethnicity lead towards 
cultural and linguistic instrumentalism (in which identity choices are made on the 
basis of relative power), a key argument in cultural imperialism (see p.102), with 
its deleterious effects on many cultures and languages, including Māori. Taken to 
its extreme, the situational view on ethnicity appeals to social constructionists 
(e.g. Hanson, 1989; Rata, 2000), and rational choice theorists, linking these views 
to both postmodernism and the political new Right (Devine, 2001; Devine, 2004; 
May, 2001, p.38-9). 
 
Thomas Eriksen (2002) discusses the ‘deeply problematic’ relationship between 
culture and ethnicity, noting the following four points: 
• Even if ethnicity may be widely believed to express cultural differences, 
there is a variable and complex relationship between ethnicity and 
culture; and there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnic 
differences and cultural ones.  
• Ethnicity is a relationship between two or several groups, not a property 
of a group; it exists between and not within groups. (Culture, of course, 
may perfectly well exist within groups.) 
• Ethnicity is the enduring and systematic communication of cultural 
differences between groups considering themselves to be distinct. It 
appears whenever cultural differences are made relevant in social 
interaction, and it should thus be studied at the level of social life, not at 
the level of symbolic culture.  
• Ethnicity is thus relational, and also situational: the ethnic character of a 
social encounter is contingent on the situation. It is not, in other words, 
absolute. (p.58, original emphasis) 
 
This understanding of ethnicity is adopted in the research methodology of this 
thesis. These points also highlight the important issues of representation and 
authenticity, which will be further considered below, in relation to Pūtaiao 
curriculum. 
 
May (2003) posits Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ as a useful way to 
understand ethnicity, and overcome the apparent dichotomy between primordial 
and situational accounts of ethnicity. The habitus notion encompasses ‘four key 
dimensions ... embodiment, agency, the interplay between past and present, and 
the interrelationship between collective and individual trajectories’.   
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‘Habitus’ refers to a set of embodied meanings that do not determine how 
individuals and groups might act, but nonetheless constitutes a powerful 
frame of reference, which influences and shapes, at least to some degree, 
how the world is seen. (May, 2003, p.107-8) 
 
The multiple dimensions of habitus straddle what Eriksen (2002) refers to as ‘a 
fundamental duality in the social disciplines,’ reflected in the ethnicity dichotomy 
described above: the sociological versus the psychological perspective; or as 
Eriksen notes, ‘sometimes described as the distinction between a Weberian and 
Durkheimian view of social life’ (p.55). The contemporary consensus holds 
ethnicity choices in tension or balance between primordialist and situational 
explanations (Fenton and May, 2002) - ‘neither ascribed nor achieved: they are 
both. They are wedged between situational selection and imperatives imposed 
from without’ (Eriksen, 2002, p.56).  
 
Smith (1997) noted the relevance of the habitus notion in the development of 
Kaupapa Māori theory, providing further support for this view of ethnicity as 
appropriate in Kaupapa Māori research and this thesis, to be returned to and 
refined in Wāhanga Tuawhā by employing a postmodernist perspective (p.95). 
The contours of this discussion on ethnicity are similar to those of inter-related 
debates in science and language, debates which will be examined in the course of 
the following chapters.  
Cultural Knowlege in Kaupapa Māori Research 
Bishop (1998) discusses the role of various participants in Kaupapa Māori 
research in terms of traditional Māori roles in society, such as the leadership of 
kaumātua, and the right to speak being dependent upon the social standing, in 
traditional Māori kinship terms, of the individual who wishes to speak. This 
emphasis on the role of old people with cultural standing also appears in 
descriptions by Native American researchers: ‘our Elders ... have been replacing 
the expected academic role of “informant” with a leadership role of directing 
research and teaching’ (Rains, Archibald et al., 2000, p.339); and ‘I am extremely 
aware of the cultural traditions that position the Elders as teachers and authorities’ 
(Hermes, 1998, p.161).  
 
Several writers have suggested the importance of the concept of ‘whānau’ in 
Kaupapa Māori research, referred to by Bishop as a ‘research whānau of interest’ 
and by Irwin as a ‘whānau of supervisors’. Bishop argues that all stages of the 
 14
research are in the control of the research whānau, within which the researcher is 
a participant, not necessarily the leader. In a Native American analogy, Hermes 
also draws attention to the re-positioning of the researcher in cultural contexts: ‘in 
Elders’ meetings, at moments I was the “organizer” or facilitator and could 
control the agenda, but when it was time to eat I was just as easily a “waitress” or, 
at the meeting’s end, a “driver”’ (Hermes, 1998, p.163). Her research journal 
entries include other whānau references: ‘What’s it like to suddenly become 
“Auntie” to 300 kids and know that in three years I’ll have to write something 
about them?’ (ibid).  
 
Hermes’ overall description of her ‘situated response’ research, however, stops 
short of Bishop’s assertion that Kaupapa Māori research must be conducted 
within existing culturally constituted practices and ‘hierarchically determined’ 
positioning, with the limits this would impose on research possibilities. In 
response to Bishop, African American scholar Linda Tillman (1998) notes 
‘several unresolved issues’ and asks, ‘can we realistically expect that all power 
relations will be eliminated?’ Chicano scholar Gerardo López (1998), while 
‘inspired by the potential for a group to direct the entire research process’, queries 
the absence of the voices of the research whānau: ‘your text offers no insight into 
how the text was actually co-constructed according to Kaupapa Māori’ (p.229).  
 
Bishop (1998) draws parallels for various Māori cultural terms and concepts, 
including hui (gatherings), pōwhiri (formal welcome ceremony), koha 
(contribution towards running hui), harirū (greeting cermony in hui setting), 
whakawhanaungatanga (mutual introductions, identifying genealogical links), 
mihi (oratory of greeting) and whakapapa (genealogy), within his outline of 
Kaupapa Māori research. In this way, he seeks to define its ‘culturally specific 
research practices’. Most of these parallels concern re-defining relationships in 
and organisation of a social science research investigation, in order to align them 
with Māori processes in traditional kinship groupings. While some of these 
analogies seem to risk distorting ‘authentic’ cultural meanings, the use of Māori 
terms, and the reference to Māori cultural items, is in itself a cultural self-
assertion. A similar point is made by Latina scholar Margaret Montoya: 
‘incorporating Spanish words, sayings, literature, and wisdom can have positive 
ramifications’ (cited in Gonzalez, 2001, p.645).  
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The positive effect on young Mexicana women of linking cultural practices to 
academic achievement is described by Francisca Gonzalez in her vision of a 
‘politically relevant education’ for the Chicana/o youth in California (Gonzalez, 
2001). Her analysis contrasts with the older ‘deficit view of cultural knowledge’ 
in the same way that Kaupapa Māori positions itself in opposition to the deficit 
model of Māori language and culture, which explicitly informed earlier 
mainstream educational policies for Māori education, and exerts ongoing ‘latent’ 
influence (Wetherell and Potter, 1992). 
 
Bishop’s description of the Kaupapa Māori research process bears most similarity 
to participatory action research, of all the recognized strategies for inquiry, 
although Bishop cautions against trying to pin an international research ‘label’ on 
Kaupapa Māori research. He focuses on the issue of distance or separation 
between researcher and researched, asserting that Kaupapa Māori research 
demands that this distance be completely dissolved into a larger, participatory 
mode of consciousness. He claims that issues of objectivity and subjectivity in 
research, along with notions of paradigm shift, are irrelevant in Kaupapa Māori 
research. According to Bishop, the appropriateness of all processes involved in 
Kaupapa Māori research can be evaluated by reference to taonga tuku iho 
(treasures from the ancestors), or traditional Māori wisdom. In this way Kaupapa 
Māori research practices and texts are judged according to Māori cultural criteria. 
As pointed out by his commentators, however, Bishop fails to give examples of 
how such criteria are applied in an ‘actual research project’ (Tillman, 1998). 
 
These accounts lead me to conclude that Kaupapa Māori research methodology is 
mostly concerned with guiding (framing) the questions one is interested in and 
why, and oriented largely towards ethics and paradigm, rather than towards 
specifying the methods to be used for collection and analysis of empirical 
materials. This position is consistent with Irwin’s description of her research 
design as ‘based on kaupapa Māori [and] ‘integrating research methods from 
qualitative and quantitative research paradigms’ (Irwin, Davies et al., 1996), and 
with the tendency, if not the detail, of Bishop’s delineations. The focus on 
contentious aspects of Bishop’s description of Kaupapa Māori research, and the 
responses to Bishop’s work from other postcolonial scholars, is useful in drawing 
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attention to aspects of greater and lesser importance, in developing a more robust 
understanding of the role for Kaupapa Māori theory and research in this thesis 
project.  
Kaupapa Māori hei Tūrangawaewae 
As indicated above, Kaupapa Māori research methodology is a recent construction 
in the academy by Māori, for Māori purposes, with each new writer contributing 
to its ongoing co-construction, focusing on certain aspects, and adding particular 
perspectives, as I attempt to do here. A metaphor for my coming to understand its 
relevance, and shift from former positivist-influenced research perspectives, is to 
say that Kaupapa Māori methodology is less like a machine technology of 
research, and more like a whare (house, building) within which to conduct 
research. One important advantage of Kaupapa Māori research to this study, 
therefore, is as a research position from which to speak, to which to belong. In this 
sense, I am regarding Kaupapa Māori research as a paradigm, tradition, school or 
community of scientists, in which to locate my own work.  
 
Furthermore, Kaupapa Māori theory holds as one of its tenets the validity of 
mātauranga Māori. This is clearly vital in the research paradigm for this topic, in 
order to entertain the epistemological claims of the notion of ‘Māori science’.  
 
Adopting Kaupapa Māori research methodology is consistent with the research 
context of Māori-medium science education, which is strongly associated with 
Kura Kaupapa Māori. There is an intention that the framework of philosophical 
and ethical assumptions and practices relating to culture, language and politics 
guiding the research, aligns with that of the context, in order to avoid ‘othering’ 
the research topic, since this is not intended as a comparative study of Māori-
medium science education with something else, but rather as an evaluation of 
Māori-medium science education on its own terms and against its own purposes.  
 
Kaupapa Māori research offers the further considerable advantage, in a topic as 
unavoidably interdisciplinary as this (May, 2001, p.xii), of providing a unifying 
viewpoint on the various debates, across a range of disciplines, which need to be 
considered. 
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Methods of Investigation: Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and 
Pūtaiao 
Having argued above that the adoption of Kaupapa Māori research methodology 
does not determine the research methods to be used, this remains a question to be 
addressed. By what means can inquiry into Pūtaiao curriculum proceed? As the 
educational context under examination, Māori-medium science education is 
presently in a small, nascent state of development, which renders many forms of 
empirical data collection (e.g. quantitative or classroom studies) extremely 
problematic.  
 
Concerning critical research methods, Young (1989) reminds English speakers 
that ‘the “theory” in critical theory is more like “method” – it is the method of 
critique’. Similarly, the Kaupapa Māori research literature does not clearly 
differentiate between theory and practice. Kaupapa Māori theory is described as 
‘praxis’ (Smith, 1997). ‘Kaupapa Māori research is both less than and more than a 
paradigm’ (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.190). 
 
This points to the possibility that critical analysis of discourses relating to past and 
current Pūtaiao policies and practices offers a significant strategy of inquiry, for 
research which seeks to inform the achievement of improved future outcomes in 
Pūtaiao education. In taking this aim, the thesis attempts to incorporate ‘concrete 
and responsible utopian thinking’ (Honderich, 1995, p.893), claiming allegiance 
to the wider ‘utopian project’ of Kaupapa Māori theory and praxis (Smith, 2002).  
 
Discourse analysis is an established social science approach to the study of spoken 
and written records of human experience, associated with the recent poststructural 
developments in interpretive theory (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.639). Norman 
Fairclough (1992) offers a model in which the ‘dimensions of discourse and 
discourse analysis’ are represented by three nested boxes, which correspond to the 
widening levels of analysis (analysis here being defined as description, 
interpretation, and/or explanation). The smallest, inside box represents Text, 
which is surrounded by Discourse Practice (where processes of production and 
interpretation occur), in turn surrounded by Sociocultural Practice (model cited in 
Titscher, Wodak et al., 2000, p.152). To relate this model to the thesis topic, 
documents such as Pūtaiao (M.O.E., 1996) could be located in the innermost box, 
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as central texts in Pūtaiao education. Texts relating to Pūtaiao classroom 
experiences, teacher education practices, and curriculum and assessment projects 
would then occupy the intermediate box or level, and more general texts on Māori 
education (or science education, from a different slant) would fill the outside box, 
representing the widest level of Pūtaiao discourse.  
 
Based on these thoughts, the term adopted for the primary research strategy in this 
thesis is Kaupapa Māori discourse analysis. In thus labelling the methodology, 
a question arises, analogous to that of the paradigmatic relationship of Kaupapa 
Māori theory to critical theory, discussed above: is Kaupapa Māori discourse 
analysis the same as critical discourse analysis? The answer is also similar: while 
Kaupapa Māori discourse analysis draws on the traditions of critical and 
postcolonial discourse analysis, it is concerned with specific relevance to Māori 
interests, rather than looking for universal laws, etc, with an aim to avoid the 
imposition of replacement ‘grand narratives’. Hence, it could be described as a 
‘located’ (McKinley, 2005) or ‘situated’ (Hermes, 1998) version of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA).  
 
CDA has developed since about 1990 from a ‘strand within linguistics (sometimes 
labeled ... critical linguistics)’ (Cameron, 1995, p.232) into a major education 
research methodology with a substantial scholarship in its own right. In a local 
introductory text on CDA, the comments of author Terry Locke echo the 
conclusions drawn above (p.15) for Kaupapa Māori research: 
CDA (critical discourse analysis) might be better described as a scholarly 
orientation with the potential to transform the modus operandi of a range of 
research methodologies. In respect of educational research, it has the 
potential to reveal the way power is diffused through the prevalence of 
various discourses throughout an education system, at both the micro-level 
of individual classrooms and the macro-level of large-scale reform. As in 
other settings, CDA has to be seen as a political intervention with its own 
socially transformative agenda. (Locke, 2004, p.2) 
 
The essentially language-oriented nature of CDA, as a derivation from linguistics, 
is also relevant to the other major distinguishing feature of ‘Kaupapa Māori 
discourse analysis’, which is the space opened for the inclusion and normalisation 
of te reo Māori text in the corpus, such that it is treated as equivalent - or, 
invoking the ‘contra preferendum’ principle of international relations, preferred - 
to text in English (see next sub-section, p.19). 
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The thesis perspective on ‘discourse’ shifts in and out: at times looking at wider 
considerations in science and mathematics education, language change processes 
in society, or Māori education and development in general; elsewhere focusing 
closely on the specific details of Pūtaiao, and my own experiences theoreof. 
Accordingly, an element of ‘personal narrative’ is threaded through, in the form of 
comments on developments in Māori-medium science education from my own 
perspective of observation and co-construction. A handbook chapter on 
‘autoethnography, personal narrative, reflexivity’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, 
pp.733-68) begins from the importance of making ‘the researcher’s own 
experience a topic of investigation in its own right’ (p.733). The additional details 
thus provided help to form a more complete picture of the ‘conditions [and] 
processes of production and interpretation of discourses’ of Pūtaiao (Locke, 2004, 
p.42). In this way, the inclusion of ‘personal narrative’ supplements the limited 
corpus of Pūtaiao discourse available for analysis. 
 
Adoption of Kaupapa Māori methodology in this study, which focuses on specific 
teaching and learning issues in Pūtaiao, is an attempt to contribute to the emerging 
pedagogical strand in Māori-medium education research (May, Hill et al., 2004; 
Rau, 2005). The emphasis in this strand moves beyond the sociopolitical and 
structural analyses in earlier published Kaupapa Māori studies (Nepe, 1991; 
Smith, 1990; Sharples, 1994).  
 
In conclusion, Kaupapa Māori as a research paradigm is conceptualised as 
tūrangawaewae or ‘home ground’ for this study, which highlights once again the 
issue of identity. Hence, my research methodology could also be described as 
‘CDA within a Kaupapa Māori habitus’.  
 
The following sub-sections deal with key methodological issues, and introduce 
policy discourse contexts relevant to Pūtaiao research. 
Te Reo Māori in the Thesis 
As foreshadowed above, te reo Māori text is treated as normal text in this thesis, 
since according to Kaupapa Māori principles, te reo ‘is’ normal, and the topic 
concerns Māori-medium education. From the perspective of a Kura Kaupapa 
Māori teacher, this practice seems entirely unremarkable, but as a general 
academic practice it has only recently, and not yet universally, become acceptable 
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to book publishers (May, 2001, p.xiii). In a document such as this, where Māori 
words form a significant proportion of the text, it is the most practical formatting 
decision. It is also in keeping with the status of te reo Māori as an official 
language of Aotearoa New Zealand, and the reflection of this status in the 
regulations for this degree, and the University of Waikato as a whole.  
 
One key textual practice is the rigorous use of ‘Aotearoa New Zealand’ to refer to 
the country of origin, highlighting the bicultural framework of the thesis, since a 
common disjunction is the inclusion by authors of ‘Aotearoa’ only in sections 
dealing with ‘Māori issues’ (this entire text, of course, is concerned with ‘Māori 
issues’). I also wish to avoid the sociolinguistic divide suggested by the either-or 
appearance of a ‘slash’ in our country’s name: ‘Aotearoa/New Zealand’. 
 
Māori words are translated (in brackets) or explained on first appearance in the 
text, where literal translations are indicated by ‘lit.’, and/or appear in the Rārangi 
Kupu (Glossary) on p.210. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted, with 
Wiremu (Williams, 1971) being treated as the definitive reference for traditional 
words, and Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (The Māori Language Commission) as 
the authority for neologisms. Macrons have been added in quotes, particularly to 
prominent words such as ‘Māori’, or substituted for double vowel orthography. 
 
Overall, the approach to te reo Māori in the thesis is in keeping with that taken 
towards Māori knowledge and Kaupapa Māori principles, and the notion of 
‘attempting to reverse the usual epistemological asymmetry’ by which 
science/English is taken as the ‘yardstick’ of knowledge/language (Roberts, 1998, 
p.69). It also follows the ‘central tenet’ adopted by May (2001), ‘that the 
normalisation of minority languages within the public domain is a legitimate and 
defensible sociological, political and linguistic activity’ (p.xiii, original emphasis). 
Feminism, ‘Race’ and Science 
There is a well-documented link between feminist and non-white research 
perspectives (Harding, 1998), with substantial shared interests, including 
perspectives on science, between feminism and multiculturalism/postcolonialism, 
to ensure ongoing relevance for each other (McKinley, 2003). Hence, a feminist 
commentary on multicultural science education (Gough, 1998) is included in the 
corpus discussed in Wāhanga Tuatoru (see p.72 below). These intersections in 
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perspective are not without problems, however. Government policies concerning 
ethnicity (for instance, affirmative action) tend to have divisive effects on 
feminists, such as when non-white feminists see their interests differently from 
Euro-American feminists (Murphy and Livingstone, 1993). Such ‘contradictions’ 
arise when gender is taken to be ‘the most fundamental oppression’ (p.180).  
It is only when the struggle against oppression and against the capitalist 
system is seen as a tri-partite struggle – against the oppression of blacks 
(whitearchy), the oppression of women (patriarchy), and the oppression of 
the working class – that the black struggle, feminism and socialism stand 
together, autonomous yet inseparable, equal against the common enemy. 
Racism and sexism would then become irreducible to the oppression of the 
working class, which depends on them as it depends on each other and on it. 
(Murphy and Livingstone, 1993, p.190, original emphasis) 
  
In focusing on the ‘limits’ of feminism, this analysis also points out corresponding 
limits of an analysis of ‘race’ as the fundamental category of oppression. In the 
contemporary theoretical concept, ‘race’  
operates neither as a signifier of comprehensive identity, nor of fundamental 
difference, both of which are patently absurd, but rather as a marker of the 
infinity of variations we humans hold as a common heritage and hope for the 
future. (Omi and Winant, 1993, p.9) 
 
These words echo the discussion of ethnicity above, and link to the examination 
of identity in Wāhanga 4.1 below (p.98). In terms of methodology, understanding 
the overlap between these discourses of oppression is necessary in developing a 
Kaupapa Māori research position from which to ‘read’ the texts and discourses of 
Pūtaiao.  
 
Consideration of the past development, current status, and future possibilities for 
Pūtaiao must be situated within the wider policy discourses of Māori education 
and science education, with both of these being influenced in turn by the 
prevailing overall discourse of education policy. Introductions to these three 
policy contexts follow. 
Māori Education Policy Discourse 
A generally accepted version of the history of Māori education policy as a series 
of phases from assimilation through integration, multiculturalism and taha Māori, 
to tino rangatiratanga, has been developed and rehearsed by many authors (Ewing 
and Shallcrass, 1970; Barrington and Beaglehole, 1974; Jenkins and Ka’ai, 1994; 
Walker, 1996; Bishop and Glynn, 1999). In such accounts, presented in terms of a 
series of phases, it is important to remember that history does not simply 
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disappear as the next phase is entered, and instructive to recognise the residual 
influences and ideologies from earlier phases that remain relevant. While policy 
phases have been described in such ‘acceptable’ terms, many writers have argued 
that the purposes and results of the education system on Māori have included the 
encouragement of the loss almost to extinction of the original language and 
knowledge systems (Williams, 2001).  
 
Contemporary Māori education policy, as reflected in the annual report on Māori 
education, ‘Ngā Haeata Mātauranga’ (M.O.E., 2005), attempts to balance the 
following policy considerations, all of which are important (if not always 
explicated) in the processes that contribute towards the development of Pūtaiao:  
• Indigenous legal rights: Te Tiriti o Waitangi as a foundation for the nation-
state of Aotearoa New Zealand; 
• Social equity: Māori under-achievement in the education system of Aotearoa 
New Zealand; 
• Epistemological and cultural diversity: the preservation of Māori language and 
knowledge.  
Science Education Policy Discourse 
A major tension in science curriculum policy is between ‘science for all’ versus 
‘science for future scientists’ (Haigh, 1995). This dialectic is related to a 
perception of the need for high science achievement to maintain international 
competitiveness, and also the importance of scientific literacy for the citizen of 
today’s world. These considerations lead to policies that increasingly place 
Science (along with Mathematics and Technology) at the core of the compulsory 
curriculum. Schools (and teachers) grapple with the resulting difficulties, caused 
in part by a traditional science curriculum based on positivist principles, and 
resistant to reform efforts, that is incompatible with the personal culture of all but 
a tiny minority of secondary students (Aikenhead, 2000). 
 
Over the last few decades, a substantial international research literature of 
multicultural science education has developed, in response to these issues. This 
literature is the focus of Wāhanga Tuatoru. Multicultural science education, in 
Aotearoa New Zealand as in most of the world, has nevertheless made little or no 
difference to the disparity of outcomes in science education experienced by Māori 
students (Smith, 1995). While a great deal of this literature comprises 
philosophical reflections on the nature of knowledge, little has changed in science 
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education classroom practices (McKinley, Stewart et al., 2004). Innovative 
approaches to school science teaching, including constructivism, narrative 
(Gilbert, 2001) and Science-Technology-Society, or STS approaches (Blades, 
1997), which aim to improve success for the majority of students, invariably meet 
with opposition in powerful academic, political and socio-economic contexts that 
are served by the gate-keeping role school science plays, both for the privileged 
classes and also for science’s monopoly on truth (Hodson, 1999). Promotion of 
Māori science education has met with opposition on similar grounds (Dickison, 
1994; Matthews, 1995). 
Education Policy Discourse 
The neo-liberal discourse of marketisation is possibly the most significant 
contemporary stream in global discourses of education policy. Marketisation is 
concerned with the construction of school education as a private good to be 
commodified, for distribution in society by the forces of the free market. This 
policy direction is informed by both neo-liberal and social conservative 
ideologies, and regarded by some commentators as an integral part of current 
developments in capitalism (Apple, 1997; Chubb and Moe, 1997). Market policies 
in general, and in education in particular, were implemented from 1984 onwards 
in Aotearoa New Zealand. Since ‘parental choice’ is part of the politics of 
introducing such policies, marketisation has been argued to work in favour of 
Māori-medium schooling. Analysis of the effect of more than 10 years of market 
policies in education in Aotearoa New Zealand, however, has shown that wealthy 
families are advantaged, while neither the national interests, in terms of the 
meritocratic principle - whereby educational success is determined by individual 
ability and motivation (Jesson, 1990, p.162) - nor the interests of relatively 
disadvantaged groups in society, such as Māori, are well served (Lauder and 
Hughes, 1999).   
 
Allied to marketisation is the growing use of ‘managerialism’ to attempt to 
improve quality in education, such as an emphasis on appraisal and quality 
management systems throughout the school sector. Curriculum content has been 
atomised into achievement objectives, and assessment for qualifications into 
stand-alone standards. These characteristics in both the administration and content 
of education have been identified as resulting from the domination of 
‘instrumental rationality’ as a way of thinking in state institutions (Coxon, Jenkins 
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et al., 1994), a way of thinking which can be viewed as a manifestation of the 
underlying economistic philosophy that defines both instrument and rationality 
(Fitzsimons, 2001).  
 
The final two sections of this chapter, below, contain two short analyses which are 
intended to demonstrate application of the ‘Kaupapa Māori discourse analysis’ 
research methodology, in two contrasting examples of discourse, both relevant to 
the topic of Pūtaiao. These sections also help to complete the introduction to the 
research situation, and its problematics, which this thesis investigates. 
1.4 NCEA Pūtaiao and Pāngarau 
This section looks at recent results for Māori-medium students sitting NCEA 
Science/Pūtaiao and Mathematics/Pāngarau examinations. This follows a well-
established view of secondary qualifications data as a measure of educational 
success (McKinley, Stewart et al., 2004; Baker, 1993; Jones and Martin-Jones, 
2004; Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999). Since improving Māori representation in the 
‘big world’ of science entails firstly increasing the number of Māori tertiary 
students of science, the secondary qualifications that lead into this pathway have 
obvious relevance. The primary role of the data in this section, however, is to add 
substance to my initial assertion regarding the extra difficulties for students and 
teachers in Pūtaiao, particularly at secondary curriculum levels.  
 
First, the current systems for senior secondary curriculum delivery, and 
assessment for qualifications, are reviewed. Then examination results are 
presented for the first 3 years of NCEA Level 1, in Pūtaiao and Pāngarau. Despite 
the compelling ‘text’ offered by the following data, a strong cautionary note must 
be taken, due to various factors, including the very small size of the Māori-
medium cohorts (ranging from 12-71 students sitting each examination paper, in 
any one year). Because of this, the data are suggestive only, with limited validity 
to represent the populations concerned, and any conclusions drawn necessarily 
speculative.  
 
Small cohorts in senior secondary levels remain extremely challenging for Māori-
medium curriculum delivery. To address this, in recent years the Ministry of 
Education (MOE) provided video conferencing (vidcon) equipment and support 
for distance teaching/learning in kura nationally, in an initiative called KAWM, 
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acronym for Kaupapa Ara Whakawhiti Mātauranga, which can be translated as 
‘Distance (lit. ‘path of transfer’) Education Project’. The name itself raises 
questions, in that it implies a ‘transmission of information’ concept of education. 
This is currently (in 2006) an important means by which Pūtaiao and Pāngarau are 
taught in Wharekura Year 11–13 nationally, with student numbers predominantly 
in Year 11 or NCEA Level 1 courses. The extra linguistic and cognitive demands 
on teachers and students in this attenuated pedagogical situation are considerable - 
as are the limitations. For example, in order for the vidcon gear to function (that 
is, not to drop the live link), KAWM lessons must be teacher-focused - 
whiteboard and/or text based, with a lecture, demonstration, or limited discussion 
style of interaction (J. Murray, personal communication, 2005). More active 
teaching strategies such as practical or group work are not encouraged by the 
technology. Nevertheless, the shortage of senior Pūtaiao/Pāngarau teachers, and 
the high importance placed on these subjects by kura whānau, together constitute 
a strong imperative for kura to participate in KAWM.  
 
Under the KAWM system, a teacher employed in one kura becomes the national 
teacher for a course, e.g. Level 1 NCEA Pūtaiao. The teacher’s home classroom 
lessons are also accessed, via vidcon, by students at up to 10 or more other kura 
around the country. One Level 1 NCEA Science textbook (by Newhouse 
Publishers) has been translated and web published, to support this Pūtaiao course. 
A further support initiative has been to hold wānanga (live-ins) for a few days 
each year, where teachers and students from around the country can meet and get 
to know each other, address concerns, etc.   
Māori-Medium Examinations 
Consultation with Māori during the NCEA development process led to the 
undertaking by MOE that the new qualification would be fully available to Māori-
medium learners. Prior to 2002, for several years, SC Mathematics and Science 
examinations had been translated into Māori each year, under limited 
arrangements made between NZQA and individual Wharekura. With the 
introduction of NCEA at Level 1 in 2002, examination translation was 
systematized, with schools able to request ‘Te Reo’ examinations during the 
candidate entry process, for any candidate entering externally assessed 
Achievement Standards.  
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Because of this system, the data for students sitting translated papers can be easily 
obtained from NZQA.7 These cohorts can be approximately equated with the 
student cohorts attending Wharekura or Rūmaki/Immersion schools and units. As 
requested, NCEA examinations are translated into te reo Māori by NZQA 
contractors.8 The translated papers are currently produced as bilingual 
examination booklets of twice as many pages as the standard papers, with the 
Māori and English versions of each page side by side. The translator attempts to 
include, in footnotes, all Māori terms in known use for the scientific vocabulary in 
the translated papers. Candidates may write answers in English or te reo (or both). 
One marker for each Achievement Standard marks translated booklets as part of 
their allocation, and unless that person is competent to mark in Māori, they are 
assisted by another person able to read Māori, who translates into English 
whatever the student has written in te reo, so the marker can mark it. 
 
Thus, this system makes allowance for Māori-medium students by translation of 
an ‘end-point’ – an already finalised examination paper. This is allowance ‘by 
language only’ (McKinley, 1995, p.44) - there is no opportunity for Māori input 
into what is examined.  Just as the Pūtaiao curriculum document ‘is not 
considered to be a Māori curriculum’ (p.55), neither can these translated 
examinations be considered distinctively Māori science assessments. The 
assumption is that the content knowledge to be assessed is exactly the same in 
Wharekura as in mainstream schools: indeed, it is reasonable to suggest this 
system constitutes added motivation to teach a mainstream science programme, 
since Wharekura wish to maximise student achievement. 
 
To date, while some senior Wharekura students have gone on beyond Level 1 
Science and Mathematics, the numbers entering Level 2 and 3 examinations are 
currently very small (typically less than 5 per cohort), and the papers are generally 
answered in English, so this area of Māori-medium science education can fairly 
be described as ‘embryonic’.  
                                                 
7 Acknowledgement and thanks to David Philips, Manager, Research, Monitoring and Analysis 
Division, NZQA, for prompt and efficient responses to data requests. 
8 Most substantive assessment work (including examination setting, script marking and 
moderating) in the NCEA system is carried out by educators (mostly full-time classroom teachers), 
working for NZQA on short-term individual contracts, so these are all included in the term 
‘contractors’, as well as those who complete other smaller roles, such as the translation functions 
being described in this section.  
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Examination Data 
The eleven Level 1 NCEA Science and Mathematics external achievement 
standards, included in this discussion,9 are listed by ID number, title and credit 
value in Whika 2 below (p.29). These data omit internally assessed achievement 
standards, and unit standards, because the Te Reo/Wharekura data for these are 
not available as separate cohorts from NZQA, since the entries do not involve 
translated papers. For each achievement standard, for each year (2002, 2003, 
2004), examination results were obtained for three cohorts: All candidates, Māori 
candidates, and Translated paper candidates. The Māori cohorts are approximately 
ten percent of the size of the All cohorts, and the Translated paper cohorts are of 
the order of one percent of the Māori cohorts. For each cohort, four raw numbers 
were obtained, i.e. the number of candidates awarded a grade of Not achieved (N), 
Achievement (A), Merit (M) and Excellence (E).10  
 
These numbers were manipulated to generate three non-overlapping student 
cohorts: Māori candidates were subtracted from All candidates to obtain figures 
for Non-Māori candidates; and Translated paper candidates were subtracted from 
Māori candidates to obtain figures for Māori Mainstream candidates. Translated 
paper candidates were identified as Te Reo candidates.  
 
Year-to-year variability has been a significant national issue raised about the new 
qualification, NCEA (National Certificate of Educational Achievement), and the 
data set used here relates to the first 3 years, where ‘teething problems’ were 
(arguably) able to be blamed for at least some of the variability. Since there seems 
to be no useful information to be gained by tracking over these 3 years, the figures 
for 2002, 2003, and 2004 have been aggregated (summed) by cohort, for each 
achievement standard. This has the advantage of increasing the size of the Te Reo 
samples, and at the same time simplifying the data for presentation, hopefully 
without significant distortion. Thus summed, the figures for each cohort were 
used to calculate the following two achievement measures, tabulated in Whika 2: 
 
 
                                                 
9 Acknowledgement and thanks to several staff members of NZCER, Wellington, who made very 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this section. 
10 The original data set obtained from NZQA is listed in the Āpitihanga (p.208). 
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• Achievement Rate (AR): Candidates achieving the standard as a 
percentage of all cohort candidates (A+M+E/N+A+M+E x100). 
• High Achievement (HA): Candidates gaining a Merit or Excellence 
grade as a percentage of all cohort candidates (M+E/N+A+M+E 
x100). 
 
The same data are presented in graph form in Whika 3, p.30, where the data for 




Whika 2: NCEA L1 Science and Mathematics Exam Results 
 






Non Māori 55.2 14.3 
Mainstream 
Māori 35.0 5.3 
90188 (5) 
Describe uses and effects of micro-
organisms and the transfer of genetic 
information  Te Reo 20.0 1.3 
Non Māori 63.8 26.1 
Mainstream 
Māori 42.1 10.0 
90189 (5) 
Describe properties and reactions of 
groups of related substances  
Te Reo 14.8 0.0 
Non Māori 58.3 18.3 
Mainstream 
Māori 37.2 4.3 
90190 (3) 
Describe rocks and minerals  
Te Reo 21.3 2.7 
Non Māori 66.9 17.1 
Mainstream 
Māori 48.2 6.3 
90191 (5) 
Demonstrate an understanding of physical 
systems  
Te Reo 33.3 0.0 
Non Māori 67.8 16.5 
Mainstream 
Māori 50.0 6.6 
90192 (5) 
Describe spatial relationships in 
astronomy and their effects on space 
exploration  Te Reo 24.6 0.0 
Non Māori 61.6 28.1 
Mainstream 
Māori 40.1 10.9 
90147 (3) 
Use straightforward algebraic methods 
and solve equations 
Te Reo 20.6 2.5 
Non Māori 56.2 15.9 
Mainstream 
Māori 34.3 5.2 
90148 (3) 
Sketch and interpret linear or quadratic 
graphs  
Te Reo 12.7 2.0 
Non Māori 76.2 37.3 
Mainstream 
Māori 58.2 18.7 
90151  (3) 
Solve straightforward number problems in 
context 
Te Reo 31.4 4.6 
Non Māori 67.7 29.3 
Mainstream 
Māori 47.2 13.6 
90152  (2) 
Solve right-angled triangle problems 
Te Reo 42.9 7.9 
Non Māori 75.4 29.0 
Mainstream 
Māori 58.4 14.2 
90153 (2) 
Use geometric reasoning to solve 
problems 
Te Reo 39.1 7.3 
Non Māori 58.3 24.8 
Mainstream 
Māori 37.6 9.5 
90194 (2) 
Calculate relative frequencies and 
theoretical probabilities 
Te Reo 13.3 0.6 
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As noted above, care must be taken not to read too much into these figures. As a 
population, Māori students clearly achieve in these standards at lower rates than 
non-Māori (McKinley, Stewart et al., 2004) - a result expected and predicted by 
all previous analyses of science and mathematics education outcomes (Smith, 
1995). However, these results also indicate that Māori-medium candidates 
generally achieve at lower rates than mainstream Māori candidates - the opposite 
result to that predicted, or at least hoped for - although, given such small numbers, 
attempts to quantify these disparities are futile. Indeed, the strongest point 
concerning the Māori-medium results may be made by looking at the aggregated 
data across all the standards, which show that for the 1317 Pūtaiao and Pāngarau 
examination papers completed in the first three years, nearly three-quarters 
resulted in Not achieved (Whika 4 below). This is a large negative result to ignore 
or explain as statistically invalid. It indicates little reason for optimism that Māori-
medium education has to date resulted in better academic achievement in science 
and mathematics, and that much work remains to be done, if greater achievement 
is the goal.  
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Whika 4: Aggregated Pūtaiao and Pāngarau NCEA Results 
 No. papers N (%) A (%) M (%) E (%) 
All Pūtaiao 376 291 (77.4) 82 (21.8) 3 (0.8) 0 (0) 
All Pāngarau 941 693 (73.5) 210 (22.3) 38 (4.0) 0 (0) 
Katoa (Total)  1317 984 (74.7) 292 (22.2) 41 (3.1) 0 (0) 
 
Another suggestion from these results is that NCEA Pāngarau currently enjoys 
better success than NCEA Pūtaiao, a conclusion supported by my personal 
observations teaching in kura. Curriculum developments in Pāngarau have tended 
to be somewhat ahead of Pūtaiao, more cohesive, and relatively better supported. 
Pāngarau has the advantage that its content is more unitary, and progression is 
more transparent. There is also a possible link to the lower level of vocabulary-
related issues in Pāngarau, since more conceptual content knowledge is carried in 
numerals, symbols, and diagrams. Better high achievement (i.e. Merit) results for 
Pāngarau, compared with Pūtaiao, is also suggestive of this difference.  
 
As I have argued, these translated examinations do not contribute to or promote 
retention of traditional pre-European mātauranga Māori - part of the ‘knowledge 
issue’ of Māori science education. Therefore, it has to be conceded that, as a 
group, these Māori students have further underachieved in mainstream science 
compared with their peers, while simultaneously being denied an alternative form 
of secondary science education, such as might be considered particularly relevant 
in Pūtaiao or Kura Kaupapa Māori education. 
 
Turning to ‘language issues’, it is important to ask if and how Pūtaiao contributes 
to the future vitality of te reo Māori. In the sense of supporting the kura policy of 
‘kōrero Māori anakē’ (speak Māori only), the current Pūtaiao system, including 
these results, contributes to status planning for te reo Māori (refer p.110), by 
extending the domain of use of te reo to include the discourse of the senior 
secondary science classroom. Also, the vocabulary lists compiled in the process of 
translating these examinations have provided the largest Māori science glossary 
(of approximately 4500 words) so far produced. (A MOE-funded Pūtaiao 
dictionary is currently under development in 2005-7). This is ironic, however, 
since lexicon development (corpus planning) is not the role of national 
examination systems (see p.109). Questions must still be asked about the type of 
language being promoted by current Pūtaiao teaching/learning discourse 
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(Halliday, 2004), particularly in view of the poor initial results. While a recent 
MOE report on Māori-medium student achievement in NCEA (Murray, 2005) 
noted that 51% of Year 11 immersion students who gained an NCEA qualification 
at any level achieved 0 credits in Science, the only partial explanation offered was 
a lack of Science teachers ‘able to teach in an immersion environment’ (p.6).  
 
Very few Excellence grades could be expected in these data, statistically 
speaking, since in cohorts below about 25 students in size (which applies to six of 
the 33 Māori-medium cohorts), not even one student would be expected to gain 
Excellence anyway. Examining the raw data (in the Āpitihanga, p.208) shows that 
the Excellence numbers vary widely anyway, even for the large ‘All’ and ‘Māori’ 
student cohorts. The total lack of Excellence grades, nonetheless, begs the 
question of whether it is actually possible for Māori-medium students to gain 
Excellence in these examinations. This is important in view of the hierarchical 
nature of the questions, and therefore of the language of the questions, in these 
science examination papers, reflecting the philosophy of NCEA, as they 
intentionally change in nature, and increase in difficulty, between Achievement, 
Merit and Excellence. How this operates in these Science/Pūtaiao standards can 
be simplistically expressed as switching emphasis from ‘recall/naming-’ to 
‘interpretation/evaluation-’ type questions. One possibility, therefore, is that the 
current system automatically excludes Te Reo candidates from such Excellence 
questions (perhaps also Merit), by virtue of their limited mastery of science 
discourse, in either English or te reo Māori. In my experience, when the specific 
characteristics of science language have been discussed at all in Pūtaiao 
development processes, it has been only in terms of the need to find/provide kupu 
hou (vocabulary) relating to science topics, particularly in the secondary 
curriculum.  
 
The increasingly specialised and technical discourse, which characterises senior 
secondary science text, results in a predominance of science neologisms in 
Pūtaiao text, within language structures that are rendered repetitive and inelegant 
by the nature of the domain, at risk of distortion or ambiguity of meaning. The 
resulting text is extremely difficult for anyone to understand. Part of this difficulty 
relates to the metaphorical aspects of the English language and of te reo, and how 
they differ (Heath, 1983). In my own experience, prior knowledge of the science 
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content is often essential in order to fully comprehend unfamiliar extended 
Pūtaiao text at senior curriculum levels, particularly if visual aids are lacking. One 
response is for the kaiako to switch to English in order to make a science teaching 
point, which bilingual Wharekura students are then able to ‘back-translate’ into te 
reo. A great deal of emotional investment is apparent in the positions taken in this 
debate, and strong orthodoxy denies the use of English in kura classrooms, with 
the result that such practices verge on being ‘undiscussable’ (Young, 1989, p.163) 
in the current Māori-medium education debates. Clearly, this situation is 
unhelpful for the interests of Pūtaiao learners and teachers. The characteristics of 
the language of science, and the implications for the language of Pūtaiao, are 
investigated further in Wāhanga 4.2 (p.109). 
Conclusion 
There are various problems associated with neologism, and not using international 
science terms (Spolsky and Shohamy, 2001): a permanent position of lexicon 
catch-up; teacher lack of familiarity; and creating a barrier to the wider world of 
science discourse (Grabe and Kaplan, 1986). There is also the possibility that 
coining new words exhausts the (admittedly sparse) resources, human and 
monetary, available for consideration of language issues in Pūtaiao, resources 
which could be made available for more productive activities (in terms of better 
teaching and learning of science), if a widespread policy of borrowing, or 
transliterating, international science terminology were adopted. 
 
The Māori-medium examination data presented above indicate a paradox in 
Pūtaiao, in that the effect being produced is the opposite of the desired outcome 
for Māori-medium science education. Policies and practices in support of 
language status planning goals have, in this case, had the unintended effect of 
exacerbating underachievement in science education, while simultaneously 
disallowing reform of the science curriculum according to the underlying 
principles of Kura Kaupapa Māori, and also failing to support the goal of retaining 
traditional Māori knowledge.  
 
This situation may be compared with a set of attitudes towards te reo that Ray 
Harlow describes as ‘covert’, since they contradict overtly-held positive attitudes 
towards the maintenance of te reo Māori (Harlow, 2005). Harlow gives several 
examples - the one-name fallacy (‘that there is only one real name for a place, [the 
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name it] is called when one is speaking English’, p.140), an insistence on correct 
Māori pronunciation when speaking English, tokenism in bilingual publications, 
and Māori names as logos – all of which he argues indicate an underlying view of 
the position of Māori ‘as a dependent “add-on” to English within New Zealand’ 
(ibid). This is significant, since in Harlow’s opinion these attitudes ‘tend to 
militate against the goals ... for the status of Māori’ (p.135) and send te reo down 
a similar path to extinction as Irish – a badge of identity, but not a language of 
‘normal discourse’ (p.144).  
 
Similarly, the overt attitude towards Māori-medium science education is an aim to 
ensure better academic achievement, while also protecting the future of Māori 
language and knowledge. The unacknowledged i.e. ‘covert’ effects of Pūtaiao to 
the contrary are indicated above. By virtue of the system and policy environment 
in which it has emerged, Pūtaiao in effect operates as a ‘dependent add-on’ to 
Science. Moreover, Harlow’s phrase ‘opaque and metaphorical’  is apt for some 
of the te reo science vocabulary which has been developed, and the resulting 
Pūtaiao texts. Such vocabulary and texts perhaps form part of the ‘badge of 
identity’ of kura, rather than elements of authentic Māori discourse (Crombie and 
Houia-Roberts, 2001). This lends weight to a ‘suspicion’ (following Harlow, 
2005) that identity politics and educational imperatives tend to counteract each 
other, in the language and curriculum debates within current discourses of 
Pūtaiao. Wāhanga 4.2 returns to focus specifically on language issues in Pūtaiao. 
 
1.5 He Kōrero  
This section continues the personal narrative thread, weaving in personal 
experience to connect the larger story, of the national development of Pūtaiao, 
with the epistemological journey, inside my own head so to speak, represented by 
the understandings demonstrated in this thesis. It contains a short discourse 
analysis which experimentally explores the research methodology developed 
above, in a context involving ‘authentic’ Māori language and knowledge. 
 
I learned about some traditional kupu kōrero (sayings) used by Taitokerau 
speakers at hui mate (tangihanga, funeral) in their whaikōrero (oratories) from my 
friend Mangu, who in the 1980s accompanied Ngāi Takoto and Te Aupouri 
kaumātua (male elders/speakers) for several years’ ‘apprenticeship’ on marae 
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taumata (speaking positions). Addressing the tūpāpaku (deceased), farewelling 
their departure from the mortal coil and heralding their entry to other realms of 
existence, was a large part of the content of these oratories. One term of address 
for the hunga mate (dead people) was ‘koutou kua whetūrangitia’ which Mangu 
translated as ‘you (plural) who have become stars’. He considered this closely 
connected to another kōrero describing the process: ‘puta ki te whei ao, ā, puta atu 
ki te ao mārama’ which they told him means, ‘you’re born in the whei ao, and 
when you die you go to be born in the ao mārama’. This makes sense as the word 
‘puta’ (often with ‘mai’ or ‘atu’) means ‘be born’ when recounting a heke (family 
tree) – ‘ka moe a mea i a mea, ka puta ko mea’ (X sleeps with Y and produces Z). 
Mangu told me that ‘whei’ in this phrase means ‘bones’, so his understanding of 
the full meaning of this kupu kōrero was ‘you’re born in this world made of (flesh 
and) bones, and when you die, you’re born into another world in which you are 
made of light – i.e. a star’. This knowledge and understanding of some ancient 
Taitokerau sayings is very precious to me because it came directly by word of 
mouth, from the ancestors, to Mangu, to me. It is ‘pure’ Māori knowledge in the 
sense that, though mediated by English, no non-Māori institutions such as school 
or book were involved in my learning - and furthermore, these kupu kōrero and 
their explanations invoke profound ideas. 
 
Though I asked Mangu, he could not tell me why the sequential world names had 
reversed word order - ‘whei ao’ but ‘ao mārama’ - if these equated with ‘made of 
bones’ and ‘made of light’ and were thus semantically equivalent. A Māori 
explanation might be euphony – ‘reka ki te taringa’ (sweet to the ear). Also, the 
word ‘whei’ is somewhat mysterious, as it is not used in standard modern Māori, 
for example it does not appear in Ryan (1995), except combined with ‘ao’ as 
‘wheiao/whaiao = world of light’(!). The northern word for bones is ‘whēua’, so I 
assumed it could have been an archaic or arcane variant, or possibly a corruption, 
though this seemed highly unlikely in such a phrase.  
 
Subsequently I came to see this phrase as widely known in the Māori academy – 
probably better in the alternate form ‘ki te whai ao, ki te ao mārama’11. The sense 
                                                 
11 One published exception is the book by Ngāpuhi author and activist Dun Mihaka (1989) titled 
‘Ki te Whei-Ao... Ki te Ao Marama...’ (translated in Webster, 1996, p.47, as ‘into struggle... into 
enlightenment’). 
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of progression implied in the reference to two sequential ‘worlds’ is possibly still 
there, although ‘whai ao’ is often written as ‘whaiao’, and variously interpreted. 
 
Anne Salmond included this latter form as part of a sample of karakia involving 
‘the conjuring of orientational opposites and markers’ (Salmond, 1978, p.26) in 
traditional kōrero, in her research on worldviews according to traditional Māori 
thought. Her paper is discussed more thoroughly in Wāhanga Tuarima. Salmond, 
however, translated ‘whai ao’ as ‘daylight’ and ‘ao mārama’ as ‘world of life’, 
thus treating the two phrases as synonymous, rather than a powerful contrastive 
reference, as the Taitokerau interpretation would provide.  
 
According to Wiremu (Williams, 1971), the primary meaning of ‘whei’, 
significantly with ‘whai’ given as an equivalent, is an intransitive verb12 meaning 
‘quarrel’. (The standard modern Māori word for ‘fight’ is ‘whawhai’, which Ryan, 
1995, also lists as the Māori word for ‘quarrel’. ‘Tohe’ is the word mainly used to 
translate ‘argue’ today. ‘Whai’ in Ryan means ‘follow, chase, possess’ – the 
meaning of ‘quarrel’ has been obscured in wider modern usage13). The existence 
of both iwi forms of the kōrero indicates that ‘quarrel’ may be the original usage 
and meaning of the word whei/whai in this kupu kōrero. The reversal of word 
order – ‘whei ao’, but ‘ao mārama’ - makes more sense if ‘whei’ refers to an 
action (‘quarrel’ rather than ‘bones’), while ‘mārama’ (‘light’) describes a 
condition, so goes in the conventional adjectival position following the noun ‘ao’. 
As a whole the kōrero can then be understood to refer to leaving behind the trials 
and tribulations of this world for the enlightenment of the next. 
 
While this analysis calls into question the ‘made of bones, made of light’ 
explanation, it still supports the larger sense in which the Taitokerau interpretation 
differs from that of Salmond: the reference of ‘whei/whai ao’ to this life on earth, 
and ‘ao mārama’ to a subsequent world or state of existence. In Salmond’s 
analysis the rhetorical force is weakened to mere repetition, with the two ‘ao’ 
regarded as one and the same. In standard modern Māori ‘whai ao’ is translatable 
as ‘sunlit’ (Salmond, 1978) in the sense of ‘whai’ as ‘possessing’ and ‘ao’ as 
‘light’, but this does not apply so well to ‘whei ao’. Thus, the dominant 
                                                 
12 English grammatical terms are interpreted loosely when used for kupu Māori. 
13 This does not preclude the possibility that it is still used in this way by some speakers. 
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interpretation has lost the reference to birth, death and re-birth in a number of 
different states of reality (ao), and with it much of the richness of the Taitokerau 
explanation. Along with the loss of understanding of its literal application to the 
addressee, there has developed a tendency for this phrase to be abstracted to fit 
modern situations as a sort of motto or slogan. Christianity is a major distorting 
influence on discourse to consider in exploring Māori texts such as these, and in 
the case of the kupu kōrero discussed above, the Church’s interest in stamping out 
traditional beliefs related to ‘reincarnation’ amongst colonised populations may 
have come into play.  
 
The analysis also highlights the usefulness of iwi variations in supporting 
understanding of traditional texts. The notion of ‘authentic Māori thought’ is an 
important issue in this thesis. This kōrero rangahau (analytical narrative) is an 
attempt to use semantics in a way sympathetic to ‘configurative linguistics’ 
(Whorf, 1956), and cognisant of discourse analysis processes of archaeology and 
genealogy, including traditional te reo Māori text, in order to explore ‘authentic’ 
Māori philosophy of science, and the possibilities of ‘kaupapa Māori discourse 
analysis’. While my analysis of this kupu kōrero differs from that of Salmond, this 
in no way lessens the value of her work in my learning journey. Along with my 
pleasure in the kupu kōrero and its explanation, the disjunctions also remained 
clear in my mind over the years. I have demonstrated the power of this analytical 
method to myself, by the resolution and fuller understanding of the kupu kōrero, 
gained through writing the story. Overall, this thesis results from my attempt to 
write the story of Pūtaiao. 
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WĀHANGA TUARUA 
He Aha te Pūtaiao? 
 
The question asked by this chapter title can be translated either as ‘What is 
Science?’ or ‘What is Pūtaiao?’ The first of these questions is investigated in 
Wāhanga 2.1, where the approach is to examine the boundaries between science 
and a range of other types of knowledge including philosophy, technology, social 
science and scientism, as well as indigenous knowledge. Part of this examination 
is recognition of the need to clarify the nature of the central canons of science, by 
definition those parts furthest from the boundaries. Such epistemological 
boundaries have been widely critiqued in postcolonial scholarship for their role in 
exclusionary thinking and practice (Carter, 2006). Nevertheless, I will argue for 
the benefits (from a Kaupapa Māori perspective) of clarifying science’s 
boundaries, in order to keep science ‘in its place’. Some of the many qualifiers 
used with ‘science’ produce qualified notions of science, notions which can be 
understood to refer to those parts of science lying between its central canons and 
its boundaries. These discussions are important in building up and clarifying 
notions of Pūtaiao. 
 
The alternate question of the chapter title is addressed in Wāhanga 2.2, which 
provides an account of the development of notions of Pūtaiao, as reflected in the 
discourses of Māori science curriculum policy during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
final section, Wāhanga 2.3, draws together the discussion of current discourses of 
Pūtaiao presented in these first two chapters, with some preliminary conclusions, 
in order to chart the next stage of the project. 
 
 A process of critique and deconstruction of the Enlightenment conception of 
science as ‘pure’ knowledge has developed during the last 40-50 years (Hanson, 
1958). This general process of critique of science has been contemporaneous with 
new developments in philosophy, namely postmodernism and poststructuralism. 
The two discourses (in science and philosophy) are closely linked but non-
identical, treating two somewhat separable objects of analysis, i.e. ‘science 
knowledge’ and ‘philosophy of science’, respectively. This view is reflected in 
Richard Duschl’s (1985) phrase ‘mutually exclusive development’ to describe the 
previous 25 years in science education and philosophy of science. Relatedly, 
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Reuben Hersh (1994) notes that ‘philosophers of mathematics ignore mathematics 
and mathematicians’.  
 
Two important lines of critique in these debates (in science and philosophy) have 
come from feminism and anti-racism (e.g. Wertheim, 1997; Harding, 1993; 
Haraway, 2004), which can both be described as claims by subaltern groups in 
society (Gramsci, 1992). Subaltern groups in society may hold different 
viewpoints and knowledges from those that are sanctioned or considered 
mainstream (e.g. ‘old wives’ tales’ in relation to medicine). One important type of 
different or ‘subjugated’ knowledge (Foucault, cited in Webster, 1996), which has 
been prominent in these science and philosophy debates, is indigenous knowledge 
(IK), of which mātauranga Māori is considered a specific example. Partly due to 
its role in the philosophical debates (Loving, 1997), there has been contested 
recognition of the claim of IK to be considered as a valid alternative form of 
science (Peters, 1993) - an argument, in other words, for a culturally pluralist view 
of science (Hodson, 1999). A pluralist conception of ‘sciences’ as ‘systems of 
knowledge’ (Roberts, 1998) makes space for consideration of the claims of IK 
(Youngblood Henderson, 2000; Battiste, 2000) and other contenders for science 
status, but does not necessarily imply that all sciences are similar or equivalent – 
this remains a question to be addressed (Irzik, 2001).   
 
Although the word ‘science’ can simply mean ‘systematic knowledge,’ it usually 
refers to what is more precisely termed ‘natural science’: i.e. physics, chemistry, 
biology, and their sub-disciplines. Mathematics, also considered a natural science, 
is usually delineated separately in the school curriculum due to its perceived 
importance (Tymoczko, 1994; Hersh, 1994). This, then, is the assumed meaning 
of the word ‘science’, which is important in considering its leading position in 
hierarchies of knowledge. In literature concerned specifically with its relationship 
to other cultural forms of knowledge such as mātauranga Māori (MoRST, 1995; 
Williams, 2001; Simon, 2003), this meaning of ‘science’ is often explicated by 
such usages as WMS (Western modern science) (McKinley, 2005) WS (Roberts, 
1998) or W-science (Kawasaki, 2002). I use the term W-science when necessary 
below to avoid ambiguity. The appearance of many meanings, and many 
qualifiers for ‘science’ (Aikenhead, 2000) indicates its contested nature, i.e. the 
debate over ‘what counts as science’ (Stanley and Brickhouse, 1994). ‘School 
 40
science’, for example, refers to the simple/simplistic version of science as 
presented in the traditional school curriculum, which most likely plays a part in 
establishing and maintaining the ‘unmarked’ meaning, and its distinction from 
mathematics. ‘School science’ is also a useful approximation of what is meant by 
the term ‘W-science’ (and equivalent terms, see above) in the multicultural 
science literature.   
 
A pluralist view of science, which reverts to the wide definition of ‘systematic 
knowledge’, opens the floodgates to the inclusion of an increasing range of 
knowledge bases, as human culture becomes increasingly sophisticated and 
systematized (with the help of W-science and W-technology). It becomes more 
difficult to identify areas of knowledge that remain firmly outside the gates of 
pluralist science (Irzik, 2001). One result of the pluralist view of science, 
therefore, is to necessitate the use of a qualified term such as W-science or natural 
science, when one wishes to use the more limited meaning of ‘science’, although, 
as noted above, outside critical scholarship, ‘physics, chemistry and biology’ 
remains its generally assumed meaning (Gregory, 2001). 
2.1 The Nature of Science 
In one of the most famous studies of the nature of science, Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
discussed his usage of the word ‘paradigm’ to mean the ‘disciplinary matrix’ of 
symbolic generalisations, beliefs and values, as well as that set of exemplars, or 
applications of the disciplinary matrix knowledge, which all members of a 
particular scientific community subscribe to, learn, teach and use in the practice of 
their discipline. Kuhn used his concept of paradigm in examining how progress in 
science is achieved. He suggested that ‘normal science’ is the steady accumulation 
of knowledge in a specialised discipline, until new information, or an advance in 
technology, catalyses a change in some aspect of the ‘disciplinary matrix’, or 
paradigm, of that discipline (and its community of scientists, students etc), which 
is what he termed a ‘scientific revolution’. This was the original formulation of 
what is now commonly referred to as a ‘paradigm shift’. Kuhn was interested in 
understanding the features of a scientific community and its practices, which 
allow science to steadily accumulate knowledge. This was also an early critique of 
the accepted dogma of the impartial, objective nature of the scientists’ work, and 
of the unquestioned importance placed on methodology (as in the scientific 
method) to account for scientific progress.  
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Kuhn clarified (in the postscript to the second edition of his study, published in 
1970, seven years after its first appearance) that ‘theory, or set of theories’ was the 
more correct term for most of what he had coined ‘paradigm’ in the original text. 
Kuhn also recognised the importance of ‘exemplars’ in localizing and concretising 
the cognitive content of science: ‘In the absence of such exemplars, the laws and 
theories [s]he has previously learned would have little empirical content’ (p.188). 
Having gained facility in the exemplars of a particular scientific discipline, Kuhn 
argued that scientists work and communicate (with other scientists in the same 
discipline) with a great deal of ‘tacit knowledge’, which together with the ‘learned 
knowledge’ comprise the scientists’ paradigm. These are very similar to Michael 
Polanyi’s description of a scientist’s ‘subsidiary’ and ‘focal’ awareness (Kim, 
2005), as Kuhn acknowledges in the postscript (Kuhn, 1970, p.191).  
 
Kuhn’s work is widely considered to be a watershed in the development of the 
notion of the research paradigm in the social sciences. Indeed his work, and the 
debate over the nature of science in general, appears to be more important to 
social scientists (Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey, 2001) than to scientists trained in 
physics, chemistry or biology, from the ranks of which almost all science teachers 
are recruited. This is because these latter domains of W-science are still based 
largely on empiricist models of the discipline, of scientific method, and, 
ultimately, of the universe, which means scientists in these fields seldom examine 
the nature of reality or knowledge, i.e. issues of ontology and epistemology. 
Clearly, there is a need for science teacher training to address this philosophical 
neglect. 
 
Yet Kuhn does not include the social sciences in his discussion of paradigms - ‘it 
remains an open question what parts of social science have yet acquired such 
paradigms at all’ (Kuhn, 1970, p.15). In the 1970 postscript, reflecting on the 
reception of his work on the notion of ‘paradigm shift’ as scientific revolution, he 
muses:  
Historians of literature, of music, of the arts, of political development, and of 
many other human activities have long described their subjects in the same 
way [as a succession of tradition-bound periods punctuated by non-
cumulative breaks]. If I have been original with respect to concepts like 
these, it has mainly been by applying them to the sciences, fields which had 
been widely thought to develop in a different way (p.208). 
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Kuhn indicates here that he uses the word ‘science’ in its unmarked sense (i.e. W-
science or school science – see discussion above). Thus, in the sense in which 
Kuhn used the terms ‘paradigm’ and ‘science’, his work does not directly apply to 
social science disciplines such as education. Cathleen Loving (1997) discussed 
such uses of Kuhn’s study under the heading ‘dubious extrapolations’. New and 
expanded meanings of these terms have since evolved, however, as seen by their 
use in contemporary social science discourses.  
 
Most of what Kuhn included in a science discipline’s ‘paradigm’ is referred to as 
‘methodology’ in contemporary social science, with considerable overlap between 
the two. Kuhn was not talking about paradigm as the scientist’s underlying 
concept of reality, although, of course, that concept inheres in everything of which 
we are conscious (Middleton, 1996). In current social science, however, the 
paradigm is defined as the ‘net of epistemological and ontological premises’, or 
‘set of basic beliefs that guide action’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p.19). This 
change in perspective on the paradigm notion is a key point, since it has allowed 
(or at least accompanied) the expansion of the notion of ‘what science is’ to bring 
about the pluralist view on science.  
 
So questions of ontology and epistemology are less important in some areas of 
science, including school science and W-science, and more important in others 
such as social science. These philosophical aspects become paramount in 
discussing the claim of IK to science status. According to Elizabeth McKinley 
(1995, p.69), ‘it is at the philosophical level that the greatest discrepancies 
between positivist science (as well as some other views of science) and 
indigenous knowledge are to be found’.  
 
In science, ethical considerations are treated independently of other aspects of 
knowing such as logic and rationality. Furthermore, science makes no distinctions 
based on the origins or history of knowledge. Regardless of whence it comes, any 
information considered valid according to scientific criteria is absorbed into, and 
becomes part of science. This is one aspect of what is described above by Kuhn as 
the ‘steady accumulation of knowledge’ that characterises ‘normal science’. In 
encounters with other forms of knowledge, ‘any such specifiable content would be 
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incorporated in the hegemony’ (Webster, 1996, p.234) of W-science. Before 
exploring issues of ethics and local knowledge (below), first the philosophical 
thread is followed from science towards technology.  
 
A conventional view is that ‘science is a step beyond technology, requiring at 
least the attempt to explain and understand’. (Gregory, 2001, p.7, original 
emphasis). Since technology, according to this account, is a form of knowledge 
developed in all cultures (unlike science), it is useful to consider the philosophy of 
W-technology, and how this differs from that of IK.  
Philosophy of W-Science and W-Technology 
Martin Heidegger (1977) traces the thinking behind W-technology to an essence 
he calls ‘the rule of Enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as 
standing-reserve’ (p.23). This analysis describes the thinking now commonly 
termed ‘commodification’, for example in critiques of market policies in 
education  (Chubb and Moe, 1997; Lauder and Hughes, 1999; Lauder, Hughes et 
al., 1999). Heidegger makes it clear that this philosophy of commodification 
carries through into W-science, commenting on the diachronic relationship 
between the development of both:  
Chronologically speaking, modern physical science begins in the 
seventeenth century. In contrast, machine-power technology develops only 
in the second half of the eighteenth century. But modern technology, which 
for chronological reckoning is the later, is, from the point of view of the 
essence holding sway within it, the historically earlier. (Heidegger, 1977 
p.22) 
 
Heidegger is saying that the ‘essence’ of modern technology pre-dated, and 
helped to give rise to, W-science, which then catalysed the rise of ‘machine-
power’. To describe the ‘ambiguous essence of technology’ (p.33) as containing 
both ‘the extreme danger’ (p.31) and ‘the saving power’ (p.34) seems applicable 
to modern science and technology. Heidegger’s discussion (or its English 
translation, to be exact) is conducted in abstract philosophical terms, but even 
where it is not, is sometimes obscure. For example, it is necessary to clarify what 
is meant by the word ‘essence’ in this passage. Synonyms could be ‘philosophy’, 
‘underlying attitude’ or ‘central value’, an interpretation supported by Hugh 
Lacey (1999, Ch.6), in arguing that ‘control of nature’ has been granted ‘virtually 
unsubordinated value’ in modern value complexes (which ultimately direct 
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science and technology). Such an ‘essence’ could even be equated with that which 
Young (1989) termed the ‘meta-decision’ (p.9 above). 
The Key Differend: Whakapapa Versus Standing-Reserve 
This description of the essence of W-science and W-technology stands in stark 
contrast with the general understanding of IK, including mātauranga Māori (see 
Wāhanga Tuarima, p.176), with its emphasis on human kinship with the natural 
world, or whakapapa, rather than ‘commodification’ of the natural world through 
the process of enframing it as standing-reserve (Patterson, 1994). These ‘two 
approaches representing fundamentally different and mutually irreducible ways of 
looking at the world’ (Beattie, 1970, p.264) constitute the central ‘differend’ 
(Lyotard, 1988) of Pūtaiao, and the key theme of this thesis.  
 
That this contrast between ‘whakapapa’ and ‘standing-reserve’ is a fundamental 
philosophical difference between the two systems of knowledge, i.e. W-science 
and IK/mātauranga, finds support in the following statement by Georges 
Canguilhem14, in a discussion of ‘the moral underpinnings of [Descartes’] theory 
of the animal-machine’ (Delaporte, 1994, p.227):  
The theoretical mechanization of life is inseparable from the technological 
utilization of the animal. Man can claim possession of and mastery over 
nature only by denying that nature has any purpose in itself, and then only 
by regarding all of nature other than himself - even that which appears to be 
animate - as a means to an end. (ibid, my emphasis) 
 
W-science and IK are thus shown to have profoundly different philosophical 
bases. At the same time, compatible aspects or items of IK will always be 
‘colonised’ (Ninnes and Burnett, 2001, p.29), i.e. taken out of context and 
subsumed into W-science. These considerations lead toward the conclusion that 
IK is different from, and therefore not W-science, and raise the key question of 
whether or not W-science changes in the process of assimilating knowledge from 
other cultures - or is this a means by which W-science evolves, becomes more and 
more W-science-like? 
Economics as Science 
Economics is another form of knowledge which is often claimed to be a science. 
The above discussion on pluralist science (or plural sciences) invites us to ask if 
the claim that ‘economics is science’ is a pluralist claim, or does economics claim 
                                                 
14 The French philosopher of science Georges Canguilhem (1904-1995) worked and wrote in a 
tradition leading from Gaston Bachelard (1984) to himself, to Michel Foucault (1998). 
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to be part of W-science (or school science)? The obvious answers are yes (based 
on the above discussion) and no (based on the school curriculum), respectively. 
Economics is a social science, and cannot be subsumed under biology, chemistry, 
physics, and/or mathematics. The development of the discipline of economics has 
had an entirely different and separate trajectory from that of W-science (Amin, 
2005, p.19). For economics, the conflation that leads to the fallacy that economics 
is W-science is in a sense the inverse of that which is the case for IK, since 
economics is based on the same underlying philosophy of commodification as 
Heidegger claims for W-science and W-technology (Devine, 2004). Therefore 
economics cannot be considered an alternative form of natural science based on a 
different philosophy, as can IK.  
 
While many areas in both IK and economics overlap with W-science, there are 
also central areas in economics (as in IK) that are incompatible with the science 
status claim. The point is shown by the contrast between the following two 
quotations, the first on an aspect of mātauranga, the second on economic theory: 
On the east coast the old Māori year began with the appearance of the first 
new moon after the heliacal rising of Matariki (the Pleiades). (Best, 1986, 
p.11) 
 
The psychological element [within economic theory] suggests that given a 
certain circumstance or change or whatever, it is unsurprising that people 
should generally – or at least in significant numbers – come to behave in a 
certain way. The institutional element then goes on to show that given this 
shift in overall behaviour, there are bound to be certain consequences – in all 
likelihood, unintended consequences – that make for an aggregate change. If 
the consequences are thought of as beneficial, then the pattern identified in 
the explanation is traditionally described, in a phrase of Adam Smith’s as an 
invisible hand; if they are thought of as harmful, it is sometimes described as 
an invisible backhand or an invisible foot. Invisible hand and invisible 
backhand are the very stuff of economic theorizing in the received, 
neoclassical mould. (Honderich, 1995, p.211, my emphases) 
 
The emphasised phrases in the second quote pinpoint where politics undoes the 
claim to scientific status of economics. Unasked questions include ‘thought of by 
whom?’ and ‘beneficial/harmful to whom?’ Therefore economics is neither W-
science, nor an alternative form of natural science. It is a social science, but 
‘contrasting it with other social disciplines of thought’ (ibid) does not make it into 
W-science.15 Perhaps economics is the most W-social science, most bound by 
                                                 
15 ‘Complexity theory’ (Kauffman, 1993) investigates order and pattern in the natural world, as a 
complement to the random effects in evolution. To find the ‘invisible hand’ to be a case of 
complexity theory (Kauffman, 1995) would possibly supply a rational explanation (and a route to 
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Heidegger’s ‘rule of Enframing’, as suggested in the following sub-section. ‘An 
economic transaction is a solved political problem. Economics has gained the title 
of queen of the social sciences by choosing solved political problems as its 
domain’ (Bowles and Gintis, 1993, cited in Harris, 1996, p.201, original 
emphasis). 
Science and Colonisation of Māori 
Imperialism, economics and science (and technology, and the entire academy) 
have been closely, synergistically interrelated in worldwide developments during 
the last few centuries. At a fundamental level, imperialism can be thought of as 
the operation of the philosophy of commodification discussed above with respect 
to less powerful societies and cultures, which is one way of expressing its 
connection to both economics and science. Key literature themes exemplifying 
this connection include: voyages of discovery (Harding, 1998; Salmond, 1991), 
naming (worlding) the world (Spivak, 2003); and colonial trade in the 
development of global capitalism (Stewart-Harawira, 2005). While traditional 
structures of imperialism have been dismantled (some would say disguised e.g. 
(Ladson-Billings, 1998, p.8), this historical nexus has ongoing impact and 
influence today.  
 
Three major roles of science in the colonisation and marginalisation of Māori can 
be delineated as follows: firstly, making it possible, by providing British colonists 
with a technological power advantage; secondly, the (ab)use of science to justify 
both the end and the means of colonisation; thirdly, by objectifying Māori for 
study by science.  
  
Each story of imperialism is unique, according to the specific context, but there is 
also enough general similarity to support recent development of an international 
scholarship of postcolonialism (Said, 1978) in which the issues of identity, 
positioning and subjectivity are central. These issues link closely to the 
epistemology debates in science over objectivity and universalism versus 
relativism, and both are relevant to the debates in multicultural science education 
and Pūtaiao. For example, McKinley (2003) studied how these conflict-ridden 
issues in the work and lives of Māori female scientists affected their self-identities 
                                                                                                                                     
demystify) the foundations of economic theory, but would not transform economics into either 
mathematics or biology.  
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in terms of ‘fractured subjectivities’. Backgrounding this study, McKinley 
reviewed the role of science in the case of imperialism of the British colonisation 
of Aotearoa New Zealand. Possibly the most pertinent factor was timing: this 
colonisation process coincided with the heights of faddish Victorian Darwinism, 
which provided a new vocabulary for a potent form of scientific racism (Gould, 
1997), in which such notions as the ‘family tree of man’ (McKinley, 2003, p.54) 
gave scientific validity to the belief in the superiority of all things European over 
all things Māori, as inherent justification, both for the entire imperialist project, 
and for specific anti-Māori acts that it entailed (Moorehead, 1968; Numbers and 
Stenhouse, 1999).  
The concept of the ‘survival of the fittest’, used to explain the evolution of 
species in the natural world, was applied enthusiastically to the human 
world. It became a very powerful belief that indigenous peoples were 
inherently weak and therefore, at some point, would die out.16 (Tuhiwai 
Smith, 1999, p.62) 
 
John Stenhouse (1999) attributes Darwinism’s ready acceptance in Aotearoa New 
Zealand and Australia, by comparison with Europe and North America, to 
religious tolerance and the lack of a pre-Darwinian scientific establishment, as 
well as ‘racist purposes’ (p.81). Stenhouse cautions against exaggerating the 
political significance of evolutionary racism or social Darwinism, however, noting 
‘some [Māori] leaders, like Pākehā humanitarians before them, argued that 
Pākehā sinfulness, not science, lay behind the [dying Māori] theory’ (p.85-6). 
 
Supporting the overall colonial enterprise, but mitigating the extent to which 
murder/genocide (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.62) could be justified as means to an 
end, were several factors, including the important missionary influence, which 
sought to save (living) souls, the lateness in the overall era of British empire 
building, which meant it was more planned and thought out, and the nature of 
Māori society at the time of contact (Webster, 1998). Iwi Māori proved able to 
respond quickly and positively to European influences, adopting and adapting 
technologies of war, literacy and money in particular, in ways which nuanced the 
cultural interface and bilateral balance of power from the start, by comparison, for 
example, with indigenous Australian ethnies, who shared much colonial history in 
common (Moorehead, 1968). It was widely held by 19th century colonials that 
                                                 
16 This belief is, of course, based on lack of understanding of the biological concept of ‘species’. In 
other words, it arises not from science but from scientism or science ideology (see following sub-
sections). 
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Māori were ‘superior natives’ (Salmond, 1985). Developing out of the 
philosophical level of scientific racism, as part of the elaboration of the modern 
academy (Becher, 1989), a third important colonial role for science was to 
construct Māori as an object of study,17 in which the disciplines of Linguistics, 
Anthropology, and Education, among others, were heavily involved (Tuhiwai 
Smith, 1999). Thus, the subaltern position of Māori as a marginalised population 
has been an inevitable and deliberate result of the premises on which the nation-
state of Aotearoa New Zealand has emerged (Lankshear, 1990), in which science 
and economics, as integral parts of the imperialist complex, have had significant 
parts to play.  
 
The contradictory colonising message to Māori – simultaneously saying ‘you 
must become like us’ (the ‘command’ to ‘turn toward the West’; Spivak, 1990, 
p.8) and ‘you will never be like us’ is revealed in analysis of early Māori-
language newspapers: 
While [British colonists] believed that any human group had the potential to 
be redeemed from barbarism, European notions of levels of civilisation were 
inseparable from ideas on racial hierarchies.  
Try as Māori might to abandon their māori practices ... they remained 
unchangeably 'native' and kiri mangu [black skin] in the colonial milieu. 
(Curnow, Hopa et al., 2002, p.92).  
 
Despite the ending of war between Māori and Pākehā, and the dismantling of 
overt racist structures such as legalised discrimination, such psychologically 
debilitating effects of colonisation have gone largely unrecognised as part of the 
‘epistemic violence’ of the discourses of the Other (Spivak, 1987) that continues 
to impact strongly on Māori today (Wetherell and Potter, 1992).  
Truth and Ethics: Positivist Philosophies and the Standard Account of 
Science 
That the power it provides has been used to help people hurt others, however, 
does not make W-science bad (Sorell, 1991, p.77ff), nor do the fallacies once 
promoted as scientific truth make it incorrect (hence the use of ‘tentative’ in the 
Loving quote below). So, what is science? One excellent two-word definition of 
science is ‘organised scepticism’, attributed to Robert K. Merton (1910-2003) by 
Phillips (1987, p.63) and Matthews (1995, p.143). 
 
                                                 
17 ‘Bishop Museum of Honolulu, Hawai’i, was the first scientific institution to study the problem 
of measuring living Polynesians’ (Buck, 1938, p.15). 
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W-science is ‘a loose configuration of critical processes and conceptual 
frameworks, including various methods, aims and theories all designed to shed 
light on nature ... done in the context of a human endeavour that is both 
interpretive and tentative’ (Loving, 1997, p.437). William Cobern and Cathleen 
Loving offer the following definition of the Standard Account of science: 
1.0 Science is a naturalistic, material explanatory system used to account for 
natural phenomena that ideally must be objectively and empirically testable. 
1.1 Science is about natural phenomena. 
1.2 The explanations that science offers are naturalistic and material. 
1.3 Science explanations are empirically testable (at least in principle) 
against natural phenomena (the test for empirical consistency) or against 
other scientific explanations of natural phenomena (the test for theoretical 
consistency). 
1.4 Science is an explanatory system – it is more than a descriptive ad hoc 
accounting of natural phenomena. 
2.0 The Standard Account of science is grounded in metaphysical 
commitments about the way the world ‘really is’. 
2.1 Science presupposes the possibility of knowledge about nature. 
2.2 Science presupposes that there is order in nature. 
2.3 Science presupposes causation in nature.  
3.0 Nevertheless, what ultimately qualifies as science is determined by 
consensus within the scientific community. (Cobern and Loving, 2001, p.58-
60, original emphases) 
 
As a science graduate, to me this definition of science seems perfectly reasonable 
(although the word ‘ideally’ in point 1.0 possibly raises unaddressed questions). I 
take it as specifying criteria by which claims to science status may be evaluated, 
while simultaneously indicating the limits of science - its legitimate scope or 
boundary. Nevertheless, the dominant empiricist epistemology, underwritten by 
philosophical commitments collectively referred to as ‘positivist’, has kept ethics 
out of science. The following comments clarify why the term ‘ethical science’ is 
problematical, if not contradictory, in terms of the Standard Account as defined 
above. This quote also indicates the links between science, philosophy, economics 
and democracy: 
In its early stages positivism was characterised by a belief in the value 
freedom of its activities. Under criticism because of the obvious falsehood of 
this view, the defence was to distinguish between the scientific contexts of 
‘discovery’ and ‘verification’. This defence may have failed in fact ... but it 
succeeded subjectively because it provided a continuing basis for the 
separation of science from ‘politics’, which was necessary if the resolute 
refusal of positive science to deal rationally with values was to be 
maintained. This refusal took the form of an ethical ‘decisionism’. Scientists 
could only make a personal decision about values [which] might be 
informed by reason but was seen as essentially non-rational in its basis. 
Science, per se, could deal with values only as the psychological states of 
individuals ... As such, the realm of ethics and political commitment was 
seen as accessible to science only as a realm available for empirical 
generalisation, law-like explanation, and manipulation. In this way, whatever 
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the impact of personal statements by scientists to the contrary, positive 
science lent itself to the further development of an alienated culture of 
manipulation. 
The appropriation of the findings of such a science by the advertising 
industry, by those who manage political campaigns and by an increasingly 
research-guided entertainment industry, was the bridge whereby this 
dwarfed vision of ethical and political reason entered the popular culture, 
providing social support for manipulative personal relations, thus completing 
the circle of limitation which has robbed advanced capitalism of its 
progressive possibilities. (Young, 1989, p.20, original emphasis) 
 
Philosophical work by Hans Reichenbach (1891-1953), and others, was 
foundational in establishing this view of science and ethics as incompatible 
(Sorell, 1991, p.4-7, also fn.19). Reichenbach was closely associated with the 
Logical Positivist movement that began in 1907, in which the Vienna Circle was 
central, although his preferred term for his own ideas was ‘logical empiricist’ 
(Honderich, 1995). Hilary Putnam (2004) explains how rejection of Kantian a 
priori ethics led logical positivists to adopt ‘a vastly inflated version of Hume’s 
idea that ethical judgements are not statements of fact but either expressions of 
sentiment or disguised imperatives’ (p.17), for which view Putnam cites a 1951 
Reichenbach work as the locus classicus (fn.20). 
Scientism 
Cobern and Loving argue that the problem facing IK and postcolonial interests is 
not the ‘universality of science’ according to the Standard Account, but rather 
scientism, giving examples of the ‘vastly overstated and singularly one-sided’ 
claims made on behalf of science. 
Good health, economic well-being, and national security all depend on many 
things, only one of which is science ... though the NAS [National Academy 
of Science] and the ICSU [International Council of Scientific Unions] appear 
eager to accept credit for good technological innovations, there is no parallel 
acceptance of technological disasters. ... Something is wrong with this 
portrayal of science (we might even say betrayal of science). (Cobern and 
Loving, 2001, p.63, original emphasis) 
 
Scientism is described as ‘a term of abuse’ (Honderich, 1995, p.814), in the sense 
that, as Massimo Pigliucci (2002, p.115) notes, ‘nobody thinks of himself [sic] as 
espousing scientism.’ Pigliucci claims that ‘in philosophy, it has become a 
widespread sport to accuse your opponent of scientism’. Two concise definitions 
of scientism are: ‘science as it pretends to be’ (Stenmark, 2001, p.viii); and ‘the 
thesis that every expression which can genuinely be correctly applied - which can 
be used in saying something true - is reducible to some expression of a natural 
science’ (Morris, 1992, p.41).  
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Mikael Stenmark (2001) distinguishes between ‘academic-internal and academic-
external Scientism’, further characterising each of these according to the 
philosophical commitments entailed. As Stenmark notes, ‘this [categorisation] is 
important because one can hold on to some scientistic claims but, nevertheless, 
reject some others’. His typology is synopsised in Whika 5: 
Whika 5: Types of Scientism 
TYPOLOGY OF SCIENTISM (Stenmark, 2001) 
Form Philosophical commitment Examples and relationships 
ACADEMIC-INTERNAL SCIENTISM (science reductionism): 
1 
all/some non-scientific disciplines 
can be reduced to or translated into 
natural science  
social sciences and humanities are 
branches of biology 
Methodological 
mandates the use of only the 
methods of natural science in other 
academic disciplines 
common interpretation of academic-
internal scientism 1 
2 
all sciences can be reduced to or 
translated into one particular 
natural science 
biology is reduced to chemistry, and 
chemistry is reduced to physics 
ACADEMIC-EXTERNAL SCIENTISM (science expansionism): 
Epistemological 
1: Epistemic 
the only kind of knowledge we can 
have is scientific knowledge*  
but we are rationally entitled to 




we are rationally entitled to believe 
only what can be scientifically 
knowable 
stronger form than epistemic, but 
both accept that science has some 
limits 
Ontological the only things that exist are the ones science can discover* 
more ambitious than, and entails, 
epistemic form 
Axiological 1 science is the only truly valuable part of human learning or culture 
implies, and is implied by, epistemic 
form 
Axiological 2 
science alone can answer our 
moral questions and explain as 
well as replace traditional ethics* 
does not necessarily entail 
epistemological or ontological forms 
Existential 
(or redemptive) 
science alone can answer our 
existential questions and explain as 
well as replace traditional religion* 
replaces religion with ‘scientific 
materialism (naturalism/humanism)’ 
Comprehensive 
science alone can and will solve all 
or almost all genuine human 
problems 
inclusive form - science has no limits 
or boundaries 
* The four scientistic theses critiqued by Stenmark. 
 
Stenmark critically evaluates the four ‘most interesting and challenging’ versions 
of scientism, marked by asterisks in the above table, by focusing on the work of 
scientists, especially evolutionary biologists, who espouse these scientistic views. 
As guilty of scientism to varying degree, he cites Francis Crick, Richard Dawkins, 
Stephen Hawking, Carl Sagan and Edward O. Wilson (Stenmark, 2001, p.vii). 
Analysing the work of these eminent science writers and others, he makes the key 
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conclusion for all four scientistic theses that they are not science, but ideological 
corruptions thereof.  
 
For example, the programme of ‘sociobiology’, which is defined by Wilson as 
‘the systematic study of the biological basis of all social behaviour’ (p.34), 
encompasses politics, morality and religion, as well as science itself, within its 
scope, claiming that all of these phenomena can be explained by evolutionary 
theory. Stenmark examines claims made by adherents of sociobiology, some of 
which have become widely known as the ‘selfish gene’ theory, which basically 
holds that natural selection works by selfishness, and extends that to the belief that 
the behaviour of all living things is biologically determined by selfishness. This 
leads to such problematic assertions as ‘universal love and the welfare of the 
species as a whole are concepts that simply do not make evolutionary sense’ 
(Dawkins cited in Stenmark, 2001, p.59).  
 
Stenmark demolishes this argument by examining the easily distinguishable 
difference between ‘biological selfishness’ and ‘moral selfishness’, pointing out 
that it is perfectly possible and reasonable for human behaviour to be biologically 
selfish but morally unselfish, or the reverse. Stenmark concludes: 
These are possibilities Dawkins completely overlooks simply because he 
conflates these different senses of selfishness and altruism and related 
notions such as universal love and generosity. The result is sheer confusion 
and a serious misconception of the relevance of evolutionary theory for 
society and ethics. (p.61) 
 
There is an important contradiction here worth underlining. On one hand, the 
empiricist account, especially that of the logical positivists (Putnam, 2004), which 
remains the predominant philosophy of science as defined by the Standard 
Account, insists that science has nothing to say about ethics, whereas the 
evolutionary18 account, on the other hand, holds that science is the only 
determinant of ethics. According to the scientism typology above (p.51), the 
empiricist view, arguing to keep ethics out of science, is a manifestation of 
epistemological and ontological scientism, while the evolutionist view, which 
argues for science to control ethics, can be regarded as axiological2 scientism, 
usually held in conjunction with, and strengthened by, the existential form as well. 
Putnam (2004) sums up ‘the philosophers of science’s evasion of values’: 
                                                 
18 Strictly, ‘evolutionist’ - but the distinction from ‘evolutionary’ is unclear, due to meaning 
‘malignancy’ (Boyd, 2001), see p.188 below. 
 53
Apparently any fantasy - the fantasy of doing science using only deductive 
logic (Popper), the fantasy of vindicating induction deductively 
(Reichenbach), the fantasy of reducing science to a simple sampling 
algorithm (Carnap), the fantasy of selecting theories given a mysteriously 
available set of ‘true observation conditionals,’ or, alternatively, ‘settling for 
psychology’ (both Quine) - is regarded as preferable to rethinking the whole 
dogma (the last dogma of empiricism?) that facts are objective and values 
are subjective and ‘never the twain shall meet.’ That rethinking is what 
pragmatists19 have been calling for for over a century. When will we stop 
evading the issue and give the pragmatist challenge the serious attention it 
deserves? (p.145) 
 
Nevertheless, as Mason Durie (2005) notes, ‘rejection of science in favour of 
indigenous knowledge’ is a significant form of the knowledge debate for Māori 
and other indigenous people. Such pro-mātauranga stances are aligned (in 
mainstream academic thinking) with those of religious fundamentalists and 
creationists (Matthews, 1995, p.146). Collectively, these stances comprise what 
Tom Sorell (1991) refers to as ‘anti-science or pseudoscience’. Sorell makes a 
distinction between ‘scientism in philosophy’, which is the object of his critique, 
and ‘scientistic ways of thinking [found] elsewhere, for example in politics or 
science itself’ (p.xi), describing himself as ‘less keen to criticise scientism outside 
philosophy’ because, in that case, scientism can be useful in ‘bolstering up an 
appreciation of, and respect for, science in the face of anti-scientific and pseudo-
scientific ideas’ (p.2). This suggests he considers such ideas more dangerous or 
incorrect ideologies than scientism. ‘While it may not be necessary ... to master an 
existing discipline, complete with ideological distortions, before criticising it, it 
might, indeed, be worse entirely to dismiss it before mastering it’ (Young, 1989, 
p.133). For this argumentative polarity in knowledge/science, ‘the two extremes 
of scientism and anti-science are equally flawed and sterile positions’ (Pigliucci, 
2002, p.118).  
 
Paulo Freire (1998), who was a ‘key writer’ drawn on in the development of 
Kaupapa Māori theory (Smith, 2002, p.34), identified scientism as inimical to the 
work of emancipation (Freire, 1998, p.29, p.88). Discussing the ‘indispensible 
qualities of progressive teachers’, including tolerance, Friere noted that 
those who embrace scientism are equally intolerant [as the authoritarian or 
the bigot], because they take science for the ultimate truth, outside of which 
nothing counts, believing that only science can provide certainty. Those 
immersed in scientism cannot be tolerant, though that fact should not 
discredit science. (ibid, p.42, original emphasis) 
                                                 
19 The pragmatist tradition in American philosophy includes Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), 
William James (1842-1910) and John Dewey (1859-1952).  
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This reflects Stenmark’s conclusion: 
The truly scientific mind must instead be conscious of the limitation of the 
scientific enterprise, and also allow forms of truth and knowledge which Iie 
beyond the scope of the sciences. (Stenmark, 2001, p.142) 
 
It is necessary to clarify the distinction between ‘scientism’ and ‘science 
ideology’. Some authors use these terms interchangeably. A distinction, however, 
is found in the work of Canguilhem, who recognised a valid role for science 
ideology as outdated or historical science, giving as examples the doctrines of 
atomism, ovism and animalculism. His remarks are also enlightening about the 
relationship of science to religion and superstition: 
A scientific ideology comes to an end when the place that it occupied in the 
encyclopedia of knowledge is taken over by a discipline that operationally 
demonstrates the validity of its own claim to scientific status. ... The 
existence of scientific ideologies implies the parallel and prior existence of 
scientific discourses. Hence, it also presupposes that a distinction has been 
made between science and religion. ... Hence, scientific ideology is by no 
means the same thing as superstition, for ideology has its place, possibly 
usurped, in the realm of knowledge, not in the realm of religious belief. Nor 
is it superstition in the strict etymological sense.  A superstition is a belief 
from an old religion that persists despite its prohibition by a new religion. 
Scientific ideology does indeed stand over [superstare] a site that will 
eventually be occupied by science. But science is not merely overlain; it is 
pushed aside [deportare] by ideology. Therefore, when science eventually 
supplants ideology, it is not in the site expected. (Delaporte, 1994, p.35-36) 
 
This distinction serves to refine the definition of scientism, by adding a diachronic 
restriction: to those science ideologies which contradict the contemporary canons 
of science (Boyd, 2001). This section has focused on the relationships and 
boundaries between science (Carter, 2006) and the following other types (or 
systems) of knowledge: 
• IK including mātauranga; 
• social science including economics; 
• philosophy including ethics; 
• scientism and science ideology. 
 
2.2 A History of Pūtaiao Curriculum Policy 
This section presents a more detailed account of the development of Pūtaiao 
curriculum to date, reviewing past and current policy and practice. In doing so it 
responds to an alternative interpretation of the chapter title, reviewing the 
development to date of Pūtaiao curriculum policy as an ‘historical fact’. It is based 
on a reading of two unpublished Master of Education theses, concerning earlier 
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policy phases, namely, ‘Science Aotearoa’ by Jocelyn Jesson (1990) and ‘A 
Power/Knowledge Nexus: Writing a Science Curriculum in Māori’ by Elizabeth 
McKinley (1995).  
Science Aotearoa 
Māori first appeared in national science curriculum policy during the Form 1-5 
Curriculum Review in Science (CRIS), which was gazetted in April 1985, and 
which Beverley Bell was appointed to direct in June that year (Jesson, 1990). As 
part of CRIS, in Term 1, 1986, eight discussion papers were sent to all schools 
inviting comment on the key issues in science education that Bell had identified 
during her previous work in Britain, including one called Multicultural Science, 
which suggested reasons for including ‘things Māori’ in science. The eight 
reasons given in the paper can be grouped into three: improving Māori 
achievement, avoiding racism, and benefiting all students with multiculturalism. 
Jesson notes these reasons ‘reflect the intermingling of learning theory, sociology 
and politics, but overall the discussion paper represented the emerging discourse 
of modern educational thinking in New Zealand’ (p.57). Following the discussion 
papers, in April 1987 eight curriculum development groups were set up, including 
one called Science Aotearoa. In Bell’s explanation of the rationale for the 
development groups, reported by Jesson, the only reference to Māori was in 
‘social concerns of equity, particularly for girls and Māori students’ (p.67). Based 
on this, it appears the planning of the Science Aotearoa project was influenced by 
some of the recent developments in Māori education policy discourse, including 
social equity, taha Māori and multiculturalism, but no acknowledged role for 
Māori language and Māori knowledge had yet developed in the science 
educational discourses at that time. 
 
Part of the brief of the development groups was to produce a professional guide 
for teachers, and Science Aotearoa was also the name of the document that this 
group produced during three years of on-going work. Jesson’s thesis documents 
the process of Science Aotearoa, including the changes in the discourse of the 
group as work proceeded, and critiques the final draft document. This is an 
interesting story in policy sociology, for only seven guides were ever published by 
the Ministry of Education at the end of CRIS. The draft Science Aotearoa 
document, although sent to Wellington, never went to print. It is likely this 
outcome is related to the philosophical conflicts that Jesson identified within the 
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Science Aotearoa group as the ‘interaction of different agendas’, which she 
defines as ‘the developmental psychology approach and the more explicitly 
political sociological approach’ (p.166). Part of her critique of the draft Science 
Aotearoa text is the range of contradictory perspectives it contained, with ‘a 
number of different discourses jostled together’ (p.141). 
 
Jesson records the Bilingual and Bicultural Maths and Science Hui (Meeting) held 
30 May – 3 June 1988 as a specific marker of when the discourse guiding the 
work of the Science Aotearoa group abruptly changed direction. During the 
1980s, a shift had occurred in the understanding of the legal rights of Māori, 
guaranteed by the Treaty of Waitangi. These now included the protection of te reo 
me ōna tikanga (the language and its customs), and as a result, new Māori voices 
were being heard for the first time in education policy discourses. Concomitant 
with the developments in indigenous politics around the world, policy studies of 
international law were reaching conclusions such as that Māori people had a right 
to be educated in te reo Māori (Hastings, 1988). The Kaupapa Māori education 
discourse had been constructed as a theoretical framework to guide future 
developments (Smith, 1990). The following sentence, from a statement made by 
Monte Ohia at the above hui, captures the mood concerning the knowledge 
conflict:  
Science and maths has to fit into Kaupapa Māori and any move to fit 
Kaupapa Māori topics and programmes to maths and science must cease. 
(Jesson, 1990, p.126) 
 
Jesson analysed the changes in the discourse: ‘The purpose of the Science 
Aotearoa group moved from producing resources about taha Māori for use in 
science education, through a position advocating some form of recognition of 
Māori epistemology as science, to a final position advocating bilingual science – 
science education in the Māori language’ (p.166). This description indicates how 
the argument for retention and revitalisation of te reo Māori, justified by reference 
to the Treaty of Waitangi, was added to the original discourse about social equity, 
updating the earlier emphasis on taha Māori and multiculturalism. This, then, 
could be considered the point at which the discourse in Māori education policy 
entered the new phase of tino rangatiratanga.  
 
During the Science Aotearoa process the discourse of Māori science was at an 
early stage. While the final draft document made reference to the existence of a 
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different epistemological system, the emphasis on teaching science in te reo Māori 
overtook and obscured any debate about the possibility of teaching different 
science. Jesson notes that, in the final draft document, ‘the particular way of 
knowing through science is, in fact, not addressed as problematic’ (p.153). Hence, 
while Māori language assumed prominence in the discourse of Māori science 
education during the CRIS development, Māori knowledge did not. Overall 
however, the Science Aotearoa project was an important early contributor towards 
the Māori science discourse.  
 
Since the entire CRIS project (of which Science Aotearoa was a small part) was 
overtaken by the restructuring of the education system in the late 1980s and the 
development of the New Zealand Curriculum in the early 1990s, and since the 
document was never actually published, Science Aotearoa could be seen as having 
little lasting relevance in the development of Māori science education. It could 
though be regarded as significant in setting the scene for later developments, and 
providing important professional development for individuals involved in Māori 
science education. The story of its development process, moreover, is an 
instructive example of changing and conflicting discourses in curriculum policy, 
related to issues of legitimation and authority of different voices in policy 
discourse.  
 
When Science Aotearoa began, Pākehā people dominated the group and implicit 
viewpoints of ‘Māori as other’ drove the group’s thinking. By the end of the 
Science Aotearoa process the new discourse of Māori education had emerged, in 
the form of Kaupapa Māori, which necessitated that Māori people and pro-Māori 
thinking control Māori education developments. While the failure to publish the 
Science Aotearoa document might be interpreted as a move to suppress Māori 
content in science curriculum policy (i.e. as an example of institutional 
racism/Eurocentrism), perhaps such a policy text was no longer acceptable to 
Māori voices in the curriculum policy discourse either. In terms of the central 
dialectic, it appears by the end of the Science Aotearoa project, Māori voices were 
effectively arguing for ‘science in Māori’, and that the earlier ‘Māori science’ 
position had been dropped. The clash of agendas in the Science Aotearoa group, 
ranging from social constructivism (the ‘developmental psychology’ approach) to 
Kaupapa Māori (the ‘political sociological’ approach), provides a good example 
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of contesting policy discourses. It also indicates why the Science Aotearoa 
process was unable to satisfactorily resolve the epistemological and pedagogical 
issues involved in Māori science education into an outcome in the form of a 
document that met the objectives of all the parties involved. There remains the 
possibility that the Science Aotearoa experience was a contributing factor in the 
strategic decision to develop a complete Māori-medium curriculum.   
Pūtaiao i roto i Te Marautanga o Aotearoa  
Te reo Māori finally made it into national science curriculum policy in 1996 with 
the publication of ‘Pūtaiao i roto i te Marautanga o Aotearoa’ (M.O.E., 1996), 
and in her thesis, McKinley traces the process that began in 1992 when she and 
Pauline McPherson Waiti, as co-contractors to the Ministry of Education, took 
responsibility for developing the document (McKinley and Waiti, 1995). 
 
McKinley indicates that the Māori science discourse did not find a prominent 
voice in the development of ‘Pūtaiao’: ‘The only recognition of Māori is by 
language only. How and what the language carries is just as important as the 
language itself in the recovery of Māori’ (McKinley, 1995, p.44). Hence she 
makes the key conclusion that in the sense of knowledge content, ‘Pūtaiao’ ‘is not 
considered to be a Māori curriculum’ (p.55).  
 
This result occurred because the content and structure of ‘Pūtaiao’ were largely 
pre-determined by the English science curriculum document, ‘Science in the New 
Zealand Curriculum’ (M.O.E., 1993), which had been completed (to publication 
in draft form) before the contract for ‘Pūtaiao’ was advertised. McKinley records 
that the advertisement ‘took many Māori educationalists a little by surprise’ 
(McKinley, 1995, p.2). The question then arises, was the decision by the Ministry 
to develop curriculum policy texts in te reo Māori a late move in the development 
of the National Curriculum, subsequent to the production of the English 
documents, or had the decision been made earlier, but kept from public 
knowledge? This question is significant in terms of McKinley’s thesis that Māori 
had actually very little input into the resulting curriculum policy.  
 
Indeed, McKinley argues that ‘Pūtaiao’ cannot actually be considered to be a 
curriculum development project. If the Māori curriculum developments were a 
late decision, it indicates a poorly planned approach to Māori-medium education 
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policy, especially in view of the fact that Kura Kaupapa Māori had been 
established in legislation back in 1990. This is, however, a more innocent 
conclusion than the second possibility, whereby secrecy could have been used 
deliberately to limit Māori input into the curriculum development. In either 
scenario, the hallmarks of institutional Eurocentrism are unmistakable (Harding, 
1998). 
 
The process of developing the Pūtaiao document gave the writing group, of which 
I was a member, an opportunity to discuss Māori science, which was of benefit to 
those of us involved, and important for Māori science discourse. Most of the 
people involved in the writing group had expertise either in traditional science 
knowledge or in traditional Māori knowledge, but not both.20 While the document 
presents a framework for the curricular knowledge base that includes some 
features derived from traditional Māori knowledge, the directive in the contract 
that all of the achievement objectives contained in ‘Science’ had to be included, 
effectively ensured that ‘Pūtaiao’ would be dominated by mainstream science 
content and curriculum thinking. 
 
According to evidence such as the directive mentioned above, it seems fair to 
assume that the Ministry of Education intended that ‘Pūtaiao’ would in fact be a 
straightforward Māori translation of ‘Science’, and McKinley states that it was 
intended for use in all Māori medium programmes including Kura Kaupapa 
Māori, according to the terms of the contract as negotiated. It is therefore 
important to examine the position of ‘Pūtaiao’ (and the other Māori language 
curriculum documents) in the on-going discussions between Kura Kaupapa Māori 
and the Ministry. Given the strong identity of Kura Kaupapa Māori in Māori 
medium schooling, it would be difficult to imagine that Māori medium curriculum 
policy would be developed specifically for non-Kura Kaupapa Māori 
programmes. Yet in a sense this is what resulted. One of the conditions being 
negotiated in the late 1980s in order for Kura Kaupapa Māori to be established as 
state-funded schools was that the Kura Kaupapa Māori curriculum would 
incorporate the ‘national curriculum’, although this had not yet been defined at the 
time. (This discussion was documented in the Tomorrow’s Schools Kura Kaupapa 
                                                 
20 As I recall, a significant amount of the meeting time allocated for developing the document was 
spent discussing ideas about Māori science, until time constraints, rather than resolution of the 
underlying questions, prevailed. 
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Māori Working Group Report, produced in October 1989.) Since Māori 
knowledge is at the core of the rationale for Kura Kaupapa Māori (Nepe, 1991), 
however, this clearly results in an inherent conflict for Kura Kaupapa Māori 
curriculum, which is greater in science than the rest of the curriculum (Irwin, 
1999), as previously discussed. 
 
McKinley’s thesis indicates that the ‘Pūtaiao’ project was not intended to be a 
development of curriculum policy for uniquely Māori science, although the 
addition of non-essential ‘bits’ of traditional Māori text was approved. Therefore 
she describes the document as a ‘contradiction’, resulting from a conflation of 
discourses in curriculum and Māori education. On the one hand, it is a radical 
curriculum innovation; on the other hand, it perpetuates the marginalisation of 
Māori knowledge. While it is irrelevant to the vast majority of science teachers, 
neither is it fully suitable for the purposes of Kura Kaupapa Māori. Such inherent 
contradictions might be expected to limit progress in Pūtaiao, contributing to its 
under-implementation in classrooms and hence, indirectly, impeding the science 
learning of students in Māori-medium programmes.  
 
‘Pūtaiao’ is undoubtedly significant for Māori. It establishes a precedent for the 
production of science curriculum policy in te reo Māori. It is difficult to envisage 
even the possibility that in the future, Aotearoa New Zealand might return to a 
situation in which science curriculum policy existed only in English. In this sense, 
regardless of its flaws, it is an extremely important ‘first’ for Māori science 
education; a platform which can be improved and built upon. ‘Pūtaiao’ has also 
been received as a very significant development by the science education 
community, and in the community at large (Barker, 1999). By virtue of the fact 
that it is a complete school science curriculum written wholly in Māori, it 
challenges and changes ideas about the capacities of the language, and possibly 
also about science. It is also part and parcel of a growing normalisation of te reo 
Māori, such that as a nation we have become used to, perhaps even expect, its use 
in everyday life, such as in signage or newspapers, on television and the radio.  
 
In these ways, the existence of ‘Pūtaiao’ as a document is of tremendous political 
importance, which in a sense is totally unrelated to its contents – and therein lies a 
measure of jeopardy. This can be expressed by saying that the less one knows 
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about te reo me ōna tikanga, or science, the more impressive the document 
appears to be. This reflects the truism that in order to critique any text requires 
fluency in the language of the text, as well as expertise in its subject matter. Thus, 
what I am labeling jeopardy here is the lack of individuals able to provide detailed 
informed critique of the contents of ‘Pūtaiao’, particularly in comparison with 
what would be considered appropriate as a level of discourse for a national 
curriculum document. The bigger picture is that ‘Pūtaiao’ as curriculum policy 
has been produced within a vacuum of corresponding practice of Māori-medium 
science education - i.e. the lack of a community of practitioners, a history of 
teaching and learning, acknowledged subject experts, accepted pedagogy, pre-
existing curriculum texts, programmes, resources, etc. Politically and 
educationally, therefore, ‘Pūtaiao’ cannot be regarded as equivalent to ‘Science’. 
It is not simply another science curriculum document. Its existence, its structure 
and its content can only be understood in relation to, and contingent upon, those 
of ‘Science’. 
   
This analysis suggests that, despite the production of ‘Pūtaiao’, issues of tino 
rangatiratanga with respect to curriculum knowledge content are still on the 
agenda for negotiation between Kura Kaupapa Māori and the state. Through its 
legitimation as an official national curriculum text, in the meantime, ‘Pūtaiao’ was 
the baseline to dictate the direction and shape of state-funded developments in 
Māori-medium science education occurring since its publication in 1996. The 
marautanga Māori (Māori curriculum documents) have been included in most 
national curriculum developments since the publication of the New Zealand 
Curriculum (NZC) in the early 1990s, even though the roll-out of the Māori 
documents was slow, with the final one (Hauora) still in draft form when the 
Māori-medium section of the Marautanga Curriculum Project to update the NZC 
began in 2005. In Pūtaiao, examples of such ‘parallel’ processes include the 
teachers guidebook, ‘Te Whakamahi i te Pūtaiao’ (M.O.E., 1997), and the Pūtaiao 
exemplars, ‘Ngā Tauaromahi Pūtaiao’, published in 2004.21 There are exceptions 
to this; for example, Māori versions were not produced for the senior Biology, 
Chemistry and Physics curricula published following the production of ‘Science’. 
                                                 
21  Website www.tki.org.nz/r/assessment/exemplars. 
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2.3 Current Policy and the Dialectics of Science Education 
The discussions presented in these first two chapters indicate that current 
developments in Pūtaiao emphasise the dialectical position identified in Wāhanga 
Tuatahi as ‘science in Māori’, at the expense of ‘Māori science’. Some resulting 
problems and disadvantages accompanying this imbalance have been explored. 
The current approach, which provides Pūtaiao by end-point translation of 
mainstream science materials, arises out of the universalising, technicist22 reason 
which controls increasing proportions of state activity in education. It is 
universalising in assuming only one approach to science education exists, 
effectively constructing difference as sameness (McKinley, 2005, p.227), and, 
simultaneously, justifying increasingly technicist, and technical, solutions to the 
problems of Pūtaiao education. 
  
Underlying this central dialectic, which is the discursive foreground of this thesis, 
it is important to consider the wider curriculum dialectics in science education. 
Curriculum research debates between ‘science for scientists’ and ‘science for all’, 
as noted above (p.22), influence science curriculum, as does the tension between 
the perspectives of science educators and those of other ‘stakeholders’ such as 
business and the economy (Bell, Jones et al., 1995). The influence of 
constructivist science teaching pedagogy has also created polarities in science 
education in Aotearoa New Zealand during recent decades (Matthews, 1995; Bell, 
1995), although acceptance of a weak version of constructivism appears to prevail 
(McMillan, 1995; Carson, 1997, p.111). 
 
Over a decade ago, Graham Hingangaroa Smith (1995) commented on the 
inability of constructivist (as well as traditional/liberal) science education to 
overcome Māori underachievement, in one of few published Kaupapa Māori 
analyses of school science education. Smith issued a challenge to ‘New Zealand 
science education academics’, to the effect that their international reputations 
‘ought’ to rest on their ‘ab[ility] to deal with domestic issues’, particularly ‘the 
Māori crisis’ (p.119), as he referred to the longstanding disparity in science 
                                                 
22 The adjective ‘technicist’ applies to practices such as the use of vidcon technology to amplify 
the size of the NCEA-level teaching resource, despite the pedagogical limitations; or the 
deployment of extra contractors to solve the issue of Māori-medium secondary qualification 
provision - first to translate the examinations, then to re-translate the scripts. 
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education outcomes noted above (p.30). Smith critiqued not only the 
constructivist position on science education, but also the prominent critic of 
constructivism, Dr Michael Matthews, noting  
a contradiction in Matthews’ position [with respect to the politics of Māori 
knowledge], on the one hand arguing against ‘social constructedness’ and 
yet on the other demonstrating quite clearly the social constructedness of 
science in the privileging of selected definitions of science. (p.105) 
 
Smith argued that Kaupapa Māori is able to ‘rescue’ constructivism, by extending 
reform to ‘structural considerations’ such as ‘power-relations’: 
Māori social, political, economic and cultural subordination to the dominant 
group is manifested in many ways including the control over knowledge and 
the curriculum. What counts as science in the school represents a selection 
of knowledge which sometimes leads to the exclusion of Māori interests. 
(p.116) 
 
Another ‘structural’ consideration cited by Smith is that of 
Ideology: there is a need to respond to Māori aspirations in relation to the 
validity of Māori language culture and knowledge revitalisation, particularly 
at the ideological level. There is a need to assert the validity of Māori 
knowledge and frameworks (ibid). 
 
Here ‘ideology’ is used in the sense of ‘philosophy’, and these comments clearly 
link back to the analysis by Heidegger of the ‘essence’ of technology and science 
(see p.43). This paper opens some important questions for Pūtaiao, which I should 
like to pursue further. For example, Smith clarifies at the start that his ‘paper does 
not purport to engage deeply with epistemological or ontological issues of 
constructivism deriving from the question of “what ought to count as science?”’ 
(Smith, 1995, p.105). He follows ‘a sociological perspective’ on knowledge: 
The critical insight here is that the school curriculum represents a selection 
of knowledge made by dominant non-Māori interest groups. In this sense, 
school science which is reified as neutral, acultural, and value free is clearly 
open to challenge. (p.108) 
 
Yet from these quotes, it seems the question of ‘what counts as science?’  is 
central to Smith’s ideas about how science education needs to change. Therefore, 
while raising the question of ‘the Māori crisis’, the advice for science educators in 
this paper is limited to a call for ‘reorganisation at the pedagogical level in order 
to deliver more effectively for Māori’ (p.119). Smith sums up his perspective as 
follows: 
I see tremendous potential in the constructivist approach, but at the same 
time, Matthews also makes some important criticisms. I would hold to the 
position that both schools of thought can be accommodated within an 
eclectic approach to science education and do not necessarily need to be 
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constructed as an absolute oppositional discourse. My overriding concern is 
to seek the best approach for delivering success in science for Māori 
students. (Smith, 1995, p.109) 
 
Noting the resonance of ‘oppositional discourse’ with the proliferating dualisms in 
this topic, the key word here is ‘eclectic’, which in Pūtaiao aligns with  
‘pragmatic’ and ‘compromise’ (against purism and orthodoxy) as approaches to 
curriculum development for which I will advocate in this thesis. The overall 
conclusion of Smith’s paper was that development of science education in Kura 
Kaupapa Māori would be required to overcome the longstanding disparity in 
outcomes. This article (Smith, 1995) pre-dated the publication of the Pūtaiao 
document; it appeared at a time when only a handful of KKM programmes 
included any Year 11-13 students. Discussions were then taking place between 
individual kura and NZQA, concerning translation of School Certificate 
examination papers into Māori for Wharekura students. It is timely, perhaps 
particularly in view of the NCEA results presented in Wāhanga 1.4 above, to 
revisit the hopes and concerns Smith expressed in this paper. 
 
The ‘nature of science’ debate has been closely involved in many science 
education reform movements (Benson, 1989), including multiculturalism (see 
Wāhanga Tuatoru), constructivism, history and philosophy of science (Matthews, 
1994), Science-Technology-Society (STS), and narrative approaches to science 
education (Gilbert, 2001). Dualisms are clearly rife in this territory: Richard 
Duschl (1990) argues ‘science has two faces, or two profiles’; ‘products of 
science’ (the knowledge base) and ‘processes of science’ (manipulative and 
cognitive – methods). ‘This two-faced nature of science has dominated science 
education practice during the twentieth century’, leading respectively to the 
‘concept approach’ and the ‘inquiry and process approach’ (p.9-11). Duschl 
analyses the dialectical imbalances, and how these have negatively impacted on 
science education since about 1960.  
The tragedy of teaching science as absolute truth or with curriculum 
objectives that seek to empower students with the contemporary final form 
of science is that the potential to achieve something very special with 
students is lost. (ibid) 
 
Based on this critique, Duschl argues that there is a need to change the focus of 
science education, so as to include knowledge about science, not only scientific 
knowledge:  
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The distinction between scientific knowledge as a curriculum objective and 
knowledge about science as a curriculum objective is based primarily on the 
exclusion and inclusion, respectively, of history of science and of the 
important role of theory development in science. The key to understanding 
science is to understand the important and diverse roles theories play in 
science. (p.42) 
 
An understanding of the wider discourses of science education, including critiques 
such as those of Duschl and Smith, is important in suggesting possibilities for 
further Pūtaiao curriculum development. These two chapters have argued that 
current discourses of Pūtaiao fail to move beyond the class of teaching strategies 
labelled as ‘Bilingual science’ in Jesson's typology (cited in Smith, 1995, p.114), 
which is defined as ‘the teaching of the standard science curriculum in Māori 
language’. In other words, the Kura Kaupapa Māori approach to science 
education, predicted by Smith in his 1995 paper, has not yet (in 2006) fully 
emerged in practice, at least not at a discernible national level. This thesis aims to 
further investigate such a Kura Kaupapa Māori approach to science education, and 
to identify conditions that would be conducive towards its development. 
 
To return to the discussion of definitions from the start of the chapter, there are 
many qualifiers used with the word ‘science’, of which two (‘Māori’ and 
‘Western’) form the central dialectic in this topic. What types do the qualifiers of 
‘science’ fall into? Firstly, there are disciplinary markers or specifiers. 
‘Biological’, ‘mathematical’, ‘physico-chemical’, and ‘social’ are a few common 
examples. Not all of these, however, are uncontested. ‘In fact, because the 
complexity of human beings cannot be captured quantitatively, the concept of 
“social science” is at its root an oxymoron’ (Pinar, Reynolds et al., 1995, p.64). D. 
C. Phillips (1987; 1992) in contrast, makes a cogent defence of ‘naturalistic social 
science’. 
 
One study ‘says that probably in its central application the term [science] is 
honorific’ (W. Gallie, cited in Sorell, 1991, p.178, fn.1). This is the sense used by 
proponents of ‘creation science’, because they seek to replace ‘evolution science’ 
with another ‘science’, an aim described as ‘scientistic or verging on it’ (Sorell, 
1991, p.2). Honorific is also, according to Matthews, the usage of science in 
‘Māori science’ (Matthews, 1995, p.146), although I dispute this in Wāhanga 
Tuarima below (p.186). A pro-Māori version of this position (more equivalent to 
that of the proponents of Creation Science) was given by botanist Murray Parsons: 
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The term Māori Science has been used to emphasise Māori people too used 
the scientific method and that it is not the prerogative of western countries 
only. (M. Parsons, 1995, cited in Williams, 2001, p.19) 
 
This argument supports the view that the term ‘Western science’ is itself 
problematic (the political stance is emphasised here, as in other quotes, by de-
capitalising ‘western’) - a reason to use ‘W-science’ instead, and then only when 
necessary. At the same time, Parsons can be read here as suggesting the term 
‘Māori science’ from a political rather than strictly scientific perspective and need 
(hence enabling the usage to be described as ‘honorific’ or ‘verging on scientistic’ 
- see above). The role of such ‘pro-Māori science’ positions in discourses of 
mātauranga is also discussed in Wāhanga Tuarima.      
 
Two further classes of qualifier (other than disciplinary and honorific) used with 
‘science’ could be labelled ‘epistemological’ and ‘perspectival’. These are classes 
called for by the widespread usage of terms such as ‘postmodern science’ (an 
epistemological qualifier?) and ‘feminist science’ (a perspectival qualifier?). It 
must be noted, however, that these qualified notions of science usually occur in 
discourses of philosophy, rather than those of ‘science itself’. Questions which 
could be posed concerning these types of qualifiers include: 
• What (if any) is the essential difference between ‘epistemological’ and 
‘perspectival’ qualifiers for ‘science’?  
• Which class of qualifier for science best fits the terms ‘Māori/indigenous 
science’, and ‘critical science’? 
• Why is the term ‘postmodern science’ widespread in the literature, but not 
‘poststructural science’, and what would be the difference between the two? 
 
Another type of qualifier for ‘science’ is also mostly encountered outside science 
domains. These qualifiers often occur in binary pairs, such as ‘good science’ and 
‘bad science’, or ‘authentic science’ and ‘inauthentic science’. Such qualifiers are 
heard in discussions of quality in science education, but also in domains such as 
resource management, where priorities (‘values’) of different societal sectors 
commonly come into conflict. This discussion of qualifiers of ‘science’ concludes 
at the end of Wāhanga Tuarima, following further discussion of the major relevant 
discourses in language, knowledge and culture (p.194). 
 
Returning to the twin questions posed by its title (‘What is Science?’ and ‘What is 
Pūtaiao?’), this chapter can be considered an extended examination of the 
meaning of the ‘word’ (in its widest possible sense, as advocated by Mikhail 
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Bakhtin; Danow, 1991), ‘pūtaiao’. Coined to mean ‘science’, the discussion has 
shown that ‘pūtaiao’ contains ample discursive space for further interrogation: 
which meaning(s) of ‘science’ does ‘pūtaiao’ correspond to, and when; and are 
there meanings for ‘pūtaiao’ that ‘science’ does not convey? These questions are 
explored in the following chapters. 
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WĀHANGA TUATORU 
 Multicultural Science Education Research 
 
In seeking to unravel and address the difficult questions that have been raised 
about Pūtaiao, or Māori science curriculum, the multicultural science education 
research literature23 is a natural place to turn. This specific field has a history of 
around 30 years, and continues to expand in scope and volume, recently being 
described as a ‘large and rather amorphous body of literature’ (McKinley, 
Stewart, et. al., 2004). 
 
This chapter presents a review of the curriculum debates found in the 
multicultural science education research literature in the last few decades. As 
expected, one of the major themes in this literature is the nature of science, and its 
relationship to culture. A few strong positions on paradigm/philosophy were 
formed around the binary polarities related to this question, positions which have 
been variously labelled - as ‘universalist-multiculturalist’ (Siegel, 1997), or 
‘positivist-postmodern’ (Loving, 1997), among others. The aim in the following 
discussion is to highlight key arguments, to show strengths and weaknesses on 
either side of these paradigmatic divides. The intransigence of these oppositional 
positions contributes to the ongoing volume of publication in the field, while 
another source of expansion is the increasing number and range of specific 
cultural contexts around the globe in which multicultural science education 
research is being undertaken. 
 
Clearly, this debate is framed by several others: the privileging of science in the 
curriculum, brought about by the imperatives first of the space race and later 
economic competitiveness (Pinar, Reynolds et al., 1995); the wider philosophical 
debate over the nature of science and the development of postmodern and 
poststructuralist traditions; and the post-World War II international political 
context, in which culture became a central issue in processes of nation-building, 
decolonisation, and sovereignty.  
 
In other words, multicultural science education research can be viewed as a 
response to the dominant scientistic discourses in science and science education, 
                                                 
23 Extensive on-line bibliographies are available at: http://www.stemworks.org/digest_main.html 
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and as such, must be applauded for its very existence. On the other hand, despite 
the large amount of work published, central questions in the debate appear to 
remain unresolved (Ninnes, 2003). According to Masakata Ogawa, 
we have not yet reached a consensus on its true colors of what [we] have 
been calling ‘indigenous knowledge’, ‘traditional ecological knowledge’, or 
‘indigenous science’ in the contexts of science education. The consensus 
will be one of the top priorities to promote research in culture studies in 
science education. (Ogawa, 2004, p.2) 
 
This comment encapsulates the challenge and the goal taken up in the following 
discussion, not to mention the remainder of this thesis. Does the notion of 
multicultural science make sense, or is science universal, and if so, is it meta-
cultural? At which level(s) should science education be reformed - curriculum, 
pedagogy, language - in order to increase participation and achievement for 
indigenous students, and Māori students in particular? These questions will be 
briefly resurrected at the end of the chapter. 
 
To formulate an account of the debates in multicultural science curriculum, I 
selected a corpus of approximately 25 interesting papers, spanning the publication 
years 1981-2003, and covering the major positions for and against multicultural 
science, from a range of viewpoints, including multiple papers by authors who 
were particularly active in the debate over extended periods of time. For 
convenience, the corpus is discussed in four chronological groups, as follows:  





The earliest stage comprises only one paper, by an Australian educator, M. N. 
Maddock (1981), a paper later cited in support of indigenous/Māori science 
(McKinley, McPherson Waiti et al., 1993). Maddock (1981) addressed most or all 
of the arguments that have since been comprehensively contested, foreshadowing 
the polarities and pitfalls which have eventuated in the quarter-century since its 
publication.  
The viewpoint proposed is that science and science education are cultural 
enterprises which form a part of the wider cultural matrix of society and that 
educational considerations concerning science must be made in the light of 
this wider perspective. (Maddock, 1981, p.1) 
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After commenting on the roles of science and science education in the post-
Sputnik West, the many US and UK science curriculum development projects of 
the 1960s, and their export through aid programmes to the Third World, he 
discussed ‘the problems involved in transplanting science curricula from one 
culture to another’ (p.4), including different worldviews, termed ‘intellectual 
models’ ‘embedded in culture’ (p.12), language issues (science vocabulary and 
English as a second language), and ‘the arrogance of ethnocentricity’ (p.13). He 
challenged ‘the American scene, where ... very little cognizance was taken of the 
fact that there are numerous subcultural groups within the country which may 
hold very different, culturally ingrained views’ (p.6).  
 
Maddock asserted ‘that a degree of dualism or biculturalism has to be accepted’ 
(my emphasis) in order for science education to make progress. He suggested the 
collation of existing and new ‘cultural material [by] suitable sensitive researchers 
and its organization into a condensed form of information on cultural scientific 
knowledge and models relevant as a foundation for science teaching, is one area 
of research well worthy of support by international funding agencies’ (p.18).   
II: 1990s 
By the mid-1990s the debate over the nature of science had permeated throughout 
the US academy, and after having been previously ignored, eventually began to be 
reflected in the mainstream science education literature (Loving, 1997, p.422). A 
traditionalist backlash emerged, exemplified by the much-cited ‘Higher 
Superstition: The Academic Left and Its Quarrels with Science’ (Gross and Levitt, 
1994). These authors made cogent critiques of certain lacunae in the ‘anti-science’ 
literature, in which they included multiculturalism, but focused on some of the 
more extreme examples of ignorance of science, which did little to support their 
argument. Their exaggerated description of science as ‘under siege’ raises the 
question of ‘moral panic’ (Cameron, 1995), which is defined as sensationalism for 
underlying political purpose, where legitimate but unfounded concerns are 
inflated and propagated to camouflage ‘inadmissible claims’ such as those based 
on racism or sexism. To label ethnocentric science education as ‘balkanisation of 
the academy’ (Gross and Levitt, 1994, p.204) may be bending to their own end 
(either cynically or unwittingly) a phenomenon related to postcolonialism in the 
academy, described by Gayatri Spivak: 
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within a permissible cultural politics which allows enchanted spaces to be 
created, sometimes alternate institutions which might define themselves as 
‘beyond the institution’ are allowed to flourish so that the work of cultural 
explanations within the institution can go on undisturbed. (Spivak, 1990, 
p.5) 
 
In related local discourse, Mike Dickison’s (1994) paper, deriding the notion of 
Māori science, was widely read by Māori and Pākehā science educators. Similar 
sceptical comments about Māori science education by Matthews (1995) were part 
of his generally patronising tone towards non-West cultures, as well as towards 
other scholars, according to his critics (Bell, 1995). 
 
At times, authors arguing for the universalist position in science education have 
drawn for support on such questionable critiques as that of Gross and Levitt (e.g. 
Good, 1995; Loving, 1997). But the reverse criticism also applies, such as the 
assertion that some multiculturalist claims are based on dubious sources (‘bad 
science’, Loving, 1997, p.147).  
 
The universalists viewed the very term ‘multicultural science’ as oxymoronic, and 
the debate gained traction and volume during the 1990s. Stanley and Brickhouse 
(1994) set out the multiculturalist case for including ‘a few well-chosen examples 
of sciences from other cultures’ (p.396), thus echoing the earlier call by Maddock, 
but in updated language (e.g. ‘sciences’). In response, Ron Good (1995) 
challenged multiculturalists ‘to be specific’ with their ‘critiques of modern 
science’ which he defined as ‘the science begun in Europe a few centuries ago’ 
(p.335): 
What is inaccurate about the scientific knowledge produced by biologists, 
chemists, physicists, and so on about nature? What “non-Western science” 
have we neglected to include in legitimate science? Or is the issue something 
else? Is it that science knowledge is used by some persons and cultures to the 
disadvantage of others? At the very least, let’s clarify the nature of the 
argument. (Good, 1995, p.336) 
 
Here, the first two questions demonstrate important universalist 
misunderstandings of the basis and nature of the debate, while this definition of 
‘science’, implying its ownership by Europe and her colonisers, is subject to 
claims of ethnocentrism. Nevertheless, Good has a point about a need for clarity. 
Brickhouse and Stanley (1995) replied: ‘What is used as an example is not nearly 
as important as the issue of how the nature of science will be portrayed in the 
science curriculum’ and pointed out: ‘There is an emerging body of 
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postcolonialist literature that may serve as a resource for those who are concerned 
with helping students understand the relationship between science and culture’ 
(p.338).  
 
Harvey Siegel (1997) made an attempt to bridge the divide by arguing that, ‘given 
the failure of the critique of epistemological universalism’, the ‘tension between 
multiculturalism and universalism’ is mostly only apparent, since the (in his view, 
only defensible) ‘case for multiculturalism’ is a universal ‘moral obligation’ ‘to 
treat cultures other than our own, and the members of those cultures, justly and 
with respect’ (p.97-8), which includes ‘exposing non-Western students to ideas 
which are not part of their culture, and – sensitively and respectfully – indicating 
to them that some of their cultural beliefs (e.g., animism) are not respectable 
scientific beliefs’, since ‘teaching them these things is part of their science 
education’ (p.104). While this argument may be sound from the perspective of 
mainstream (colonialist) aims of science education, it is framed within an 
ethnocentric ‘us and them’ paradigm which is off-putting, if not offensive (and 
therefore pedagogically self-limiting) from the perspective of ‘members of those 
cultures’. (Siegel’s more recent views on the epistemological debate are included 
in Wāhanga 5.3.) 
 
In contrast, Glen Aikenhead (2000) argued this moral obligation towards other 
cultures demands a pluralistic multiscience approach in which teachers become 
culture brokers, explicitly teaching border-crossing to enable students to learn 
‘various sciences’ including ‘common-sense understanding’ and ‘Aboriginal 
science’ as well as ‘western science’. Besides respecting other cultural forms of 
knowledge, Aikenhead introduces a critical perspective by arguing that 
‘renegotiating school science is fundamentally a political event’ necessary to 
overcome the ‘gatekeeping role’ played by traditional school science (p.257).  
 
Extending Aikenhead’s critical perspective, Annette Gough (1998) structured her 
argument for moving beyond Eurocentrism toward a more democratic science 
within a feminist poststructuralist framework, including a synopsis of the feminist 
and postcolonial critiques of science. Claiming the need to overcome the 
‘unconsciousness’ of scientists concerning their own ‘bias or political agenda’ 
which leads them to believe they are ‘neutral and objective’ (p.185), she also 
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suggests ‘the search for national and international standards in science education 
and the renewed emphasis on traditional content in science curriculum 
frameworks’ (p.200) constitute further obstacles in the path beyond Eurocentrism.  
 
An example of a complementary indigenous pluralist viewpoint is provided by 
Prakash’s (1999) essay in a collection on IK (Semali and Kinchloe, 1999), which 
includes the postmodern challenge to science in support of his argument for the 
benefits of ‘people’s science’, using dahin (yoghurt/curds) from indigenous Indian 
culture as an example of sustainability and ecological literacy.  
 
Although there was some critical rhetoric during the 1990s, very few examples of 
multicultural science education materials (Ninnes, 2003), or clear guidelines for 
teaching science multiculturally, had appeared. While multiculturalist rhetoric was 
concerned with arcane philosophical debates, the link between these and 
improving the outcomes of science education for indigenous students remained 
tenuous, and inequity of outcomes continued, or worsened. Teaching 
multisciences (Hodson, 1993) is likely to prove impracticable, since content 
overload is already a constant issue for science teachers. The intriguing 
suggestions contained in these papers, namely: to become conscious (i.e. informed 
about the debates, and about one’s own perspectives); to explicitly teach cultural 
border-crossing in the science classroom; and to investigate indigenous practices 
as alternatives to mainstream environmental science education, still required full 
development, to be implemented and evaluated in classroom programmes. Their 
traction for improving equity was as yet undetermined. 
III: 2001 
The third set of papers is taken from the first 2001 issue of the prestigious journal 
‘Science Education’, which brought together work by several leading 
multiculturalist and universalist authors, including responses to each other, thus 
providing a useful snapshot of the (then) current state of the debate. The papers in 
this collection continue to be widely cited (e.g. Carter, 2006; Hipkins, Bolstad et 
al., 2002), indicating their ongoing importance.  
 
Stanley and Brickhouse (2001) restated their earlier ‘conten[tion] that science 
education should be multicultural’ (p.35, my emphasis): 
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We do not believe a universalist view of science is either compatible with a 
multicultural approach or fully coherent as a foundation for the science 
curriculum ... Many educators have focused their efforts on the question of 
what kind of science (Western modern science and/or local ‘ethnic’ science) 
to teach indigenous people whose worldviews are distinctly different from 
mainstream Western ones. (ibid) 
 
Here, the first sentence encapsulates the two major multiculturalist arguments, 
namely that W-science (and by extension W-science education) is inherently both 
ethnocentric, and lacking in truth. The second sentence presents as unproblematic 
three (arguably unfounded) assertions: that there are non-Western sciences; that 
these are (or can become) available as curricular choices/alternatives for 
educators; and that these form the bases of indigenous students’ worldviews. The 
bulk of the paper reviews the theoretical philosophical debates behind these 
positions, rebutting Siegel’s claim (above) ‘not only ... to know what is 
universally right or wrong, but of the very possibility of attaining such 
knowledge’. This amounts to a position of strong moral and epistemological 
relativism (Moody-Adams, 1997), which threatens to invalidate the entire 
discussion, if not the very notion of scholarship, which depends on some notion of 
‘standards’ of knowledge. A related lacuna is their ‘worry’ that an approach to 
multicultural science education, advocated in the same issue by Snively and 
Corsiglia (2001), over-emphasises ‘the politics of science’ at the expense of 
‘teaching about other aspects of the nature of science’ (Stanley and Brickhouse, 
2001, p.46). This amounts to denying or problematizing their own stated axioms 
(above). In advocating ‘an examination of the debates within WMS [as] a way of 
teaching students about the relative merits of different sciences’ (p.47), these 
authors effectively construct the academic debate in which they are engaged as 
‘multicultural science education’, a position which is a significant move away 
from their earlier call to incorporate science knowledge from non-Western 
cultures. While the inherent problems of this previous recommendation remained 
unaddressed, nor does this later move away from science content altogether 
appear to be an improvement. While claiming multiculturalism, the paper reveals 
embedded ethnocentrism: 
the problems [Matthews and Siegel] believe all sciences should be interested 
in solving [how radios work, why the moon stays in orbit, why hundreds of 
thousands of Africans are dying of AIDS] are really local problems that 
would be of most concern to Westerners. If the question were to explain the 
anaesthetic effect of acupuncture or how to live with limited resources, 
WMS might not fare as well. (Stanley and Brickhouse, 2001, p.46) 
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One cause of these lacunae appears to be the lack of distinction made between 
philosophy and empirical knowledge, so that Western scientific ideas are 
frequently compared with non-Western values in a way that leads to the trap of 
denying the validity of Western science, in order to assert the validity of non-
Western values.  
 
The paper referred to above, by Gloria Snively and John Corsiglia (2001), is one 
of the few in this collection which includes an identifiably indigenous perspective, 
with John Corsiglia noted as a ‘Consultant on First Nation’s [sic] history and 
culture, British Columbia’ (p.6). This paper starts by arguing ‘that since 
Aboriginal cultures have made significant contributions to science ... the 
definition of “science” should be broadened, thereby including TEK [Traditional 
Ecological Knowledge] as science’; but then goes on to  
distinguish between “Western modern science”, which is the most dominant 
science in the world, and “indigenous science” which interprets how the 
world works from a particular cultural perspective ... [T]raditional ecological 
knowledge ... is both the science of long-resident oral peoples and a 
biological sciences label for the growing literature which records and 
explores that knowledge. (p.8) 
 
In this way, the meaning assigned to ‘science’ varies between ‘W-science’ and 
‘pluralist science’, which results in lack of clarity. This paper attempts to respond 
to the universalist challenge to document indigenous science, although some 
claims, such as the discovery of rubber, vulcanizing and platinum metallurgy by 
Native Americans, were refuted by other scholars (Ortiz de Montellano, 2001). 
The related issue of documentation and accessibility of indigenous science is also 
problematic, with large claims made at various points: 
[E]ducators can now use a burgeoning science-based TEK literature that 
documents numerous examples of time-proven, ecologically relevant, and 
cost effective indigenous science. (Snively and Corsiglia, 2001, p.6) 
TEK is being used by scientists to solve important biological and ecological 
problems. (p.8) 
Growing worldwide acceptance among scientists and international aid 
agencies of indigenous knowledge is reflected in a network of 33 national 
and regional TEK and IK Resource Centers, so far embracing six continents, 
as well as the Philippines, Japan, Micronesia and New Zealand, and a dozen 
more centers are in the process of becoming established. (p.20) 
Examples of indigenous and TEK science may be accessed through living 
elders and specialists of various kinds or found in the literature of TEK, 
anthropology, ethnology, ethnobiology, ethnogeography, ethnohistory, and 
mythology, as well as in the archived records of traders, missionaries and 
government functionaries. (p.11) 
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Some of the difficult, unacknowledged issues related to IK are revealed in the 
final statement above: first, its holistic nature, dispersed across a wide range of 
Western disciplines; second, the reliance on European archives; and third, the 
assumption that IK is still retained substantively today by members of indigenous 
communities. 
 
Snively and Corsiglia offer ‘a five-step process for producing a TEK unit in cross-
cultural science teaching’ in which the steps are: 
Step 1. Choose a Science Topic or Topic of Interest (e.g. medicine, 
cultivating plants, animal migrations, geology, sustainability) 
Step 2. Identify Personal Knowledge 
Step 3. Research the Various Perspectives 
Step 4. Reflect 
Step 5. Evaluate the Process. (p.27) 
 
It is unclear whether this process is intended to replace or supplement the current 
science curriculum, although learning Western science still seems to be the 
ultimate aim, according to statements such as ‘it is possible to teach Western 
scientific concepts to native students with a preferred traditional spiritual view of 
the world, without changing in the sense of replacing, the students’ preferred 
orientation’ (Snively and Corsiglia, 2001, p.26).  
 
The paper ends with the assertion that ‘respect for nature’ (p.30) is the ‘genius of 
indigenous science’ (p.29) which will be required to manage the problems of the 
future. This is an important point, but does not follow from the argument of the 
paper, which contains two main contradictions: first, in claiming IK as both 
science and traditional wisdom, and second, in the primary purpose of cross-
cultural science education as learning Western science or IK. This paper also 
conflates philosophy and empirical knowledge: in focusing on the ‘facts’ of TEK 
there is the implicit assumption that this will change and improve the ‘values’ of 
W-science. 
 
The final full-length paper in this selection, by William Cobern and Cathleen 
Loving  (2001), rehearses the arguments in defence of the universalist view or 
Standard Account of science (see p.48), and includes a warning about ‘radical 
revisionist’ materials on non-Western contributions to science, claiming these 
contain a ‘triumphalist’ rather than factual version of events (p.52). They argue 
that including TEK in science implies a wide definition of science such as 
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‘descriptive knowledge of nature’ (p.55). Describing a multicultural science 
lesson on ecology, which incorporated traditional Native American views on 
nature, including ‘nature is viewed as sacred’, they make the crucial point that this 
‘is one such legitimate way [of thinking about nature], but it is not the way of 
science’ (p.56). Therefore, 
although we hate to use the word hegemony, Western science would co-opt 
and dominate indigenous knowledge if it were incorporated as science. 
Therefore, indigenous knowledge is better off as a different kind of 
knowledge that can be valued for its own merits, play a vital role in science 
education, and maintain a position of independence from which it can 
critique the practices of science and the Standard Account. (p.51) 
 
Valuing IK for its own merits and for its ability to critique Western science, as 
Cobern and Loving recommend here, is consistent with a Kaupapa Māori view. 
Corsiglia and Snively (2001) responded, however, ‘that indigenous science offers 
important science knowledge that WMS has not yet learned to produce’ (p.82) 
and that TEK ‘is able to compete because it is already doing so ... and because 
there are areas where WMS is weak’ (p.84). These statements, however, sit oddly 
with their comment that ‘most indigenous parents want their children to be 
exposed to the best knowledge that Western modern science can offer’ (p.85), 
although in using such general terms as ‘areas’, ‘important knowledge’, and ‘the 
best knowledge’, this is difficult to evaluate. For instance, there is the possibility 
that the ‘areas’ where IK is stronger than WMS are outside the school science 
curriculum. 
 
Several commentaries from other scholars on the three full-length articles also 
appeared in the same issue, which added a further level to the debate. In their 
issue  introduction, Lewis and Aikenhead (2001) focused on the need to shift 
Eurocentric paradigms, and listed three points accepted in common by Cobern and 
Loving (2001), Stanley and Brickhouse (2001), and Snively and Corsiglia (2001): 
 all systems of knowledge are embedded in the context of a cultural group; 
 all systems are, therefore, culture-laden; 
 science (Western science) is the system of knowledge about nature that is 
predominant in Western culture. (Lewis and Aikenhead, 2001, p.3) 
 
According to Lewis and Aikenhead (2001), the issues under debate in this volume 
are two-fold: 
 how to position Western science so that it can inform and be informed by 
the nature-knowledge systems of other cultures; 
 the role that non-Western nature-knowledge systems should play in the 
science curriculum. (ibid) 
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The three lead articles, discussed above, were also reviewed in the same issue by 
Gurol Irzik (2001), whose main argument against the multiculturalist position is 
that it relies on the ‘disunity of science’ thesis, which then leaves no choice but to 
broaden the notion of science to make room for TEK and IK (p.71-72). Irzik 
refutes Stanley and Brickhouse’s (2001) assertion that science is ‘disunified and 
multiple’ in favour of Cobern and Loving’s (2001) claim that ‘science can be 
defined with sufficient clarity so as to maintain a coherent boundary for ... school 
science curriculum development’. Irzik then highlights the difficulty of taking a 
multiculturalist position, as he sees it: 
Will we invite our students to judge which is a more true account of nature? 
Or are we going to simply tell them that different cultures have different 
conceptions and worldviews that are equally valid? ... Which of these two 
attitudes is ethically more correct? (Irzik, 2001, p.73) 
 
Pitting science and IK in competition against each other like this, as is typical of 
universalist arguments, reveals underlying scientism (p.50 above). There is the 
implicit assumption that the criteria used to decide the ‘winner’ and ‘loser’ will be 
those of science. Nevertheless, Irzik agrees ‘wholeheartedly’ that there are things 
of value to learn from IK. These commentaries acknowledge the ‘dilemmas and 
tensions’ (Lewis and Aikenhead, 2001, p.5) of the debate. Its problematic state 
was summed up as follows by Bernard Ortiz de Montellano (2001): 
Teaching multicultural science is a meritorious enterprise, but the devil is in 
the details. What should be taught? Examples must be both 
anthropologically and scientifically accurate. Unfortunately, much of the 
material developed is triumphalist rather than pedagogically sound for an 
elementary level audience or is inaccurate and little documented. (ibid p.79) 
 
IV: 2002-2003 
The last stage represents more recent contributions. Dawn Sutherland and Reg 
Dennick (2002) reported their questionnaire and interview study, exploring the 
views of Grade 7 Euro-Canadian and Cree students, which included some Cree 
speakers, thus incorporating language issues. While preliminary, with results 
considered to be inconclusive, this study does at least attempt research ‘inside the 
classroom’ - somewhat rare in the multicultural science education literature. An 
indicated future area of study is the possibility that ‘the syntactic order as a 
function of language structure may influence science explanations’, a research 
direction that tends towards linguistic relativism (Whorf, 1956; see Wāhanga 
Tuawhā), and the interference of non-standard English in mathematics and 
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science conceptual learning (Wilson Orr, 1987). This paper suggests ‘the standard 
process of presenting the nature of science to students, which assumes the ideas 
are equally accessible to all students, may not be a valid assumption’ and, though 
guilty of essentialism in references to ‘the epistemological differences between 
Cree and Euro-Canadian students’, ‘suggests a greater emphasis on understanding 
the epistemological differences between traditional and Western scientific 
knowledge systems should be explored in the middle years (Grades 5-9) science 
programme, especially in schools with high Aboriginal populations’ (Sutherland 
and Dennis, 2001, p.21). Stating that multicultural science education ‘may assist 
in the initiation process to science’ (p.22), however, indicates adherence to the 
purposes of mainstream science education. 
 
The final set of papers comprises five out of ten chapters in a recent major 
collection, Multicultural Science Education (Hines, 2003). In the first of these, 
Roberta Ahlquist and Julie Kailin (2003) rehearse the arguments for a critical 
multicultural (as opposed to a cultural pluralist) perspective: the impact of science 
and technology on everyday life and the environment; inherent sociopolitical 
injustice in science-based industries; myths of objectivity; and a critique of global 
capitalism, including the increasing influence of big business on science 
education, through the funding of classroom materials. It seems ironic, however, 
to characterise as ‘critical’ the claim that, since Western science contains many 
historical contributions from non-Western cultures, it cannot therefore be superior 
knowledge: 
This is why it is important to demystify and dismantle the myth of 
superiority that Western capitalist science promotes. It is a dangerous myth 
because it disrespects and disregards the vast contribution of other peoples 
and civilizations on this earth. (p.38) 
 
For the same reasons, it could also be argued that, since ‘Western science’ 
includes many contributions from non-Western cultures, it clearly must be the 
most superior form of knowledge. As a corollary, this argument suggests that the 
term ‘Western science’ is a misnomer. 
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Appeal by Ahlquist and Kailin to ‘dubious sources’24 in support of their claim 
adds to the problem, and indicates the ongoing currency of these sources in the 
multicultural debate. One of these sources is cited in a review of ‘bad’ culturally 
relevant materials in this same volume (Loving and Ortiz de Montellano, 2003). 
Brief suggestions for developing ‘good’ culturally relevant materials include the 
requirement for ‘fewer topics in more depth’ and that ‘teachers learn a little 
anthropology and history associated with a particular scientific phenomena (sic)’ 
(p.161), in working towards ‘democratic, culturally relevant classrooms – where 
ethnic, racial or cultural differences are not ignored or hidden but are openly 
discussed as worthy and interesting’ (p.160). 
 
Peter Ninnes (2003) reports in his chapter on ‘representations of indigenous 
identities and knowledges’ in science education texts, which link to discourses in 
identity, and hence ethnicity and postcolonialism (see also discussion on p.98). 
Nevertheless, Ninnes concludes that ‘a number of problems remain unresolved’ 
(p.182). 
 
Paul Rowland and Carol Adkins (2003) present a rationale and overview of 
Native American science education (NASE) as a ‘special lens’ or ‘vantage point’ 
on multicultural science education (MSE), concluding that while NASE can be 
‘easily justified through ethical arguments that appeal to cultural preservation as 
well as to students’ academic success’, MSE, whether for ‘voluntary minorities’, 
‘minority ethnic students’, or ‘majority students’, is far more difficult to justify 
(p.117). This perspective gains support from (and is mutually reinforcing of) the 
contemporary North American scholarship on identity (Battiste, 2000). It is the 
inverse of the earlier multiculturalist argument (Brickhouse and Stanley, 1995), 
which called on postcolonialism to support multicultural science education, since 
in this case the postcolonial view privileges its own claim to multicultural science 
education to the exclusion of mainstream (and possibly other subaltern) groups. 
 
In the final chapter of the volume, Samina Hadi-Tabassum (2003) set out to define 
‘a theoretical framework for multicultural science’ (p.187), indicating no irony in 
                                                 
24 Two cited examples are: Bernal, M. (1987). Black Athena: The Afro-Asiatic roots of classical 
civilization. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press – see Loving and Ortiz de Montellano 
(2003, p.154); and Weatherford, J. (1988). The Indian givers: How the Indians of the Americas 
transformed the world. New York: Fawcett Columbine. See Ortiz de Montellano (2001, p.78). 
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this objective, despite basing the argument on Foucault’s notion of genealogy and 
claiming ‘postmodernism no longer accepts the “master narratives” of Western 
science’ (p.190). In ‘meditating on multiple sciences’ the author claims Western 
science has dominated ‘mostly because it imposed linguistic and social 
conventions in the struggle for agentive control’ (ibid). In contrast, ‘the concept of 
multicultural science is informed by postmodern views of classrooms that do 
mediate a sense of multiplicity, fragmentation, instability of meaning, dissent and 
dissolution of grand narratives, and emancipatory practice’ (p.191). Brief 
comments on three examples of multicultural science education - in Navajo, 
Hawaiian, and limited-English-proficient contexts - lead into discussion of the 
author’s team-teaching experience, in a culturally diverse classroom, teaching 
thematic science on the topic of solar energy, which ‘used a two-way immersion 
bilingual framework for our class, so that students were “doing science” in both 
English and Spanish’ (p.196). The only bilingual example given, however, is “The 
sun has energia solar” (p.198). The unit sounds impressive, having the following 
characteristics: activity-based; starting with cultural narratives about the sun; 
incorporating physics, astronomy, technology and making things, including a 
solar-powered model car to race in a competition. The case for calling this 
‘postmodern science’ is unclear, however, since it could equally well be described 
as a good example of up-to-date mainstream or  W-science teaching. Postmodern 
terminology, such as ‘transgress the borders’ and ‘crosspollination’, is used to 
describe ‘successful postmodern science education’: 
The students worked well with each other across racial, ethnic and linguistic 
lines. Their ability to transgress these borders was evident during the solar 
energy car race, when camaraderie was at its strongest as students cheered 
each other. Thus, there was a crosspollination of languages, knowledge, and 
experiences within our multicultural science classroom. (p.198) 
 
It is certainly to be hoped that many students of all backgrounds are able to have 
such experiences in their science education. But the use of ‘postmodern’ by this 
author is not essentially in relation to the science content or curriculum. This 
results in an elision of the two notions - ‘science for non-Western students’ and 
‘non-Western science’ - as meanings for ‘multicultural science’, and illustrates the 
tendency towards confusion around definitions in this field. 
 
The research literature has included little specific curricular material for 
multicultural science education. To complete this review, two examples follow. 
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The first is from a University of Auckland cross-faculty (Arts and Science) Stage 
I paper, titled ‘Indigenous knowledge and Western science: perspectives from the 
Pacific’ (Roberts, 1998, p. 75): 
Module 1: Foundations of Indigenous Knowledge (9 lectures + 2 tutorials) 
Module 2: Foundations of Western Science (9 lectures + 2 tutorials) 
Module 3: Navigation and Voyaging (6 lectures + 2 tutorials) 
Module 4: Environment (6 lectures + 2 tutorials) 
Module 5: Health and Disease (6 lectures + 2 tutorials). 
 
While indicative only, these titles indicate a ‘two worlds’ (Salmond, 1991) 
approach to the comparison between science and mātauranga/IK, with the 
inherent weaknesses (Munz, 1994) - and strengths - of such an approach. The 
three themes selected as focus areas are ones in which Māori knowledge may be 
construed as ‘equivalent’ or ‘equal’, or even ‘superior’, to W-science knowledge.  
 
An example of multicultural science curriculum for schools is found in a book by 
Tewa Indian Gregory Cajete (1999) titled ‘Igniting the Sparkle: An Indigenous 
Science Education Model.’ Like the Roberts paper above, this is a universalised 
treatment, ‘meant to function as a template’ for application to ‘other indigenous 
populations around the world’, in ‘third-world nations as well as among Native 
Americans’ (p.10). Thus, while most of the book rehearses the arguments in 
support of ‘indigenous science education’, brief curriculum details are appendiced 
under the following headings: 
Syllabus #1 The Creative Process in Art, Science and Native American Cultures 
Syllabus #2 Philosophy: A Native American Perspective 
Syllabus #3 Social Ecology: A Native American Perspective 
Syllabus #4 Herbs, Health and Wholeness: A Native American Perspective 
Syllabus #5 Animals in Native American Myth and Reality 
Syllabus #6 The Primal Elements: A Native American Perspective 
Syllabus #7 Astronomy: A Native American Perspective. (ibid pp.193-218) 
 
It is unclear whether this syllabus is intended to replace or supplement a science 
programme, and no information is provided of ‘actual’ classroom implementation. 
Since the topics are not typical of ‘school science’, the proposal is vulnerable to 
allegations of ‘soft options’ (Phillips, 1987), which are discussed again below 
(p.98), in relation to the ‘canon’. 
Conclusion 
The above review indicates that much literature on multicultural science education 
comprises rhetorical critique of the relevant issues, from many different angles, in 
diverse cultural contexts, and to varying levels of complexity. The diachronic 
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aspect of the review shows how the same arguments have been recycled for many 
years. To address the concerns of many scholars working in this area, an online 
discussion forum for CSSE (Culture Studies in Science Education) has recently 
been established, with Masagata Ogawa (2004) as the first convenor, and 
Elizabeth McKinley (2005) the second and current convenor (in December 2006), 
to facilitate the ongoing international conversation.  
 
Most of the difficulties discussed in the multicultural science education literature 
arise from two closely related sets of intellectual bias, one related to culture, 
represented by the term ‘ethnocentrism’, the other more specific to science, i.e. 
‘scientism’ (see p.50). Ethnocentrism has been shown to be embedded both in 
modern science and in the academy in general, including the discipline of 
education (Ladson-Billings, 1998), and both universalist and multiculturalist 
arguments have been shown to contain ethnocentric thinking. Recent perspectives 
have included emerging new forms of ethnocentrism, sometimes as a positive 
strategy for overcoming historical oppression, for example Afrocentrism (Rivers 
and Lomotey, 1998).  
 
Scientism is related to ethnocentrism, as identified above, and to sexism, which 
has limited and failed to acknowledge the contribution of women. More 
specifically, scientism arises from unacknowledged biases (‘unconsciousnesses’, 
Gough, 1998) within science. The most prominent of these are the myth of 
objectivity, in which the aspiration to be free of human bias is taken for its 
achievement (see also p.188), and the myth of omniscience, which misrepresents 
science’s aim to mandate the best available explanation for natural phenomena.  
 
While these caveats over the (mis)representation of science and its achievements 
in the curriculum are cogent, it does not follow that science is therefore no more 
powerful than other cultural forms of knowledge, against the tide of the 
overwhelming dominance of science knowledge, and its impact on the life of 
every citizen in the contemporary world (Matthews, 1995, p.146). Indeed, the 
history of modern science demonstrates that it is by nature a ‘colonising’ form of 
knowledge, in the sense that any knowledge about nature is enframed as 
‘standing-reserve’ (Heidegger, 1977). Science subsumes relevant information 
from all cultures, and therefore can be claimed as belonging to all. Perhaps the 
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problem is not so much that modern science is Western in nature, but that modern 
science has been ‘captured’ by privileged groups in the West (Mihaka, 1989).  
 
A related concern results from this recognition that all indigenous knowledges 
contain empirical information that can be translated into modern science 
knowledge (although to do so invariably risks separation from the original cultural 
context). Multiculturalists have used this recognition to argue that IK actually is 
modern science (or postmodern science, Peters, 1993), which reinforces the above 
lacuna. Generally speaking, IK is holistic, not compartmentalised in the same way 
as Western knowledge. Therefore, a major problem with including IK in the 
science curriculum is that it implies either teaching an entire culture (hence also 
implying Western science equates with Western culture), or including 
decontextualised extracts, which in turn become caricatural. An example of this is 
the overplayed context of harakeke (flax) to stand for Māori representation in the 
curriculum (McKinley, Stewart et al., 2004). 
 
Discussion of the nature of science and IK in terms of ‘ideas’ often fails to 
distinguish between empirical and philosophical aspects of knowledge, in 
suggesting that inclusion of IK can improve science education. While the 
underlying philosophy on which IK is based may be better than that underpinning 
modern science (see Wāhanga Tuarima), this must be changed at a broader level 
than the school science curriculum. It is difficult to envisage how including IK 
‘facts’ or ‘values’ in school science curricula might change the philosophy within 
which science knowledge is framed.  
  
Another common lacuna in the multicultural science education literature relates to 
ideas linking the psychology of indigenous people/children to IK. Indigenous 
students are often either assumed to ‘have’ IK, which interferes with their learning 
of science, or are argued to ‘need’ IK, usually as an intermediate step towards 
science. ‘No one has a pure worldview that is 100 percent Indigenous or 
Eurocentric’ (Little Bear, 2000, p.85). A more politically robust position holds 
that indigenous students have a right to learn IK, but this is often either at the 
expense of science, or again justified as a transition to learning science. Many 
such arguments essentialise the identity of indigenous students (e.g. Sutherland 
and Dennick, 2002), in simplistic analyses of modern ethnicity (see p.10). 
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The following table lists four major lacunae and problematic assertions, found in 
the multicultural science education literature, with an attempt to re-frame each one 
in more robust terms: 
Whika 6: Lacunae in the Multicultural Science Education 
Research Literature 
Lacuna Re-framing 
Science is flawed; therefore 
IK is as powerful as science. 
Science is flawed, but is often presented in the 
curriculum idealistically. 
IK is science. IK and science are different forms of cultural 
knowledge based on different philosophies. 
Science advances by incorporating knowledge 
from all cultures, so ‘belongs’ to all cultures.  
Science can be taught based 
on IK philosophy. 
Better teaching of philosophy of science, 
including critical perspectives, is required. IK 
philosophy may offer an alternative to that of 
science, and therefore be of immense 
significance. Further research is needed on IK 
philosophy and its role in education.  
Indigenous students 
have/need IK instead/in aid 
of learning science. 
Indigenous students have a range of modern 
subjectivities of relative cultural balance, but 
very few if any indigenous students today have a 
solely indigenous worldview unaffected by Euro-
American culture. 
 
This list indicates the wide range of issues which the multicultural science 
education literature attempts to address. Yet the first one, the need for realistic 
presentations of the history, philosophy, culture and workings of science in the 
curriculum (Gough, 1998), might more properly be regarded as a general science 
education issue. IK philosophy, furthermore, due to the fundamental nature of its 
differences from philosophy of science, cannot be simply ‘infused’ (Corsiglia and 
Snively, 2001) into the science curriculum, despite its obvious importance. 
 
Science education in Samoa (Tavana, Hite et al., 1997) or outback Australia 
(Sansom, 1982; Attwood and Magowan, 2001) differs greatly from the 
development of Pūtaiao in Aotearoa New Zealand, yet all three scenarios are 
describable as ‘multicultural science education in the Pacific’. In the US, the 
arguments for multicultural science education (as the above review shows) vary 
somewhat for African American, Native American, Latin American or Asian 
American students. These are examples of the range of scenarios within which 
multicultural science education is considered, yet these differences are often 
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minimised in their treatment in research literature. This may possibly be 
connected to the nature of the academy itself, which encourages theorising and 
generalisation. This may also explain why most suggestions about how to 
implement multicultural science education can be classified as one, or a 
combination, of the four approaches listed below in Whika 7. The first two of 
these perhaps reflect generally ethical classroom practices, rather than specifically 
‘multicultural’ science education. Examples from the corpus above to illustrate 
each approach are given, as well as cross-references to the science education 
literature review by Rosemary Hipkins, Rachel Bolstad et al. (2002). This state-
commissioned literature review contained a section on ‘teaching science in 
multicultural classrooms’ (p.205) which outlined three variations or perspectives 
on ‘border crossing pedagogy’ (p.208). These three perspectives fit within 
approach 3 and 4 in my typology below, supporting the suggestion that the first 
two approaches may not, strictly speaking, qualify to be labelled as 
‘multicultural’. 
Whika 7: Approaches Towards Multicultural Science Education 
Approach Examples 
(from the corpus) 
‘Border-crossing 
Perspective’ 
(Hipkins, Bolstad et al., 
2002, p.208-10) 
1. Teaching science with 
sensitivity and respect for 





2. Teaching science with 
the inclusion of examples 
from non-Western 
cultures 
Stanley and Brickhouse, 
1994; Sutherland and 
Dennick, 2002; Prakash, 
1999 
 
3. Teaching non-Western 
cultural knowledge as 
well as, or instead of, 
science 
Aikenhead, 2001; 
Rowland and Adkins, 




i. Teaching the debates 




4. Teaching how the 
nature of science 
compares with the nature 
of IK ii. Teaching science with 
awareness of the debates: 
Cobern and Loving, 
2001; Gough, 1998 
The pluralist perspective  
 
However the approaches might be classified, labelled, supported or not, the 
important question to ask is what guidance the multicultural science education 
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debate provides for Pūtaiao, as a form of science education based on Kaupapa 
Māori aspirations for Māori students?  
 
Firstly, there are important differences between the classroom contexts covered by 
the literature reviewed above, and those relevant to the Pūtaiao curriculum, the 
most obvious of these being the medium of instruction. Very little of the literature 
concerns science classrooms and schools where the lingua franca is not English 
but an indigenous language. The lack of a language component keeps the focus on 
changing the content or discourse of science education, an objective which 
becomes obscured, in Pūtaiao curriculum development, behind the enormous 
language task. So these differences, while limiting the relevance to Pūtaiao of the 
international literature, also offer advantages to the investigation of the 
‘knowledge issues’ arising in Pūtaiao education (see Wāhanga 1.2).   
 
Secondly, politics and philosophy are clearly very important in determining what 
and how knowledge is presented in the science curriculum. This importance, in 
my own experience, is not apparent in current mainstream or Māori-medium 
science education praxis, such as teacher training, professional development, and 
curriculum projects. 
 
In terms of philosophy, Loving (1997) described the appeal by the 
multiculturalists to postmodernism as going to the opposite extreme from the 
excesses of positivism, such as teaching ‘final form science’ (Duschl, 1990), and 
looked for a balanced view:  
To reduce all that has come to be known as good scientific explanation to the 
same category with myth, mysticism, belief, personal agendas, or 
commonsense notions of the world is not supported by the history of 
science. While there may not be one inductive (or deductive) scientific 
method – the all-too-familiar lockstep list on chalkboards across America – 
there are unique aspects to what successful and good science must do to 
justify its explanations that involve reasoning and public discourse, testing 
and retesting, trying to confirm or find fallible with rigor, making results 
public using rational arguments, or using mathematics and statistics when 
appropriate to strengthen or weaken. These ways did not come easily to 
humans. (Loving, 1997, p.439) 
 
The word doing most discursive work in this quote is perhaps the last (‘humans’), 
since it simultaneously includes and silences the key question of which humans 
(Noddings, 1994) benefit from, and control the future of, science.  
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Edward Said (1993) discussed the politics of knowledge, noting ‘on the national 
and intellectual level the problems are very similar’ (p.310), giving a postcolonial 
version of Loving’s comments on the value of science: 
The whole effort to deconsecrate Eurocentrism cannot be interpreted, least of 
all by those who participate in the process, as an effort to supplant 
Eurocentrism with, for instance, Afrocentric or Islamocentric approaches ... 
these clamorous dismissals and swooping assertions are in fact caricatural 
reductions of what the great revisionary gestures of ... anti-imperialist 
resistance originally intended. For such gestures it ... was always a matter of 
opening and participating in a central strand of intellectual and cultural effort 
and of showing what had always been ... part of it, ... but which had been 
either denied or derogated. (Said, 1993, p.311) 
 
So, in this topic, it has become a common complaint: science education (and the 
mainstream in general; Jocks, 1998) caricaturises indigenous knowledge; 
scientists (Pigliucci, 2002) and science educators (Hadi-Tabassum, 2003) 
caricaturise postmodernism; postmodernists caricaturise science (Loving, 1997); 
new ethnocentrisms caricaturise anti-imperialism (Rowland and Adkins, 2003); 
and reification and essentialism caricaturise indigenous ethnicity (May, 2001).  
 
The process of Pūtaiao curriculum development must take heed of the 
multicultural science education debate, and avoid becoming trapped by the 
extremes of either positivist or postmodernist philosophies. This conclusion 
echoes the recommendation from the previous chapter (p.63) for an ‘eclectic’ or 
‘pragmatic’ approach. To return to the questions posed at the start of the chapter, a 
preliminary conclusion is that science is both universal and cultural (see also 
Wāhanga Tuarima). The notion of ‘multicultural science’ is problematic, given 
the lack of resolution over how it is to be defined, but the above review has also 
problematised the term ‘Western science’. In order to reform the idealism of 
current representations of science in the curriculum, change is needed at the level 
of curriculum, with the resulting changes this would entail for pedagogy. This 
addresses the question of ‘knowledge content’ in Pūtaiao, signalled in Whika 1 
(see p.5; the language questions of Whika 1 are addressed at the end of Wāhanga 
Tuawhā).  
 
So far, several dialectical polarities in science and science education have been 
identified: 
• scientism versus anti-science 
• universalism versus multiculturalism 
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• positivism versus postmodernism. 
 
Such binary oppositions are prevalent in this topic, with yet more still to be 
introduced. It is time to leave the specific field of multicultural science education 
research, and move into wider ‘theoretical landscapes’ (Salmond, 1982), to further 
explore the basic notions and questions which have been raised in relation to 
Pūtaiao curriculum. The next chapter examines more general debates in 
curriculum, identity, culture, and language, highlighting several further discursive 
antinomies, relevant to Pūtaiao, in these areas. 
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WĀHANGA TUAWHĀ 
Language, Identity and Representation in 
Science, Education and Pūtaiao 
 
While multicultural science education grapples with the problematics - political, 
factual, ethical, epistemological, or a combination thereof – mainstream (or 
‘elitist’; Harding, 1993) science education sails on, retaining, along with 
mathematics, its flagship role in the curriculum. Thus, as William Pinar, William 
Reynolds et al. (1995) explain, ‘in mathematics and science education, traditional 
curriculum development still occurs, as these privileged areas still receive 
significant amounts of government and private grant monies’, in contrast to 
curriculum in general, where the focus has moved from development to 
‘preoccup[ation] with understanding’ since ‘many complexities have entered our 
conceptions of what it means to do curriculum work ... we are no longer 
technicians, that is, people who accept unquestioningly others’ priorities’ (p.6).  
 
The implication here that science and mathematics curriculum development is 
relatively outdated is made more overt in Richard Duschl’s review of the 
historical ‘failure’ of science curricula, in which he argues ‘one of the factors 
associated with the problem is, “the fact that developers [scientists] often come 
from fields outside of education and may be unaware or resistant to the available 
curriculum research” [citing Connelly, 1972]’  (Duschl, 1985, p.551).  Elite levels 
of funding driven by external demands associated with the knowledge economy, 
linked with outdated concepts of curriculum and curriculum development, 
combine in helping to explain why the science curriculum is so resistant to 
change: 
The twentieth century began with nature divided into physics, chemistry, 
biology and geology by an emerging community of scholars calling 
themselves scientists, but the century ended with nature viewed as a trans-
disciplinary collage by communities of engineers, technologists, scientists 
and funding agencies. The twentieth century began with the high-school 
science curriculum divided into the content of physics, chemistry, biology 
and geology, taught to an occupational elite. The century ended with a 
curriculum that adhered largely to its nineteenth-century roots, in spite of 
many innovative attempts to change it. In short, school science resisted co-
evolving with western science during the twentieth century. This successful 
resistance suggests that school science must somehow be serving the 
interests of dominant stakeholders who enjoy social, economic and political 
power in society. (Aikenhead, 2000, p.257) 
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While learning science is clearly important in its own right, the subject matter, as 
traditionally presented in the school curriculum, lends itself to ‘correct or 
incorrect’ methods of teaching and evaluation, (Doll, 1998), and avoids the 
‘messy’ social/ethical dimensions of ‘real science’ (Gough, 1998). It is possibly 
also for this reason that science (along with mathematics) has proved suitable to 
play a gate-keeping role in an increasingly technicist (see fn.22, p.62) notion of 
education.  
 
Duschl’s review of the then ‘contemporary crisis in science education’ is now 
over 20 years old (Duschl, 1985). At that time, he viewed the problem as 
stemming from around 1960, at the beginning of the space race era. Similarly, 
echoing the discussion of scientism in Wāhanga Tuarua, William Doll (1993) 
notes this was when modern science ‘expanded from a discipline or a procedure 
into a dogma’: 
Such adoration of science, its deification, probably reached its height of 
influence in the early 1960s, shortly after Sputnik and just at the beginning 
of the curriculum reform movement. (Doll, 1993, p.2, original emphasis) 
 
At that time, scientists were put in charge of science curriculum development, but 
‘ignored developments in the history and philosophy of science which have been 
shown to have significant implications for science education’ (Duschl, 1985, 
p.551) in favour of teaching ‘science as inquiry’ in ways that reinforce ‘scientific 
ideology’, and have proved difficult to dislodge in subsequent developments, such 
as multicultural science education (see Wāhanga Tuatoru). Here, Duschl uses the 
term ‘science ideology’ to mean a misrepresentation of the contemporary canons 
of philosophy of science, which differs from the usage by Canguilhem as 
‘outdated science’ (discussed on p.54). Duschl’s usage of ‘science ideology’ is 
synonomous with ‘scientism’ as defined above (p.50).  
 
Duschl traced the vast increase in funding for science curriculum that occurred 
during the period of these science community-driven ‘reforms’. This is 
significant, because the trends discussed in the mid-1980s by Duschl continue 
today. The current ‘troubling decline’ in tertiary science enrolments, which leads 
to a shortfall in projected numbers of scientists (feared to threaten US/UK 
dominance on the world stage - see the Young, 1989, quote below), is currently 
reported in terms of ‘crisis’ in both the US (Science and Engineering Indicators 
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2004, National Science Board; Jackson, 2004) and UK (Curtis, 2003) – for which, 
unsurprisingly, the remedy called for is more funding for science education.  
Postmodernism and Multiculturalism: Oppositional Politics of 
Knowledge 
When postmodernist ideas address the ethical and political questions over the use 
of science, education, or other dominant discourses as power, they are relevant to 
Māori interests (Webster, 1993a; 1993b). Doll (1993), for example, while 
acknowledging the lack of consensus on what postmodernism is, or what it 
implies for education and curriculum, suggests that ‘a critical reappraisal of 
modern modes of thought’ (p.5, my emphasis) is a key element of postmodernism. 
In contrast, surveying the meanings that ‘gather round’ the term, Dick Hebdige 
(1996) lists the following types of postmodernism: neo-conservative, anti-
modernist, critical, and ludic. Of these, only ‘critical postmodernism’ (defined by 
Hebdige as ‘all those strategies which set out to dismantle the power of the white 
male author as a privileged source of meaning and value,’ p.178) is clearly 
aligned with Kaupapa Māori, since the other three versions do not necessarily 
question power and privilege.  
 
McLaren (1995) suggests using the adjective postmodern ‘only in its most general 
sense’ to refer to ‘the cultural logic or sensibility currently organising aspects of 
everyday life’ (p.13). Here the term postmodern is used primarily as a signal of 
recognition that ‘the modern world is now a thing of the past’ (Toulmin, 1982, 
p.254). As Robert Young (1990) puts it: 
Postmodernism can best be defined as European culture’s awareness that it 
is no longer the unquestioned and dominant centre of the world. (p.19) 
 
Robert E. Young (1989) makes a more pointedly political observation: 
the spectre of a shift in the geo-political centre of gravity to a point 
somewhere between China, Japan, and India shrieks its way through 
neoconservative demonology. (p.50) 
 
In these observations, while resonating with the theme of ‘de-centring 
Eurocentrism’, postmodernism appears to refer primarily to an era in time, 
meaning something like ‘after modernism’ (Peters, 1996). Posited from a Euro-
American perspective, it calls into question the relevance of postmodernism to a 
researcher operating in a non-European cultural paradigm such as Kaupapa Māori 
research. It supports a conclusion that a better qualifier for ‘science’ in Pūtaiao 
may well be ‘critical’ (or perhaps ‘poststructural’, see p.66), rather than 
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‘postmodern’. Critical viewpoints (as discussed in Wāhanga 1.3, p.7), are 
primarily concerned with the politics of knowledge/power, concerns which are 
central to a Kaupapa Māori perspective.  
 
In the multicultural science education literature (Wāhanga Tuatoru), 
postmodernism is either enlisted or demonised, as suits the author’s purpose, often 
without adequate definition as to what notion of postmodernism is being invoked. 
For example, David Blades (1997) uses postmodernism to explore lack of change 
in science curriculum reform projects in Canada, while Hadi-Tabassum (2003) 
examines postmodernist perspectives in the Latin US science classroom. More 
commonly, postmodernism has been cited in support of the inclusion of IK in the 
science curriculum (Prakash, 1999), although the relevance of this argument to 
Pūtaiao was queried above.  
 
Michel Foucault, despite his frequent citation by other scholars (such as 
educators, including the first two cited in the previous paragraph) in association 
with ‘postmodernist’ influences in social science, professed himself unable to 
understand the meaning of the term ‘postmodernity’, or what kind of problem is 
common to postmodernist or poststructuralist thinkers (Peters, 1996). Michael 
Peters describes ‘postmodernism’ and ‘postmodernity’ as ‘catch-all concepts’ 
(p.34), holding in common an attitude (following Lyotard) of ‘an incredulity 
towards meta-narratives’ (p.54). This is a more useful understanding of 
postmodernism (than that of era, above), since it allows for the ongoing 
continuance of the conditions of modernity, and the tension between 
postmodernism and modernist doctrines at various levels, including Marxism, 
liberalism, structuralism and positivism.  
 
The link between multiculturalism and postmodernism consists of common 
central notions in both traditions, prominently the pair of notions of ‘(the 
decentring of) Eurocentrism’ and ‘incommensurability’. Some regard it as a 
‘troubled alliance’ (Webster, 1996), in suggesting that postmodernism is not 
necessarily in the interests of ‘other’ cultures. For example, noting that ‘ethnic 
movements avail themselves of the image of their culture appearing in 
postmodernist theory’, Webster (1993, p.2) concludes that ‘Māori culture appears 
to have become postmodernised,’ because ‘appearances of contemporary Māori 
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culture are ideologically separated from the everyday realities of Māori society.’ 
Webster’s analysis of the Māori Renaissance is discussed more fully below 
(p.104). 
 
There are at least two ways the notion of incommensurability is relevant to 
Pūtaiao curriculum. Firstly, the ‘incommensurability thesis’ is debated in 
epistemology of science, a thesis and debate independent of (while perhaps 
foundational to) the question of postmodernity (Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey, 
2001). Secondly, there is the postmodernist notion of the ‘differend’ (Lyotard, 
1988), which signifies the presence of discontinuous or incommensurable 
discourses, i.e. discourses that are unable to be judged according to the same 
criteria, a description clearly applicable to the dissonance between Māori and 
Pākehā culture. ‘One side’s legitimacy does not imply the other’s lack of 
legitimacy’ (ibid p.xi). As worldwide transport and communication networks have 
developed, the number of contacts/conflicts between such incommensurable 
discourses has skyrocketed, as a state of globalization has become increasingly 
realized (King, 1991; Jesson, 1999; Fitzsimons, 2001). Thus, arguments around 
incommensurability and identity, or difference versus sameness, arise at various 
levels in considering Pūtaiao, namely: curriculum content and pedagogy, language 
and thought, science and philosophy, ethnicity and culture.    
 
This means, as noted above, binary oppositions25 are rife throughout this topic. 
In one interesting example, linguist Sydney Lamb describes a basic dualism in 
‘cognitive style’ (and hence philosophical approach) as follows: 
To put it simply, we may say that “lumpers” and “splitters” operate in 
different cognitive styles. As cognitive style manifests itself broadly in 
thinking patterns, we can expect to find correlations between views in one 
area and those in another. Consider the three contrasts ... to illustrate “core 
philosophical differences”: “absolutism vs. relativism; monogenism vs. 
polygenism; “lumpers” vs. “splitters.”  We may conjecture that absolutism 
goes with “splittism” and that relativism correlates with “lumpism.” (Lamb, 
2004,  p.496) 
 
Lamb relates these observations to the growing understanding of the purposes and 
functions of the left and right hemispheres of the brain, and how these co-operate 
in the tasks required by language: the left brain ‘is the home of that part of 
linguistic structure - most of that traditionally studied by linguists - that operates 
by making sharp contrasts’ (p.500).  
                                                 
25 A favourite theme of John Dewey (1938; also see Peters, 1977). 
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Thus it is very important for linguistic communication that /p/ be distinct 
from /b/, and even segments which are intermediate phonetically between 
these two are perceived as one or the other - binary perception of 
continuously varying phenomena. (ibid) 
 
The right brain takes care of ‘aspects of phonology’ ‘includ[ing] intonation, stress, 
duration of vowels - phenomena where sharpness of contrast plays a more 
peripheral role’. Other right brain functions ‘include not only prosodic features 
but also pragmatics and much of semantics’ (ibid), ‘holistic thinking as well as 
intuition’ (p.501). Lamb concludes by speculating that ‘lumper-thinking is right-
brain driven, while splitter-thinking, like most thinking that goes on in academic 
circles, relies heavily on left-brain activity’ (p.502), and calling for greater 
acceptance of each thinking type by those of the other.   
Pūtaiao as ‘Bricolage’ 
Lamb’s ideas, while speculative, provide an encompassing, unitary view on many 
of the questions underlying Pūtaiao, although their main purpose here is to 
illustrate the widespread occurrence, and the futility, of binary oppositions, or 
dialectical polarities. In the sense that such arguments imply an acceptance of one 
view or the other as ‘truth’, this betrays a commitment to grand narratives, hence 
returning to the discursive concerns of postmodernity, raised above. To 
investigate the question of postmodernity, Peters (1996) reviewed the debate 
between the Frankfurt School critical theorists, especially Habermas, and the 
French poststructuralists, ‘principally Jacques Derrida, Foucault and Jean-
François Lyotard’ (p.33). This debate is relevant to the argument for favouring 
‘critical’ over ‘postmodern’ as the more useful perspective on (or qualifier for) 
science, for the purposes of Pūtaiao curriculum development. A postmodernist 
attitude, nonetheless, points to the wisdom of incorporating aspects of both sides 
of a duality - a ‘both-and’ approach, in contrast with ‘either-or’ thinking (lumper- 
rather than splitter-thinking? - Lamb, 2004). It echoes the recommendation by 
Smith (1995) for an ‘eclectic’ approach to science education for Māori students 
(see p.63 above), and refines the understanding of ethnicity (discussed in 
Wāhanga Tuatahi above) as a ‘tension or balance’ between the poles of 
primordialist and situational understandings. In the postmodern view, compromise 
between opposing positions is envisaged as a ‘bricolage’, where elements from 
both sides of a dualism intermingle (with hybrid strength), rather than as a 
theoretical ‘balancing act’ (with the limitation of movement, and danger, that 
implies).  To apply postmodernism to my topic in this way, while simplistic, is 
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useful in providing a richer perspective on how to regard and negotiate the various 
important dialectical polarities arising in the discourses related to Pūtaiao.  
 
4.1 Cultural Politics and Pūtaiao 
A Kaupapa Māori approach to science education requires an informed view of the 
sociopolitical relationship between Māori and Pākehā, and how this impacts on 
the Pūtaiao curriculum via the debates in knowledge and language. A 
sociopolitical lens focuses specifically on notions such as ethnicity (Hall, 1991), 
nationalism (Eriksen, 2002) and globalisation (King, 1991). These notions impact 
significantly on the multicultural science education debates examined in the 
previous chapter, yet there are often treated superficially, such as in the 
essentialising treatment of indigenous students in science education research (p.79 
above).  
Multiculturalism and the Canon 
The oppositional discourse, in its attack on the canon, in its construction of 
countercanons, in its flows and molecular structures, runs the risk of 
becoming what it opposes, dissolving all texts, secular and canonical, into an 
endless stream of interpretation within which a secure foothold, however 
tentative, is unlikely. ... How do we avoid the fixity of form and the 
dissolution of formlessness? (Taubman, 1993) 
 
Pūtaiao has received little previous attention in sociopolitical debates, so 
analogies are important in reading the literature on culture. The first of these 
involves the similarities between Māori cultural politics and those of other 
indigenous ethnies, which underpin the international indigenous academic identity 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005), founded on early work such as that of Frantz Fanon 
(1965). Thus, for example, Stuart Hall’s comments on culture, below, are 
considered relevant to the contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand situation.  
 
Also, the literary canon plays an analogous role in the language debates to that 
played by the Standard Account in science (p.48 above). The link is the 
Eurocentric notion of ‘the best that has been thought and known’ (West, 1993). 
Canons of literature have featured prominently in the postcolonial scholarship on 
notions of authenticity and representation (Spivak, 1987; Hall, 1991; Said, 
1995).    
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To what extent do the cultural politics of literature apply to science? In terms of 
Bourdieu’s (1991) notion of forms of symbolic power, all languages are 
theoretically equal, separate constructions arising from the characteristics of the 
species (Sapir, 1933 p.7; Ricento, 2000, p.12). Hence English is argued to be the 
‘accidental’ language of science (Kaplan, 2001). By contrast, W-science is a pan-
human construction, to which all cultures, not just the British (or Western), have 
contributed (irrespective of the prevalent ideological narratives of its 
representation). IK is elided with modern science when this cross-cultural 
distinction between the debates in knowledge and language is not recognised. To 
answer the above question, while access to canons of both literature and science is 
controlled by interpersonal power in many ways, science knowledge is 
fundamentally constrained by our ability to measure the space-time continuum in 
ways that literature or art is not (Spivak, 1990). Perhaps the space-time 
dimensional scales within which science operates can be considered its essential, 
foundational ‘text’ - the equivalent of the ‘No!’ (‘primal father’) which Taubman 
(1993, p.37) suggested forms the ‘canonical unconscious’ and, in so doing, 
structures the literary canon. For this reason, in Wāhanga Tuarima, ‘space and 
time’ are considered as fundamental, cross-cultural science concepts. 
 
This analogy is useful in discussing the wider multicultural curriculum debate, 
much of which has arisen within the discipline of English (and its sub-disciplines 
such as Film Studies), with literary criticism playing an important role in the 
(post-)disciplinary history of Cultural Studies (Hall in Morley and Chen, 1996, 
p.401). The analogy allows a more productive reading of the language ideological 
debates concerning questions of authenticity and translation of knowledge 
content, since the published studies on these questions have generally focused on 
literature rather than science (Blommaert, 1999). Besides suggesting how the two 
debates (in knowledge and language) come to occupy a similar position in relation 
to cultural politics, the analogy also highlights an important difference between 
the two. The ‘Law of the Canon’ (Taubman, 1993, p.45) is dynamic, changing as 
society changes (in detailed outline, if not in efficacy), but the laws of 
thermodynamics, while permanently open to challenge and refinement, are not (as 
the prospect of global warming seems ready to remind us).  
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The literary canon is a representation of our culture, thus of our identity (Pinar, 
1993, p.69), our collective self. The scientific canon is a representation of the 
world/environment, the not-us (the known in relation to the knower). This 
metaphor suggests how the literature on culture in the curriculum can be viewed 
from the perspective of Pūtaiao. Multiculturalism in the science curriculum is 
rightly concerned with the ‘unconsciousnesses’ of science that produce sexist, 
racist and scientistic thinking and practice; but this does not necessarily call into 
question the central canons of science knowledge. The canon of literature, 
however, is comparatively more determined by politics or interpersonal power. 
This is why the methods that involve changing the canon, by which multicultural 
reform has operated at the level of the classroom to achieve positive results in 
other curriculum areas, such as English (e.g. Macbeth in Māori costume) or Art 
programes drawing on multicultural traditions, are unavailable to science 
education. Canon considerations also help explain the difficulty with basing 
Pūtaiao curriculum on the science found in Māori contexts, such as the chemistry 
of rongoā (traditional plant remedies). Although making rongoā in the science 
classroom would be useful in early chemistry learning (e.g. to illustrate solubility 
behaviour), to go further into the chemistry of rongoā requires much more 
advanced knowledge, while not teaching central concepts of chemistry (i.e. the 
canon), as is generally considered important in school science. This is why 
attempts to base science education on, for example, Māori contexts, often result in 
‘soft options’, in which the social and ethical dimensions are covered at the 
expense of the canonical science knowledge (Cajete, 1999; Phillips, 1987). 
Identity and the Politics of Representation 
Ideas of culture and ethnicity depend on the foundational notion of identity. 
Australian authors Peter Ninnes and Greg Burnett (2001) situate their ‘research on 
science textbooks [in] a larger project concerning the representation of diverse 
knowledges and identities’ (p.26), in this paper focusing on Aotearoa New 
Zealand science texts. Our local science education is thus a useful context for their 
representational research. Five ‘aspects of postcolonial theory considered 
particularly relevant to an analysis of representations’ (Ninnes and Burnett, 2001, 
p.26) are listed below, the first three being described as ‘paradigm notions’, and 
the last two as methods, which are useful in a ‘postcolonialist stocktake’:  
1. ‘Colonial practices continue ... in Aotearoa New Zealand’ including 
control of Māori through representation in curricula; 
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2. Representation of Māori (and other minority groups) is typically 
essentialist (reifying); 
3. Construction of cultural binaries ‘exaggerate difference between groups 
and mask diversity within (i.e. homogenise) groups’; 
4. Exoticizing ‘process[es] of constructing the “other” (Said, 1978)’ (p.27) 
can be explored; 
5. The use of textual devices (such as past tense) can be analysed and 
exposed. (p.26-7) 
 
These points are relevant in the cultural politics of Pūtaiao, and in the research 
methodology, i.e. Kaupapa Māori discourse analysis, adopted in this thesis (see 
analysis of Firth, 1972, in Wāhanga Tuarima). Their following comments reflect 
the problems faced by multicultural science education, explored above in 
Wāhanga Tuatoru: 
While the curriculum and the textbooks display evidence of substantial 
efforts to represent diverse knowledges, our analysis suggests this is 
primarily a means of appropriating these diverse perspectives for the cause 
of promoting and teaching western science, which in turn acts to control and 
subjugate these knowledges ... the spatial positioning of particular ‘other’ 
knowledges appears to act to relegate them to a lower status than ‘western 
science’ ... Finally, the textbooks and the curriculum tend to adopt unitary or 
constructivist views of science (or both), and rarely address issues of power, 
colonialism, imperialism, race and so on ... there clearly needs to be a greater 
effort to examine the historical and political relationships between science 
and Māori. (Ninnes and Burnett, 2001, p.35) 
 
Various delineations of the underlying notion of ‘identity’ have been proposed. 
Peter Taubman (1993) provided a succinct, useful model, comprising ‘three 
separate but interactive registers’ (p.288) which he uses to comment on 
approaches to multicultural and antibias curriculum. His model is summarised 
below:  




Characteristics of each 
register: 
Drawbacks, consequences 
of losing dialectical tension: 
Fictional  
Identity as a construct of 
language; appeals to 
poststructuralism (Lacan, 
Foucault, Derrida) 





Ground for action 
‘identity in motion’ 
sense of community 
cultural literacy 
Becomes fixed, immobile; 
monumentalisation; 
essentialism; 




determinism; the existential 
subject (Habermas, Stern) 
Naïve, limited, incomplete; 
leads to self-interested 




Although the registers cannot be collapsed onto one another, they can be 
held in a dialectical tension with each other. They are only useful if they are 
in tension with each other. If multicultural or antibias education is 
introduced from within only one register, the result is a distortion in thought 
and action. (Taubman, 1993, p.303, original emphasis) 
 
Taubman contends that most approaches to multicultural and antibias education, 
while grounded in the communal register of identity, have fallen into the ‘trap’ by 
‘relinquish[ing] the tension’ thus becoming ‘the frozen identity emerging in the 
first register’ (p.299). He also employs the model to analyse the criticism of 
multicultural and antibias approaches by certain ‘conservative educators’ as using 
the autobiographical register from which to decry the ‘particularism’ and ‘ethnic 
chauvinism’ of multicultural education, which they claim ‘denies the individual 
and the transcendental humanity of the subject’ while unconsciously fixing the 
other two registers in the dominant (white male) culture, termed ‘the common 
culture’ (p.302). ‘It is a majoritarian particularism masquerading as universalism’ 
(May, 2001, p.309). Therefore, 
current approaches to multicultural and antibias education are simplistic and 
flawed. Not only have they failed to address how identity is formed, what it 
might mean, and how it functions, but they have left unexplored the way the 
approaches themselves consciously or unconsciously are used to create 
identities. (Taubman, 1993, p.287-8) 
 
 
Wlad Godzich assigns terms to various notions of agency in identity, according to 
era (cited in McLaren, 1995, p.237-8): 
• pre-modern  - persons 
• modern  - individuals 
• postmodern  - subjects. 
 
For example, in traditional, pre-modern Māori society, the connections in the 
social fabric (whakapapa) were known for most people, and considered vital in 
relationships - in other words, they were unique ‘persons’. This contrasts with the 
modern view, which envisages individuals as interchangeable ‘atoms’ in the 
‘machine’ of society. This view holds that on a ‘level playing field’, individuals 
who are well socialised and have marketable skills can succeed. The modern 
identity still prevails, but is morphing increasingly and unevenly towards forms of 
postmodern identity. The postmodern identity is composed of subjectivities of 
‘production and consumption’ – ‘exploited not for collective ends but for private 
rituals of self-fashioning’ (McLaren, 1995, p.238). These ideas are particularly 
relevant to teachers because of the important role played by schools in 
maintaining and reproducing students’ ideas about identity, society and culture. 
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McLaren argues for the importance of teacher awareness of these issues, as part of 
‘critical pedagogy’. His challenge to schools is that they should not become 
‘ultimately reproductive mechanisms for new forms of subjectivity based on a 
merging of identity and the fetishized consumer object’ (p.238-9). 
 
Part of the colonising message about identity to Māori was ‘You will never be like 
us’ (see p.48). Echoing this, Hall (1996) identifies the ‘mark of difference’ as the 
essential meaning of ‘black’ in ‘black popular culture’, which by analogy can also 
be considered the ‘essential meaning of Māori’ in notions of ‘modern Māori 
identity’. To Hall, ‘black’ (or ‘Māori’) signifies the ‘historical experience’, the 
‘distinctive cultural repertoires’, and the ‘counter-narratives’. Hall argues that 
cultural politics needs to move beyond the dialectical ‘zero-sum game’  within 
which the term ‘popular culture’ acquires meaning in the  
mapping of culture between the high and the low [in] four symbolic domains 
... in psychic forms, in the human body, in space, and in the social order. ... It 
is therefore necessary to deconstruct the popular once and for all. There is no 
going back to an innocent view of what it means. (Hall, 1996, p.468-9) 
 
Hall uses ‘innocent’ to describe a view which fails to acknowledge that popular 
culture is that which is excluded from the canon (connecting it to the discussion of 
canons above). Hall goes on  
to insist that in black popular culture, strictly speaking, ethnographically 
speaking, there are no pure forms at all. Always these forms are the product 
of partial synchronization, of engagement across cultural boundaries... 
Always these forms are impure, to some degree hybridized from a 
vernacular base... They are not the recovery of something pure that we can, 
at last, live by ... they are what the modern is. (Hall, 1996, p.473) 
 
Hall’s comments concern aesthetics – literature, cuisine, film, music, etc – not 
science. Nevertheless, the canon analogy developed above suggests ‘modern 
science’ and ‘IK’ have come to occupy equivalent positions in the debates, as high 
(sanctioned/scientific) and low (popular/customary) knowledge, respectively.    
Deconstructing the Dialectics of Authenticity 
Some authors attempt to argue that Māori culture and ethnicity is constructed 
(Hanson, 1989; Rata, 2003), therefore not ‘real’ (authentic), so it can/should be 
disregarded/dismissed. An opposing, more widely supported view holds that ALL 
human culture is constructed, and all ethnicities (Hastrup, 1982); therefore all 
culture is authentic (Levi-Strauss, 1977). This latter position is more pro-Māori 
than the former, yet nevertheless it fails to provide grounds for evaluating cultural 
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projects and developments, such as Pūtaiao. The problem remains of defining the 
required criteria. Both views tend towards the extremes of either instrumentalism 
or relativism, which are both unhelpful, as explained below, to the interests of 
indigenous ethnies, such as Māori.  
 
Instrumental-only thinking with regard to culture tends to value its economic 
worth exclusively, with the resultant losses of smaller cultures, concomitant with 
globalising trends throughout the last three to four centuries. Cultural relativism, 
while seemingly opposite to instrumentalism, leads to the same result, though less 
forthrightly, since if all cultures are thought of as being of equal ‘value’, then 
what ‘counts’ in the world is something other than culture (Borg, Mayo et al., 
1998). This is analogous to the ‘pluralist sciences’ position which holds that all 
cultural knowledge systems are of equal value, yet fails to disturb the hegemony 
of, or even to critique, the dominant form (Loving, 1995).  
 
This polarity is expressed in general terms as cultural relativism versus cultural 
imperialism (out of which instrumentalism arises). Like the science dipole of 
scientism and anti-science discussed above, both extreme positions are hostile to 
Māori or indigenous interests. Putnam acknowledges this when he notes 
relativism’s ‘respectable appeal [to] those who fear that the alternative to cultural 
relativism is cultural imperialism’ (Putnam, 2004, p.45). But his main point is that 
the dipole is reinforced (if not formed) by the ‘fact/value dichotomy’ 
characteristic of W-science, and influential throughout most domains of a 
‘scientific’ culture: 
recognizing that our judgments claim objective validity and recognizing that 
they are shaped by a particular culture and by a particular problematic 
situation are not incompatible. And this is true of scientific questions as well 
as ethical ones. The solution is neither to give up on the very possibility of 
rational discussion nor to seek an Archimedean point, an ‘absolute 
conception’ outside of all contexts and problematic situations, but - as 
Dewey taught his whole life long - to investigate and discuss and try things 
out cooperatively, democratically, and above all fallibilistically (ibid, 
original emphasis). 
 
In other words, for both science and culture, Putnam argues that viewing the 
situation in terms of oppositional either-or polarities is unhelpful and unrealistic. 
In education, this cultural dipole is listed as one of seven characteristics of 
‘traditional pedagogy’ (Young, 1989 p.96), which is defined here as ‘teaching a 
pre-decided curriculum’:   
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Whether this curriculum is the curriculum of the establishment or a 
subversive curriculum, its pedagogical structure is the same. It displays 
teaching methods [which ... either] conceive of the world from the 
standpoint of a dominant culture or dogmatically reject the possibility of 
evaluative comparison of cultures altogether, that is, they embrace either 
cultural imperialism or relativism (Young, 1989, p.96-7) 
 
Said suggested ‘the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation 
of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are 
representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, 
institutions, and political ambience of the representer’ (Said, 1978, p.272). 
Authentic representation remains a focus of concern in indigenous language 
education literature (Henze and Davis, 1999). It is problematic in relation to both 
the language and knowledge content of Pūtaiao programmes. Underlying both of 
these, however, as the above discussion highlights, is the question of authenticity 
of modern Māori identity, on which the existence of KKM depends, and which 
KKM in turn supports. While the ‘identity’ of KKM depends on a specific point 
of view, the ‘identity’ of the science knowledge content of Pūtaiao programmes 
assumes a universal truth in speaking for all. The philosophical disjunctions 
between these various levels of debate concerning identity, authenticity and 
representation have yet to be widely debated or addressed by practitioners, 
policymakers and developers of Pūtaiao.   
 
Traditional Māori knowledge, social structures, and language have been 
increasingly lost since colonisation began, yet Māori cultural roots remain to some 
degree intact. Despite widespread use, such as in ‘Kaupapa Māori research’, the 
term ‘Māori’ is understood to be a ‘construct’ in the sense of a recent identity 
concept, contingent on colonisation (Papesch, 2006). We recall that in traditional 
reo it takes a small ‘m’ (see quote on p.48) and means ‘ordinary’ or ‘normal’, as 
in wai māori (fresh water) as opposed to wai tai (seawater).  Wiremu notes its 
usage for Māori people, and as an adjective meaning ‘belonging to Aotearoa New 
Zealand’, started in around 1850 (Williams, 1971, p.179).  
 
Along these lines, a more ‘authentic’ way for me to describe myself is through my 
identity of iwi (Ngāpuhi), hapū (Ngāti Kura), and marae (Te Tāpui, ki Matauri i te 
Taitokerau). My ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as Māori may be an ideological construct, 
along with the notion of ‘race’ itself, but my iwi identity is socially constructed 
and maintained through ‘processes of discourse’ known as whakapapa (T. Smith, 
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2000), based on genetic history (see also John Rangihau, cited in Roberts, 
Norman et al., 1996, p.8). In this sense, Kaupapa Māori concepts of ethnicity 
retain some adherence to the primordialist view (see discussion p.11), without, of 
course, regarding primordialism as an adequate concept of ethnic identity. In 
terms of Taubman’s model of identity (Whika 8, p.99), modern Māori identity 
draws more easily than modern mainstream identity on the communal register; 
while in Godzich’s terms (p.100), modern Māori identity retains a relatively 
greater degree of pre-modern agency or ‘personhood’, in comparison with the 
contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand mainstream identity. These are important 
comparisons in notions of ‘authentic’ identity. 
 
Thus the notion of authenticity, applied to aspects of human culture such as 
language or ethnicity, makes sense only as a relative, rather than absolute, 
concept; so while some particular examples of te reo me ōna tikanga might 
usefully be regarded as more or less authentic than others, it is impossible to make 
‘objective’ binary judgements (as ‘authentic’ or ‘inauthentic’). This argument for 
authenticity does not apply, however, to the canon of basic laws of science, which 
apply equally to all inhabitants of this planet. This invalidates the science-IK 
high-low bipolarity described above (p.101). It also highlights the importance of 
the boundaries of science, and particularly of its canon, in terms of its legitimate 
concerns, and its effects in society.   
Marketing the Māori Renaissance 
It is commonplace to refer to the ‘Māori Renaissance since the early 1970s’ 
(Webster, 1998, p.14) in accounts of the improvement in official attitudes towards 
the Treaty of Waitangi, including its widespread acknowledgement as basis for 
the legal rights of te reo me ōna tikanga (Nepe, 1991, Harlow, 2003). On the other 
hand, some commentators suggest the Māori Renaissance exists primarily at an 
‘ideological’ level, supported (if not engineered) by colonialist interests, in order 
to draw attention away from the lack of ‘real’ change for Māori (Webster, 1993a; 
Webster, 1993b). As a population, Māori, while growing faster during these 
recent decades, compared with Pākehā, continue to be over-represented in the 
negative social indices (Mulholland, 2006). Paradoxically, ‘some of these indices 
have actually worsened during the Renaissance’ (Webster, 1998, p.25). Webster 
gives as example the rates of readmission for serious psychotic illnesses, which 
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for Māori increased by 40% over the decade 1981-1990, while Pākehā rates fell 
by almost one quarter (ibid). 
  
It is also suggested that renewed Māori protest from approximately 1975, 
particularly the Springbok rugby tour protest in 1981, effectively stimulated the 
social conscience of mainstream Aotearoa New Zealand (Walker, 1996; Webster, 
1998). This may have been part of a growing international concern for ethics 
during the 20th century, particularly following World War II (Spoonley, 
Macpherson et al., 2004). Research suggests, however, that racial prejudice in 
Aotearoa New Zealand has not actually disappeared, but has become more 
concealed (the ‘geological’ metaphor of subterranean forces; Wetherell and 
Potter, 1992, p.208). Relatedly, discussing ‘the cultural politics of guilt,’ Avril 
Bell (2004) illustrates how dominant positions of both refusal and acceptance of 
guilt by Pākehā allow ‘the avoidance of engagement and responsibility’ (p.90), 
both hence proving futile for Māori interests. 
 
Thus, the ‘Māori Renaissance’ has prominently featured Māori-medium education 
and media, but shows little sign of translating into improvement of the negative 
statistical indices of the Māori population overall. Evan Poata-Smith (2004) 
details how ‘the vast majority of Māori families have borne the brunt of the 
economic restructuring’ (p.60) of the last two decades. Departure of  
manufacturing industries to third world countries, and increasing mechanization in 
agriculture and other primary industries, are recent capitalist trends which have 
significantly increased unemployment amongst Māori and Pasifika people. New 
social scourges, such as ‘P’ and neighbourhood gaming, have further debilitated 
these sectors of the population.  
 
Steven Webster traces the development of a ‘contradictory and sometimes 
ideological’ relationship between perceptions and realities of Māori culture back 
to the notion of ‘Māoritanga’ (as a domesticated ‘race pride’) developed by 
‘anthropologists and administrators’ in the 1920s (Webster, 1998, p.74).   
If a better understanding of contemporary Māori society is to be achieved, 
Māori culture must not be understood abstractly in the Romantic tradition as 
‘a whole way of life’ somehow unique, integral, harmonious, and Other than 
that supposedly led by European societies. This preconception sometimes 
obscures and is even a mystification of the other side of Māori culture as it is 
lived, more or less consciously by most Māori in their daily lives. ... Few 
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Māori benefiting from the Māori Renaissance are not painfully aware of this 
other side of Māori culture, and aware that regardless of their more 
privileged status and opportunities, it is their culture too. (p.48-9) 
 
Webster’s analysis problematises the ‘Māori Renaissance’, but does not clearly 
explain why state education policy reversed over 60 years, from paying teachers 
to ensure children did not speak Māori, to paying teachers to ensure that these 
same people’s mokopuna (grandchildren) speak only in Māori. Thus, a kaumātua, 
speaking at the opening of a new kura (school) in Auckland in 1993, recalled his 
own childhood experience in the 1930s of being punished for speaking his home 
language (labelled ‘swearing’ by teachers), and contrasted this with the rule of 
‘kōrero Māori anake’ (speak Māori only), which today operates in Kura Kaupapa 
Māori. 
 
Foucault’s perspective on power in society provides a cogent understanding of 
this remarkable change (Foucault, 2001). Foucault explains power as discourse, 
likened to a conversation that power holds with itself (not, as I might previously 
have thought, between ‘more powerful’ and ‘less powerful’ in society, a model of 
discourse essentially as a hui or debate). So what change in the self-image of the 
Aotearoa New Zealand government would account for the changes in its support 
of te reo me ōna tikanga over the last one or two generations, yet still explain the 
marginalised position today of most Māori in society? To answer this, I will 
recapitulate the history of the Māori Renaissance, following Webster’s (1998) 
analysis, and borrowing McLaren’s (2005) ruthless political cynicism, from the 
perspective of Pūtaiao. 
 
The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840, shortly before the major period of 
armed struggle between Britain and iwi. In the 1860s, the bulk of military power 
available to Britain was brought to bear on Māori until they surrendered, and in  
the process had much of their property confiscated (as punishment for ‘rebellion’) 
and turned to needs of the colonisers (Stenhouse, 1999, p.82-3). This historical 
conjuncture makes it difficult to interpret the Treaty as evidence of sincere British 
intent to ‘share’ power with Māori in the new nation of Aotearoa New Zealand. 
As James Belich (1986) and others have noted, it actually supports a view of the 
Treaty as device, a way to forestall the interests of other European colonial 
powers (especially France and Catholicism) and also to prolong, for logistical as 
 107
well as humane reasons, the onset of full British military engagement in her 
distant new colony.  
 
The history of statutory oppression of Māori (in which the Treaty was only one 
event) demonstrates that Māori were perceived over an extensive length of time as 
an actual threat to European power. Science played an important role across the 
entire gamut - institutional, personal, military, philosophical (Harding, 1998) - of 
oppression of Māori, because social Darwinism was used as rational 
reinforcement of Eurocentrist policies and practices (Walker, 1996), a role 
continued by its re-invented ‘modern science’ (actually, scientistic, see p.50) 
guise of catallactics (Devine, 2004). 
  
During the course of the 20th century, as globalisation was increasingly realised, 
humanity became more aware of ethical issues, concomitant with development for 
the first time of the technological capability to destroy itself (and the planet) 
completely (Hannerz, 1991), and with modern genocide on an unprecedented 
scale (Gaita, 2002). Today, every government is under the spotlight of the TV 
camera, and governments’ images are of utmost importance. In 1900 it was 
‘politically correct’ to mourn the imminent extinction of the Māori race, talk of 
‘smoothing down its dying pillow’ (W. Buller, 1884, cited in Stenhouse, 1999, 
p.85). Finally, in 1907, the Tohunga Suppression Act, the most blatant anti-
mātauranga legislation of all (Durie, 1996), was introduced – indicating not only 
that the government finally judged such a law ‘safe’ (no longer carrying a 
significant risk of strengthening banned practices), but also that it was still felt 
necessary (though on largely political/military grounds, not those of 
‘knowledge/rationality’), to counter the growing threat to the government posed 
by Rua Kenana (Williams, 2001). Ironically, James Carroll, an MP of both Māori 
and European heritage, introduced the Bill, and despite reservations expressed by 
Hone Heke and Apirana Ngata (and possibly others), ‘all the Māori MPs 
supported passage of this legislation’ (p.195).  
 
During World War II our new-found national unity was cemented by the 
successes of the Māori Battalion in defence of nation and Empire. Schools were 
no longer required to disrupt intergenerational cultural transmission – urban drift 
and technology had all but completed the process. Webster (1998), discussing this 
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history, concludes Māori have been ‘sold’ a modern renaissance which is more 
symbolic than real. Webster’s Marxian analysis indicts educated (and/or naïve) 
middle-class Māori for conspiring, intentionally or not, to assist the dominant 
forces of economic exploitation in the hegemonic hoodwinking of the iwi into 
believing themselves, and the Treaty, re-positioned in the distribution of power in 
society.  
The commitment of the state to these ideological directions in the Maori 
Renaissance [i.e. its separation from, and contradiction of, Māori social 
reality] since the early 1980s parallels their reactionary restructuring policies 
in other social and economic areas. Thus the lie is given to their support of 
the Renaissance. It was realised that the appearances of the Renaissance 
served these political interests while obscuring the reality of increasing 
integration of Maori in capitalist society, either as part of the new elite or, 
more likely, the increasingly disenfranchised and impoverished. (Webster, 
1998, p.156) 
 
But, as the new millennium approached, a different danger to the nation-state 
arose, one unimaginable at the beginning of the century. Surveys revealed rapid 
decline in the number of speakers of te reo Māori (Benton, 1997). As international 
recognition of severe global language and cultural losses grew, by about 1985 a 
major policy consideration for the Aotearoa New Zealand government became to 
prevent the extinction of an indigenous language and culture (May, 2005) which 
had received much international attention for many years (Tuhiwai Smith, 1999). 
This sensitivity regarding its international image and position forms a coherent 
reason, according to Foucault’s notion of power, for the ongoing commitment by 
the Aotearoa New Zealand government to fund te reo initiatives such as Māori-
medium education and Māori television. Indeed, the most compelling 
interpretation under economistic thinking for the 180-degree turn, noted 
anecdotally above, in policy on Māori-medium education, is the value of the 
‘Māori brand’ in the global market. For the brand to continue to be useful might 
well depend on Māori identity (hence language) remaining extant. Is it merely 
coincidence that the start of Kura Kaupapa Māori funding coincided with the 
restructuring of our national economy to better suit the needs of global capital? 
The knowledge economy is a challenge to us all. The Māori community, 
including Māori researchers, businesses, educators and iwi groups need to be 
up with the play, and be leaders in using knowledge to generate and develop 
new ideas. The recognition and development of traditional knowledge, 
including respective rights to this, is also a key issue. (Ministry of 
Commerce, 1999, cited in Devine, 2001, p.15) 
 
Webster notes how cultural relativity has contributed to the emergence of 
movements such as Kaupapa Māori: 
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The convergence of postmodernist interests and ethnic politics has promoted 
the anthropological principle of cultural relativity to market brokership: the 
more esoteric or rarified the definition of a culture, the more expertise or 
influence is required to affirm or deny the authenticity of a version. Like 
high art, Other cultures are a long-term investment. (Webster, 1993, p.237, 
my emphasis) 
 
In the context of Pūtaiao, the above analysis of its sociopolitical environment calls 
into question the extent to which government policies for funding Māori-medium 
science education could ever reflect the same set of interests as those which 
(individually and collectively) motivate Māori educationalists. Currently, the 
government provides funding by means of which to contract out to individual 
Māori educators the bulk of the responsibility for Māori-medium education, a 
system which, it appears, has in the last few years created a greater disparity for 
Māori students in mathematics and science education outcomes. ‘With these 
patrons of Māori culture, who needs enemies?’ (Webster, 1998, p.21). While the 
government measures its commitment to social equity by the balance sheet of 
Māori-medium education funding, the ability for those involved (such as myself) 
to improve this system, in terms of outcomes for students, easily becomes lost in 
the ‘bigger picture’ - diffused almost to invisibility across institutions and agents 
concerned with an array of complex and wide-ranging issues. Thus, for example, I 
find myself writing this thesis, exploring the disadvantages for students and 
teachers of current purist language policies, whilst serving on the advisory panel 
for production of a MOE-funded Pūtaiao dictionary, assisting with facilitating the 
next edition of the Pūtaiao curriculum, and, each December, providing script 
translation services for markers of NCEA Science/Pūtaiao and 
Mathematics/Pāngarau examinations.  
Quite unlike Māori land, only the shadow of Māori culture can ever go to the 
Governor.26 ... On the other hand, although culture is in this sense 
inalienable, by the same token one cannot eat it any more than the Māori can 
eat the shadow of their land.  (Webster, 1993, p.238) 
 
4.2 Science Language 
Having attempted to delineate the most cynical pro-Māori view possible on the 
political context in which Pūtaiao curriculum develops (to face, as it were, the 
‘worst-case scenario’ for Māori interests), this section returns to more symbolic 
                                                 
26 Alluding to a kōrero attributed to Nopera Panakareao, a Ngāpuhi rangatira and signatory of the 
Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, reassuring his people that only the shadow of the land was to go to the 
Governor, while the iwi would retain its substance - an assessment he soon ruefully reversed 
(Webster, 1998, p.252).  
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realms of discourse. As noted in Wāhanga Tuatahi, this topic necessitates a 
interdisciplinary approach, which includes aspects of linguistics, as well as 
philosophy, in addition to the more usual sociological educational considerations. 
This section deals with linguistic issues in language shift and planning as they 
relate to Pūtaiao, starting with an introduction to these terms below, before 
considering them in the specific language context of the Māori-medium science 
classroom. 
 
Language planning has been described as an ‘outgrowth of sociolinguistics’ 
(Luke, McHoul et al., 1993). The literature on LPP (language planning and 
policy) reflects a form of applied linguistics arising since World War II, which is 
‘closely tied’ to postcolonial nationhood (Kaplan, 1990). The field is primarily 
concerned with the effects of unequal power on languages, which tend to reflect 
the fortunes of the cultures of their speakers (Wa Thiong'o, 1986), with a few 
becoming predominant, and many others subaltern, corrupt or extinct. These 
processes are collectively referred to as ‘language shift’. Māori is one such 
currently endangered language (Harlow, 2005), for which language planning is 
necessary in the attempt to halt or reverse the massive shift to English, resulting 
from colonial processes, including state education.   
 
Language planning is divided into two parts: status planning, or language 
determination, and corpus planning, or language development (Harlow, 2003). 
This section focuses on language development: status planning for te reo Māori is 
more relevant to the discussion in 4.1 above. Language development can be sub-
divided into 3 aspects: graphisation (or writing system), standardisation, and 
modernisation. Of these, the language issues in Pūtaiao are mainly those of 
modernisation (although standardisation is also involved).  
 
In the Kura Kaupapa Māori framework, language policy is generally understood 
to be reflected in the motto ‘i ngā wā katoa, i ngā wāhi katoa’ (at all times, in all 
places) (May and Hill, 2005); equally, Te Aho Matua (Education Act, 1989, 
s.155A) is considered the definitive statement of kaupapa (philosophy). Kiri 
Powick’s (2001) dissertation, written entirely in Māori (which is worth noting, in 
itself), is a highly relevant example of Kaupapa Māori research on language 
policy within revitalisation. The title is ‘Te Aho Matua. Me pēhea te whakahaere i 
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ngā mātāpono o te wāhanga reo i roto i te akomanga o te Kura Kaupapa Māori?’ 
[How are the language principles of Te Aho Matua implemented in Kura Kaupapa 
Māori classrooms?], and it reports a small interview study with Kura Kaupapa 
Māori teachers. To synopsise the discussion under the heading ‘Te Reo Pākehā’ 
on p.54-6, Powick discusses two conflicting statements in Te Aho Matua (one 
indicating introduction of English in the schoolwork at the ‘right time’, the other 
echoing the above ‘Māori only’ policy) and reports a division amongst Kura 
teachers as to which they endorse, commenting that this confusion is also a price 
paid by the children. Acknowledging te reo Pākehā as the language with mana 
(prestige, power) Powick refers to parents’ worries if their children are not 
competent in English. Since the research indicates a majority of teachers favour a 
Māori-only language policy, Powick asks why, if that was the intent, the 
principles relating to the introduction of English were included in Te Aho Matua: 
Mō ngā tamariki, kia rua ngā reo. Ko te reo o ngā mātua tupuna tuatahi, ko 
te reo o Tauiwi tuarua. Kia ōrite te pakari o ia reo ...’ [For the children, there 
must be two languages. The language of the ancestors first, English second. 
Fluency in each language must be equal ...]. (Mātāpono 2.2, Te Aho Matua, 
cited in Powick, 2001, p.56) 
 
This tension in Kura Kaupapa Māori between the aim of revitalising te reo, and 
that of biliteracy (balanced bilingual literacy), has only very recently begun to 
appear in the research literature. An example is the description of a transition 
programme of English literacy for Year 6-8 Kura Kaupapa Māori students, 
introduced to prepare them for successful learning at secondary school ‘where 
they may be assessed in English, and found to have serious deficiencies in English 
literacy’ (Glynn, Berryman et al., 2005, p.434). 
English, the Global Language 
Recent accounts of the history of linguistic domination of English over te reo 
Māori include May (2004), Spolsky (2005) and Williams (2001, p.115-175). Ours 
is but one part of the larger story of how the English language has arrived at 
contemporary global ‘pre-eminence’, summarized as follows by David Crystal 
(2003) in his acclaimed book, ‘English as a Global Language’: 
In the 17th and 18th centuries English was the language of the leading 
colonial nation - Britain. In the 18th and 19th centuries it was the language 
of the leader of the industrial revolution - also Britain. In the late 19th 
century and the early 20th century it was the language of the leading 
economic power - the USA. As a result, when new technologies brought new 
linguistic opportunities, English emerged as a first-rank language in 
industries which affected all aspects of society - the press, advertising, 
broadcasting, motion pictures, sound recording, transport and 
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communications. At the same time, the world was forging fresh networks of 
international alliances, and there emerged an unprecedented need for a 
lingua franca. Here too, there was a clear first choice. During the first half of 
the 20th century English gradually became a leading language of 
international political, academic, and community meetings. (p.120-121) 
 
Crystal identifies two more recent events, since 1960, which finally ensured the 
position of global dominance which English occupies today: the creation of 
several new countries (ex-colonies) in which English has become the language of 
independence (e.g. Algeria, Ghana, etc) and ‘the electronic revolution, where here 
too English was in the right place (the USA) at the right time (the 1970s)’.   
 
The history of the spread and dominance of English over ‘indigenous’ languages 
around the world is similar in contour to that of science over IK discussed in 
Wāhanga 2.1 above. There is, however, greater emotional attachment involved in 
the language debates, compared with those concerning science and IK. ‘There 
seems to be something about the intimate relationship between language, thought, 
individuality and social identity which generates strong emotions.’ (p.140).  
 
With regard to the dominance of English, Crystal examines two situations 
involving ‘strong emotions’: first, pertinent to Kura Kaupapa Māori, ‘the rejection 
of English’: 
It is inevitable that, in a post-colonial era, there should be a strong reaction 
against continuing to use the language of the former colonial power, and in 
favour of promoting the indigenous languages. (p.124) 
 
The second example is the ‘official English’ movement in contemporary USA, 
which seeks to have English legislated as the ‘official’ language, with associated 
legislation enacted in 27 states by 2002 (p.140). Crystal describes this movement 
as arising from a backlash against recent movements in the USA to maintain 
cultural identity including ‘mother tongues’ (Fishman, 1986) and notes that given 
the polarization and name-calling, it is ‘difficult to see the grounds for 
compromise’.  Linguists have described this movement as ‘a convenient mask for 
the anti-foreigner feeling’ (Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999, p.256) and a prominent 
example of ‘moral panic’ (Cameron, 1995).  
Preventive Linguistics  
Crystal favours the label ‘preventive linguistics’ for the field concerned with 
endangered or minority languages (May, 2001; May, 2003), covered in ‘Language 
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Death’ (Crystal, 2000), the companion volume to that cited above (Crystal, 2003). 
Other associated terminology (such as ‘life’, ‘purity’, ‘hygiene’) indicates the 
tendency to anthropomorphise language discussions. 
 
Preventive linguistics is an updated label for the field of ‘language revival and 
revitalization’ or ‘language regenesis’ (Paulston, Chen et al., 1993). This field has 
generated international scholarship in the past few decades (Grenoble and 
Whaley, 1998; Fishman, 2001), particularly amongst and in relation to indigenous 
communities (e.g. Baldauf and Luke, 1990; Hinton and Hale, 2001; McCarty, 
1996) with te reo Māori often cited in a role of international leadership (Wilson 
and Kamanā, 2001). Such cultural and linguistic resistances and resurgences are 
recent and contested historical processes, united and made unique by common 
links to poststructuralist and/or postmodernist philosophies, the West/non-West 
dichotomy, and the conjuncture with economic globalization and its associated 
Euro-American cultural hegemony. Thus Pūtaiao is part of a wider effort to 
regenerate (or prevent the ‘language death’ of) te reo Māori. Linguist Ray Harlow 
(1993) has commented on the expansion of te reo Māori for mathematics and 
science education: 
Why not, then, follow the international set of terms when turning to Māori? 
This is not a trivial question. Firstly, ... access to scientific writing in other 
languages would be easier... Secondly, coinage would be easier. (p.128) 
 
Borrowing is not in itself destructive27 - but there can be no denying the 
strength of the ideology that places severe restrictions on its use in the 
present case. This attitude is called purism ... in the case of Māori ... by and 
large, purism is restricted to the rejection of the[se] sort of loans from 
English (p.129) 
 
Undue rigour ... has led to the situation, often complained of, that older 
people, for whom the borrowed terms are the usual words, cannot 
understand what is being referred to in the language being promoted in 
schools. The issue of inter-generational mutual intelligibility is not a trivial 
one for Māori language planners, yet the trend seems to be to sacrifice it at 
the altar of purity. (Harlow, 2003, p.39). 
 
In repeated references to purism as ‘non-trivial’, Harlow’s work indicates that 
within the larger socio-cultural processes of revival and revitalisation of te reo 
Māori, purism is a relevant linguistic concern (although, in my own experience, 
seldom identified or discussed as such in the Kura Kaupapa Māori community). 
                                                 
27 This view is not universally accepted: ‘...modernization of terminology occurs mainly by way of 
loans from English rather than using indigenous linguistic resources... Contrary to wide-spread 
opinions, these loans not only affect the receiving languages’ lexicon but also their deeper 
structures.’ (Ammon, 2001, p.ix).  
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This analysis might lead one to question the extent to which the purism evident in 
past and current KKM policies and practice has been followed as a deliberate 
strategy, with due recognition of the complexities involved. Analogously, in the 
context of South America, Nancy Hornberger and Kendall King (1999) canvassed 
attitudes towards linguistic authenticity in the efforts to revitalize Quechua, 
arguing ‘that to impose restrictions on borrowing from Spanish into Quechua 
would project a purist attitude which might ultimately have the effect of hastening 
the death of Quechua’ (p.168). 
 
In another paper, Harlow (2005) delineates purism in te reo Māori as having two 
aspects: one, as discussed above, against word-borrowing from English (although 
Harlow indicates significant syntactical borrowing from English occurs); and the 
other being dialect purism. Harlow points out two manifestations of this: the first, 
which he considers ‘intelligible, if perhaps counterproductive’, is related to 
identity politics (Watts, 1999) at inter-iwi level, and ‘emphasizes a few 
shibboleths at the expense of the far greater similarities between the regional 
variants of Māori’ (Harlow, 2005, p.139). The second manifestation of dialect 
purism is the rejection of any form of standardization of the reo, including 
rejecting any new words on the grounds that they are not part of one’s dialect. A 
related attitude I have encountered is for Wharekura students (invalidly, in my 
view) to blame ‘dialect differences’ for any comprehension difficulties in Pūtaiao, 
an issue particularly pertinent in senior curriculum delivery via video 
conferencing, where the teacher may be in another iwi area. 
Linguistic Purism 
As the discussion so far makes clear, consideration of language issues in Pūtaiao 
is likely to involve either puristic or anti-puristic (Thomas, 1991, p.81) arguments, 
or both. Therefore, understanding the phenomenon of linguistic purism is 
required, in order to adequately evaluate its role in the development of Pūtaiao. 
 
The book ‘Linguistic Purism’, by George Thomas (1991), is a key reference on 
the topic, and forms the basis of the following discussion, hence the fullness of the 
quotations below (most other book-length works on purism are collections e.g. 
Brincat, Boeder et al., 2003). Thomas locates the beginning of scholarship on 
language purism in pre-World War I German, later extending to other European 
languages (Brincat, Boeder et al., 2003) as well as modern Hebrew (Fellman, 
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1973; Saulson, 1979) ‘and, more recently still, the languages of the developing 
world’ (Thomas, 1991, p.13). While the intellectual overlap with preventive 
linguistics (above) is clear, the relationship of these literatures is not 
straightforward. Language purism is viewed ambivalently in the academy 
(Wildgen, 2003), owing to the acceptance of language change processes, which 
purism is presumed to oppose, in the successive mainstream linguistic paradigms 
termed historicism, descriptivism and functionalism (Thomas, 1991, p.3-8). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, its treatment in applied linguistic fields, such as 
the literature on the intersection of culture, politics and language, has often been 
somewhat peremptory (Dorian, 1994; Loffler, 2003; Farfan, 2001), reflecting 
‘years of its exclusion from mainstream linguistics’ (Thomas, 1991, p.10). An 
historical link of language purism with Herder’s views on culture (p.6) constitutes 
further grounds for its rejection as associated with xenophobic nationalism 
(Bourdieu, 1998, p.19), while also providing a link between purism and Whorfian 
‘linguistic relativity’ debates (Fishman, 1960; 1980; p.117 below). 
 
Thomas starts from basic principles, considering the notions of purity, rational 
and non-rational motivations (see below), the language situation, extra-linguistic 
factors and the diachronic (or temporal) aspect, in developing his analysis. 
According to Thomas, purism arises in all standard languages to varying degrees, 
and is identified largely with xenophobic purism, often with one or more of the 
following orientations: elitist, ethnographic, archaising or reformist. Three of his 
10 general hypotheses about purism are particularly relevant to Pūtaiao: 
• The dominant target of purism is vocabulary of foreign origin. 
• Those languages are most prone to xenophobic purism which have 
emancipated themselves from domination by another language of culture 
during the period of nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism. 
• The modernisation of society leads to two conflicting trends: (1) a retreat 
from purism, (2) increased opposition to loanwords. (p.195-206) 
 
In Thomas’s final chapter, linguistic purism is considered as both a strategy and a 
problem in language planning processes. 
If we define language planning as a rational, purposeful and organised 
intervention in language and the social situations in which it operates, it is 
not difficult to see how purism might be seen as part of the scheme. 
However, ... [t]o what extent may purism be described as ‘rational’ and 
‘organised’? (p.215) 
 
In order for purism to be rational, Thomas argues, purists are obliged to make 
compromises, which 
 116
are no more than an application to language intervention of Talcott Parsons’ 
[1902-1979] five antinomies of value-orientation, [and] involve: 
1. Maintaining personal neutrality towards the elements of the language in 
question: the desirability of elements should be judged on how they 
function in the system, not on the basis of personal preferences for 
elements from one source or another; these elements should be the 
subject of dispassionate discussion, not emotional commitment. 
2. Suppressing idiosyncratic impulses: an objective approach to the 
problems facing a language is required, in which the speech 
community’s needs have precedence over those of any individual. 
3. Recognising the merits of features which unite the language with 
another code: rather than stressing its specificity, a language should be 
opened up to enrichment from languages having close genetic, 
typological or cultural ties with it. 
4. Stressing results rather than resorting to rhetoric: the purification of a 
language is not an end in itself but is only a means to providing a 
language with prestige; puristically inspired criticism should not be 
mean-spirited and negative but constructive and goal-orientated. 
5. Integrating purism into an overall interventionary response to a 
language’s functional needs: purism should not be a single-issue 
ideology but an integral part of language cultivation. (p.216-7) 
 
These suggestions are applicable to the discussions of ‘kaupapa’ that commonly 
occur in KKM whānau meetings.  
 
Thomas concludes that ‘there is no single [puristic] paradigm which satisfies the 
conditions of rational language planning: each speech community must identify a 
paradigm which reflects the situation and context in which its language is forced 
to operate’ (p.217). Thomas then comments on the organisation of purism in 
language planning, and on possible conflicts between purism and ‘the other 
objectives of language planning’ (p.219). Finally, as a language planning problem, 
he concludes that in strongly purist language contexts, purism ‘must be fully taken 
into consideration in the formulation of any corpus planning’ as ‘the reciprocal of 
the moral imperative imposed on the professional purist’ (p.220) by the need for 
rational compromises, as cited above. Thomas describes possible language 
planning ‘problems posed by purism’ in terms suggestive for Pūtaiao: 
1. By favouring etymological over functional criteria in judging the 
desirability of linguistic items, purism may be a serious impediment to 
the spontaneous and planned growth of a language in accordance with 
its socio-economic needs. 
2. By stressing individuality and separateness of a linguistic code, purism 
may foster a decrease in inter-linguistic comprehension and 
communication: in situations where language planning is predicated on 
the need to maintain or promote socio-political or ethno-cultural bonds 
such differentiation between codes may be particularly inimical to its 
aims. 
3. By preferring nativisation of the lexicon, purism may be seriously 
detrimental to the drive for modernisation: language planners might 
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legitimately consider that a language cannot afford to stagnate while 
adequate native equivalents are sought for items of terminology widely 
distributed in the languages of the world. (p.219-20) 
 
The last point is particularly pertinent to the science terminology question 
discussed above. While recognising that Pūtaiao is not typical of the language 
situation on which the ‘traditional’ linguistic purism literature is based, the 
understanding provided by this comprehensive treatment is useful in considering 
the impact of purism on Pūtaiao development. According to Harlow (1993) the 
guideline against borrowing was made in order to avoid ‘an admission of defeat, 
an admission that in fact Māori is not capable of handling new areas and topics 
with its own resources’, with the aim of ‘preserving it in opposition to and distinct 
from English’ (p.129). There is clearly potential for this objective, arising from 
non-rational motivation (in opposition to Talcott Parsons’ ‘rules’,) to conflict with 
the educational aims of Pūtaiao. 
 
Returning to Crystal (2000), his 5 reasons (in bold below) why we should care 
about language death are that firstly, as repositories of history, languages 
express identity. Secondly, languages contribute to the sum of human 
knowledge, in which we need diversity in order to most adequately confront the 
issues of the global future. The fifth reason, that languages are interesting in 
themselves, while subjective, is widely-held, and reflects the centrality of 
language to being human. 
The Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis 
As (Crystal, 2000, p.54) notes, ‘the spirits of Benjamin Lee Whorf [1897–1941] 
and Edward Sapir [1896–1941] haunt many linguistic discussions’ (Whorf, 1956; 
Sapir, 1933), particularly those concerned with inter-cultural communications 
(Kaa, 1976; Gumperz and Levinson, 1996). This alludes to their widely known 
hypothesis on the links between language, thought and cultural worldview, which 
was an explicit, structuralist formulation of a very old idea, with Francis Bacon 
(1561–1626) and John Locke (1632–1704) both cited for their contributions to the 
‘question of what influences what: Does language affect the culture of a people, ...  
or is language itself merely the creation of the culture?’ (Schlesinger, 1991, p.12). 
The ‘a’ and ‘o’ possessive classes in te reo Māori have been cited as one 
Whorfian example (Robins, 1976). 
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Joshua (Fishman, 1960; 1982) later systematized the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, 
describing it as threefold:  
W1: linguistic relativity (weak Sapir-Whorf) i.e. worldviews and languages are 
reciprocally related; 
W2: linguistic determinism (strong Sapir-Whorf) i.e. language determines 
worldview; and 
W3: ethnolinguistic diversity (as a worldwide societal asset).  
 
Somewhat like linguistic purism, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has acquired the 
status of an academic black sheep, subject to a range of cogent criticism from 
mainstream linguistics for many years (Fishman, 1980; Schlesinger, 1991), which 
has seen W2 conclusively dismissed as fallacy, tainting W1 and W3 in the 
process, and hence obscuring their value (Macnamara, 1991). Reconsidered from 
a contemporary view on ‘discourse’, Whorf’s ideas (perhaps no longer thought of 
as ‘the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’) are enjoying renewed linguistic respectability 
(Lamb, 2004; Lee, 1996). Michael Halliday (2004) refers to Whorf’s work as ‘the 
classic statement’ on the issue of ‘the way experience is construed in language’ 
(p.209). Whorf‘s writing also contributes to early literature on traditional Native 
American knowledge – analogous perhaps to such scholars as Elsdon Best (1986) 
and Raymond Firth (1972) for mātauranga Māori (see Wāhanga Tuarima). 
Whorf’s insights about language, thought and culture have also been viewed as an 
early contribution to social constructivism (Bowers, 1988, p.43). With its 
‘antiestablishment bite’ (Fishman, 1982, p.9) moreover, his writing remains 
politically robust, perhaps even postmodern, in contrast with much scholarship of 
similar age. Whorf was an academic outsider during his short scholarly career in 
the 1930s, which may help explain his alignment with postmodernist and 
multiculturalist scholarship, evident in the pairing below of a Whorf statement, 
followed by an Anne Salmond equivalent: 
The West ... has not bridged the intellectual gulf; we are no nearer to 
understanding the types of logical thinking which are reflected in truly 
Eastern forms of scientific thought or analysis of nature. (Whorf, 1956, p.21) 
 
[T]he process of opening Western knowledge to traditional rationalities has 
hardly yet begun. (Salmond, 1985, p.260) 
 
While most of the literature on Sapir-Whorf concerns widely different languages, 
W1 has also been invoked in the Ebonics (also termed Black English or BEV) 
debate (Delpit and Dowdy, 2002; Collins, 1999), one of the main targets of 
‘official English’ arguments in the US referred to above (p.112). Eleanor Wilson 
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Orr (1987) identified certain common conceptual difficulties for African 
American secondary school learners in mathematics and science education. Her 
research indicated these difficulties were caused by specific language 
misunderstandings of students who were Ebonics speakers, thus supporting the 
consideration of Ebonics as a different or hybrid language (Crystal, 2003). Once 
this is accepted, consideration of lack of equity in education for this group of 
students must clearly also include issues of ESL (English as a second language) in 
addition to other profiles of disadvantage such as socio-economics and covert or 
institutionalised racism. 
 
Finally on Sapir-Whorf, John Macnamara (1991) notes ‘one guiding principle of 
natural-language semantics: science and technology apart, whatever can be 
expressed in one language can be expressed in any other language’ (p.48, my 
emphasis). Macnamara refers to this ‘semantic principle’ in order to point out that 
‘Whorf’s linguistic relativity run[s] afoul’ of it, since the two ideas, taken to their 
extremes, are incompatible. Clearly, this principle is foundational to the 
contemporary understanding of ‘a language of thought ... a language of cross-
channel communication for the mind’ (ibid) which is associated with the 
structural linguistic notion (in the work of Noam Chomsky) of ‘the universal 
sublinguistic’ (p.59) or ‘universal grammar’ (Honderich, 1995, p.887), which is 
still pivotal in contemporary theories of mind and the relationship between 
language and thought (Pinxten, 1976; Walkerdine, 1994). The notions of 
‘universal grammar’ and ‘linguistic determinism’ (i.e. W2) form yet another 
cognitive polarity where ‘truth’ lies in a dynamic balance between the two 
extremes, a balance perhaps best represented in this case by linguistic relativity 
(weak Sapir-Whorf, or W1). In this sense, language, like other aspects of human 
culture, is best described in relative, rather than absolute terms. 
 
Furthermore, the highlighted exclusion by Macnamara of science and technology 
from this linguistic principle is obviously relevant to Pūtaiao. It indicates that 
‘science and technology’ is considered by linguists to be an important exception, 
in terms of language domains, to inter-cultural understanding and translatability 
(Bloom, 1981). This supports my previous assertion (p.5) that language issues are 
more severe in Pūtaiao than the rest of the Māori-medium curriculum. 
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Language Planning for Te Reo Māori 
Much of the literature on language planning concerns specific language situations 
(e.g. Gill, 2004; Nical, Smolicz et al., 2004). Welsh and Hebrew, two well-
documented international cases, informed language planning policy for te reo 
Māori, particularly in the earlier stages (1980-1990) of Māori-medium education. 
The following discussion compares these two languages with te reo Māori, with a 
focus on relevance for Pūtaiao. 
 
Baker (1993) provided a review of the role of bilingual education in the survival 
of Welsh, first outlining the paradoxically synchronous rise in Welsh-medium 
education over the previous 4 decades, even while the number of Welsh speakers 
continued to decline. Welsh-medium examination subjects are cited as a key 
factor enhancing the prestige of the Welsh-medium system. Baker concluded that 
while bilingual education cannot by itself accomplish language revival, for Welsh 
the schools have been essential in the (limited success of the) language reversal 
process. Jones and Martin-Jones (2004) include results of 1998 fieldwork showing 
code-switching in bilingual mathematics secondary classrooms, and conclude that 
many more ‘ethnographic classroom studies’ remain to be done in order to 
develop ‘greater understanding of the linguistic and social processes ... before any 
major interventions are made in the current system’ (p.65). 
 
Welsh, like te reo Māori, is an indigenous language struggling to survive in a long 
history of domination by English. But there are also important differences that 
impact on decisions made about language-in-education: Welsh has been a written 
language in contact with English (also French, Gaelic, Irish, etc) since the 11th 
century; accordingly there have been past phases of Welsh lexicography, purism, 
academies, and other literary activities, associated with the written language, 
which are not found in the history of te reo Māori. 
 
Bernard Spolsky is an important preventive linguist in the history of LPP for te 
reo Māori (Spolsky, 1989; 1987). Born in Aotearoa New Zealand, later moving 
overseas and becoming an internationally recognised scholar of Hebrew, Spolsky 
has compared the revitalisation processes of the two languages (Spolsky, 1996). 
Modern Hebrew28 has a history of revitalisation dating from about 1880, and is 
                                                 
28 Also termed ‘Israeli’ or ‘New’ Hebrew (Kuzar,1999). 
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associated with social circumstances widely regarded as unique (Gaita, 2002). 
Hence, Spolsky suggests Hebrew may be a ‘special case’ of language 
revitalisation (Wright and Bloor, 1995, p.75), very different from that of te reo 
Māori, even more so than Welsh. At different phases of its revival, Hebrew has 
struggled against French, German, and Yiddish as well as English (Spolsky and 
Shohamy, 1999). As the national language of Israel, however, there was ample 
motivation - both instrumental (functional) and ideological (identity/cultural) for 
individuals to make the ‘Great Leap’ (Moshe Nahir, see Spolsky, 1991, p.142) of 
switching to Hebrew. Spolsky characterises language policies for schools in Israel 
as following a ‘three plus one’ model: Hebrew, Arabic and English, plus another 
e.g. German or French (Wright and Bloor, 1995, p.31). 
 
Spolsky makes a problematic statement about te reo Māori, in outlining a general 
typology of countries according to language situation:  
New Zealand may be described as a traditionally Type I [monolingual] 
country, moving under the pressure of Māori revitalisation efforts ... towards 
Type II [bi-lingual]. (Spolsky and Shohamy, 1999, p.59-60) 
 
This is arguable from a Māori point of view, and at odds with other accounts such 
as those of May (2001) and Harlow (2003), as well as Spolsky’s own accounts 
elsewhere of the history of slow decline of te reo Māori (Spolsky, 1989). While 
there is no doubt te reo Māori has been ‘marginalised’ (Spolsky and Shohamy, 
1999, p.60), this has allowed its flickering survival, since there is still life ‘in the 
margins’ (Edgerton, 1993). Pākehā may have remained largely monolingual, but 
since contact Māori have generally been bilingual, up until the last generation or 
so (Oliver, 2001). 
 
Another relevant issue is that of educational ‘separatism’, of which Spolsky  
(1987) approved, citing religious education as a precedent (although this can 
hardly be regarded as politically unproblematic, according to Pinar, Reynolds et 
al., 1995, p.606-60), provided it is ‘carried out as the result of community choice’ 
(Spolsky, 1987 p.20). Such discussion paves the way for Māori-medium 
education to be constructed within the application of Public Choice Theory to 
state education in Aotearoa New Zealand (Devine, 2004) - a route later 
demonstrated to be inimical to Māori interests (Irwin, 1999; Lauder, Hughes et al., 
1999; Johnston, 1999). 
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It is a truism that each language situation is unique, and comparisons are certainly 
made with that understanding. Nevertheless, in Spolsky’s (1987) original report 
on bilingual education, commissioned by the Aotearoa New Zealand Department 
of Education, and influential in policy setting for Kura Kaupapa Māori, there are 
repeated comparisons with ‘the Canadian French immersion programmes’ which 
‘provide a useful model’ (pp.18, 11-2, 24-5) without acknowledgement of the 
divergence between, in one case, two immigrant world Western European 
languages, and in the other, a colonised indigenous language resisting total 
obliteration. While stressing the French Canadian comparison as a model for te 
reo Māori, Spolsky makes no reference to indigenous Canadian languages 
(Burnaby, 1996), which seems surprising from today’s perspective. Spolsky’s 
treatment exemplifies the ambiguity in the literature regarding the distinction 
between ‘maintenance’ and ‘enrichment’ bilingual education models, and their 
limited applicability to ‘heritage’ language programmes such as Māori-medium 
education (May and Hill, 2005).  
 
The larger issue to be taken with Spolsky’s report (Spolsky, 1987) and subsequent 
paper (Spolsky, 1989) on te reo Māori is sociopolitical, concerning the role of 
schools in language planning. This relates to the argument by Robert Kaplan 
(1990), made in his chapter in the collection ‘Language Planning and Education 
in Australasia and the South Pacific’ (Baldauf and Luke, 1990), which contains 
no contributions from Aotearoa New Zealand, a somewhat surprising omission, 
given the title. Kaplan defines the functions of central government as setting and 
resourcing (or modifying) language policy, and of the education sector as 
establishing curricula in accord with that plan. He notes ‘it is not the function of 
the education sector to decide de jure what languages will be taught’ and that ‘a 
serious problem in the history of language planning has been the confusion of 
these two functions’ (p.9). This echoes the point made for Welsh above, and 
emphasised throughout the language planning literature: while schooling in the 
medium of an endangered language is a central part of language revitalisation, it 
cannot accomplish the task alone, but must be part of a comprehensive societal 
approach.  
 
In contrast with Kaplan’s analysis, Spolsky suggests Māori-medium education has 
been central in the language planning efforts: ‘Accompanying this educational 
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activity, political and legal pressure has been brought to bear to support the 
language revitalisation process.’ (Spolsky, 1989, p.91). Here, ‘Māori bilingual 
education’ is equated with a ‘major principle’ of ‘equality of educational 
opportunity’ (Spolsky, 1987, p.8), enabling its presentation as a unitary remedy 
for the historical linguistic oppression of te reo carried out by schools, and 
providing ‘Pākehā (European) guilt at the possibility of cultural genocide’ with a 
useful salve (Graeme Kennedy cited in Spolsky, 1989, p.90). Spolsky’s (1987) 
comment that this principle is ‘stressed in the recent New Zealand Curriculum 
Review’ (p.9), and his tendency to posit ‘the Ministry of Education’ (Spolsky, 
1996, p.10) as responsible for revitalisation efforts, adds further substance to this 
interpretation. 
 
Later, Spolsky (1996) made an extensive comparison between the two cases of 
language revitalisation, namely te reo and Hebrew, while noting that to start with 
the situations were ‘quite different: Hebrew had been unused as a spoken 
language for some 1700 years, while Māori still had significant numbers of older 
native speakers alive’ (p.25). He also acknowledged Hebrew’s ‘immense 
storehouse of written material’ compared with the dependence of Māori on an oral 
tradition. Despite these contra-indications, he applied the traditional European 
language planning model of H and L varieties in both cases29, stating that Hebrew 
faced the task of ‘adding an L variety to an H language’ while ‘for Māori, the task 
was adding modern H functions to a language restricted in its domains’ (p.26). It 
is not difficult to problematise this diagnosis. At its nadir, prior to TKR and 
KKM, much remaining social usage of te reo Māori was in ceremonial, religious, 
and formal cultural situations such as whaikōrero hui mate, which constitute the 
traditional H language functions. Therefore the revitalisation task for te reo Māori 
could equally well be described in similar terms to that of modern Hebrew, as the 
need to develop modern L varieties, so as to revive te reo Māori as a language 
around the back of the marae and in homes, as well as on the taumata (paepae). To 
one-sidedly describe the task of revitalising te reo as ‘adding modern H functions’ 
carries within it an already-made judgement of cultural value. 
 
                                                 
29 H and L refer to the varieties of language (or languages) spoken in different domains of 
linguistic behaviour, hierarchised according to the domain from highly valued (H) to less valued 
(L).  
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Further, Spolsky cites ‘control of the school system’ and ‘a pre-school 
component’ as similarities between the two cases, yet these are widespread in 
language revitalisation efforts, and thus unremarkable. His sociopolitical 
comparison, on the other hand, is more contentious: 
The Hebrew and Māori efforts were neither of them the result of a 
government planning decision, but rather the activity of minority ethnic-
based ideologies working to establish new identities. Both had to deal with 
physical, demographic, social and cultural dislocation. (Spolsky, 1996, p.26)  
 
The problematic terms here are ‘ideologies’ and ‘new identities’ when applied to 
Kaupapa Māori, as prominent among the phenomena he is describing as ‘Māori 
efforts’. The Māori case might be more accurately described as the removal of an 
ideology (in correcting Eurocentric bias) to serve a bowed, yet unbroken (i.e. not 
new) identity – we may live in the city today, but our tūrangawaewae remain 
where they have always been. And while ‘dislocation’ is a shared experience for 
both groups (as for many minorities), the comparison is again a very general one, 
since the two cases differ greatly in the extent and nature of their respective 
histories of displacement. Given the close convergence in both cases with central 
nation-building processes, moreover, Spolsky’s distancing of revitalisation 
activities from government here seems overplayed.  
 
Historically, non-Māori scholars such as Spolsky have produced most of the 
literature concerning preventive linguistics for te reo Māori. This fact in itself 
reflects ‘[t]he need for indigenous voices to be heard’ (Henze and Davis, 1999, 
p.12), indicating a role for Kaupapa Māori research in matters such as te reo 
Māori language planning policy. In more recent work, Spolsky has presented  
more complex analyses of te reo Māori ‘regeneration’ (Spolsky, 2003; 2005), 
noting the benefit he gained from a visiting research fellowship at the 
International Research Institute for Māori and Indigenous Education at the 
University of Auckland in 2000 (Spolsky, 2005, p.83, fn.1). Nevertheless, it was 
his earlier work, discussed above, which was influential in policy setting for 
Māori-medium education in the early stages, hence establishing the current 
conditions of Pūtaiao. 
Languages of Science 
The language domains of science and technology are considered important in 
ensuring English’s position of global dominance (Crystal, 2003). Concomitantly, 
sociologists of science and sociolinguists have intensively studied the processes 
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and effects of ‘the dominance of English as a language of science’. Various 
viewpoints and case studies are brought together under this title (Ammon, 2001), 
in a collection from which three papers (Kaplan, 2001; Siguan, 2001; Spolsky and 
Shohamy, 2001) are discussed below. 
    
The major point of Robert B. Kaplan’s contribution is contained in its title: he 
makes a case for the view that English is ‘the accidental language of science’ 
(Kaplan, 2001), examining the conflict between two ‘amazing world resource[s]’ 
represented by multilingualism on the one hand and global English on the other 
(echoing Crystal), and the need for ‘balance between these two views’. So far 
unproblematic, he states ‘the spread of English in the registers of science and 
technology ... threatens not only the survival of small languages; it also stills the 
voice of science in languages other than English’ (p.19). While this sentence is 
clearly referring to two separate phenomena, the next collapses them together:  
the spread of English – and to a significant extent the widespread use of 
English in science and technology – has the gravest consequences for the 
practice of science and technology in other languages – assuring the 
dependence of less developed nations on a few states, and largely in a single 
language. (Kaplan, 2001, p.19) 
 
Here it is difficult to tell whether Kaplan is referring to the decline of scientific 
publication in (e.g.) German, or to the fact that published science has not occurred 
in (e.g.) Māori. The effect is to imply that development of science in Māori is an 
unquestioned good. This is possibly an example of international scholarship that 
draws on indigenous situations, without full cognisance of the indigenous 
viewpoint.   
  
The contribution by Spolsky and Shohamy (2001) to the above volume gives a 
synopsis of the situation of Hebrew as a language of science (and science 
education), a topic that has been extensively discussed within the voluminous 
body of Hebrew revitalisation literature (Fellman, 1973; Saulson, 1979). From 
about 1880–1920, French and German medium schools were established by 
wealthy philanthropists, for the benefit of European Jews who were at that time 
repatriating in areas which later became part of the state of Israel. A debate began 
in 1913 over the choice of German or Hebrew as medium of instruction for 
science and technology courses at a proposed new tertiary technical institute in 
Israel. The struggle was won decisively by Hebrew when the Technion eventually 
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opened in 1924 (after World War I) as a Hebrew-only institution. This story, 
known as The Language War in Hebrew revitalisation history, is possibly the 
greatest achievement ever for a non-Western language of modern science.  
 
Fast-forwarding to the contemporary Israeli academy, Spolsky and Shohamy 
(2001) note that Hebrew University is the strictest (of about seven) in adhering to 
a Hebrew-only policy, while The Weizmann Institute of Science is the least strict. 
Out of 100 dissertations ‘in scientific fields’ from Hebrew University between 
1940 and 1997, ‘only a dozen’ ‘in the last 30 years’ (p.171) were written mainly 
in English; and of 102 recent dissertations in physics, biology, engineering and 
chemistry from Tel Aviv University, 62 were written entirely or mainly in 
English, and 40 in Hebrew. 
 
In other aspects, namely reading lists and the requirement to publish 
internationally, Spolsky and Shohamy judge the encroachment of English as the 
accepted language for science to be even greater, although Hebrew remains 
‘normal’ as the spoken vernacular ‘in laboratories and lecture rooms and common 
rooms ... albeit with the code switching engendered by technical terminology’ 
(p.173).  
 
Regarding science terminology, the Hebrew Language Academy efforts to 
develop a Hebrew science lexicon are described as having ‘limited success’: 
Lectures given in Hebrew are thus likely to be thickly spattered with English 
(or rather anglicized, international) technical terms. While high school 
textbooks are more prone to attempt to use the approved Hebrew words, 
seeing that most advanced textbooks used at the universities are in English, 
the English words easily slip into academic scientific discourse. (p.172) 
 
Spolsky and Shohamy conclude by stating their belief that, while English 
continues to penetrate ‘Israeli linguistic space’ through the demands of science 
and technology and the associated education, ‘this penetration is not in itself a 
serious threat to the continued hegemony of Hebrew’. As the first language of the 
nation-state, ‘Hebrew remains the first language that one must master for social, 
educational and economic success’ (p.175). The gulf between the respective 
language situation for science and science education through the medium of 
Hebrew and Māori must be accounted for in any precedent claimed for Pūtaiao 
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vocabulary policy. Spolsky and Shohamy revert to a cost argument, necessarily 
even more pressing for te reo Māori: 
Even if the terminological innovations of the Hebrew Language Academy 
were to be more widely adopted, there would still remain the issue of the 
shortage of scientific and scholarly material published in Hebrew in the 
rapidly expanding fields of knowledge. The cost of translating specialized 
material into national languages is usually well beyond the economic 
possibilities of smaller countries. Only a nation like China can make this a 
matter of general policy. (Spolsky and Shohamy, 2001, p.172; for a related 
discussion of modernization of Chinese into science domains see Grabe and 
Kaplan, 1986) 
 
A final important observation regarding Hebrew and te reo Māori as languages of 
science is the lack of reference found in the Hebrew revitalisation literature to an 
alternative epistemology of science based on cultural worldviews divergent from 
those of the philosophy of Western science. In that case, ‘science in Hebrew’ is 
the only issue – there appears to be no equivalent to the ‘Māori science’ side of 
the dialectic. 
 
Miquel Siguan (2001) asks, ‘to what extent is knowledge – and particularly 
scientific knowledge – conditioned by the language in which it is formulated?’ 
(p.59). Dismissal of the ‘utopia’ of a ‘perfectly rational language’ entails the 
implication that for science to be(come) monolingually English ‘may eventually 
impoverish it’ (p.68). This is possibly the key argument against monolingual 
global science, phrased in W-science’s own terms of maximising rationality and 
hence knowledge. Both this paper, and that of Kaplan (2001) discussed above, 
however, cite social and ethical (rather than W-science) domains as examples of 
this process - German sociology (Siguan, 2001, p.68), and international relations 
(Kaplan, 2001, p.22 fn.24). Siguan refers to ‘scientific areas in which the aim of 
objectivity means that the language in which they are expressed and the cultural 
traditions in which they emerge are of no consequence’ - including, one is left to 
assume, the central areas i.e. the canons of mathematics, physics, chemistry and 
biology. (Objectivity in science is discussed further in Wāhanga Tuarima.)  
 
Siguan describes a thought experiment on ‘a text on atomic physics’, first noting 
that it ‘can be easily translated from English to Italian, or viceversa’  (Siguan, 
2001, p.64). He then considers Tagalog, the recently standardised official 
language of the Philippines. Despite the difficulties, ‘great efforts are now being 
made to adapt the language to the teaching of atomic physics, law and economics’ 
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which if successful would allow such a translation – though ‘this can only occur 
within the framework of certain sociocultural changes that somehow integrate 
Philippine society inside western patterns and dissolve the autochthonous 
Philippine culture into western culture, or into a synthesis of the two’. Since this 
amounts to saying that science can occur in an indigenous language only on 
condition the indigenous culture is lost, it calls into question the development of 
‘science in Māori’ in the name of cultural renaissance. Finally, he considers 
‘Inuki, the language of the Eskimos’, which is an oral culture, and therefore 
‘alien’ to scientific concepts. While ‘this does not mean that the mind of an 
Eskimo is unable to grasp these concepts’, he concludes that ‘today it is 
impossible to translate a manual of atomic physics or a book on political 
philosophy into Inuki’. 
The Nature of the Language of Science 
The thought experiment described above by Siguan (2001) is useful to consider 
for Pūtaiao. Which of the three language comparisons (Italian, Tagalog, or Inuki) 
best applies to Māori? We might fairly say that 200 years ago, te reo Māori was 
most like Inuki;  today, the better comparison would probably be to Tagalog. In 
either case, Siguan’s reasoning problematises the current widely-held assumption 
in Māori-medium education that any science text can be ‘easily translated’. One 
factor supporting this problematic attitude could be the adoption of an 
‘impoverished view of language’ as merely a tool or instrument, which, according 
to Michael Halliday and James Martin (1993, p.4), ‘prevails in western thought’. 
These authors argue that, while still ‘a variety of the parent language’, the 
‘distinctive quality of scientific language lies in the lexicogrammar (the 
“wording”) as a whole’ - ‘syndromes’ of co-occurring features in which ‘certain 
words, and more significantly certain grammatical constructions, stand out’ (ibid). 
The discussion below follows this lead by separately considering kupu (words) 
and hanga reo (language constructions or ‘grammar’). 
• Terminology 
The papers on the language of science, reviewed above, indicate that much 
science vocabulary is better regarded as ‘anglicised internationalisms’ (Ammon, 
2001) rather than English as such. This is partly due to its recency, as science 
terminology continues to expand explosively, entailing an ongoing race to keep up 
for any language (such as Hebrew or Māori) that seeks to develop a parallel 
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lexicon. Science vocabulary is systematic and precise, in contrast to the multi-
layered richness of even simple Māori words (C. Smith, 2000). Although much 
scientific history is encapsulated in its lexicon, a large proportion of science terms 
are labels (for chemicals, equipment, species, etc) rather than meaning-laden 
concepts: this is a possible basis for making distinctions in lexical development 
processes. 
 
A relevant example in Pūtaiao concerns the terms that have been coined for the 
names of the chemical elements of the Periodic Table (Harlow, 1993), some of 
which are descriptive ‘metaphorical opacities’ (Harlow, 2005). A problematic 
example is konutea (zinc, lit. ‘white metal’), a name derived from ‘Zinc’, a white 
brand of sunblock.30 The limited usefulness of lexical expansion in this area is 
indicated by the fact that the international element symbols have to date been 
retained in Pūtaiao materials. To coin new words clearly requires metaphors of 
some kind to be used, a process which perhaps deserves more deliberation than is 
apparent in the case of these important names. The opportunity to introduce 
systematic or mnemonic terms - such as hautahi (first gas), haurua (second gas), 
konutahi (first metal), konurua (second metal) for H, He, Li, Be31 - has been lost. 
 
The sociopolitical history of the Hawaiian language is more like that of te reo 
Māori than either Hebrew or Welsh (Wilson, 1999). Māori and Hawaiian are 
closely related Polynesian languages that continue to resist total obliteration by 
English. The recent success in these efforts has united the individuals involved in 
both countries and encouraged mutual support of each other and their respective 
projects (e.g. regular visits and exchanges). Te Kōhanga Reo, and ex-Māori 
Language Commissioner Tīmoti Karetu, are cited as seminal inspirations in an 
overview of the history of Hawaiian language revitalisation (Wilson and Kamanā, 
2001). This includes the question of science terminology: 
The biggest difficulty the [Lexicon Committee] has faced is in developing 
Hawaiian equivalents of terms that are from categories that seem to go on 
endlessly - Latinate scientific terms for chemicals, species, and so on ... The 
committee has been torn in two different directions regarding the 
development of Hawaiian terms in these categories. One direction is to 
continue composing terms based on Hawaiian roots, and the other is to 
                                                 
30 Zinc oxide, a common sunblock ingredient, is white (like many oxides), whereas elemental zinc 
is actually silver-grey in colour. 
31 The current neologisms are hauwai (hydrogen, lit. ‘water gas’), haumāmā (helium, lit. ‘light 
gas’), konukōhatu (lithium, lit. ‘stone metal’), konuuku (beryllium, lit. ‘clay metal’), which also 
illustrate the descriptive metaphoric approach.  
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borrow the international term. The native-roots position has proven to move 
much too slowly, and although the committee has approved native-root 
terms, especially for very common things such as the stomata of a leaf, 
pukahanu (literally, “breathing hole”), it has often also adopted many terms 
from the international lexicon. The borrowing position is designed to allow 
students to move between Hawaiian, English, and other languages in the 
scientific area, especially in the written forms of those languages. (p.168) 
 
The authors describe the common practice in Hawaiian immersion settings of 
‘Hawaiianizing’ the spelling and pronunciation of scientific terms, e.g. ‘sodiuma 
bisulufahate’ for sodium bisulfate. Well-established science-related Māori 
examples include kāhi (gas) and mihīni (machine). Such practices for science 
vocabulary can be included in the term ‘borrowing’. These practices support the 
immersion policy for medium-of-instruction, and bring the world of science and 
the cultural world closer together, aims consistent with those of Kura Kaupapa 
Māori for te reo and for improved educational success. Bridging the access to the 
lexicon of international science is a strong supporting argument, as noted in the 
previous Harlow quote (p.113). This concludes the argument for ‘borrowing’ in 
favour of ‘neologism’, raised as the language question of ‘vocabulary policy’ in 
Whika 1 above (p.5). 
• Grammatical Metaphor 
‘But there is another aspect of scientific language that is just as important as its 
technical terminology, and that is its technical grammar’ (Halliday and Martin, 
1993, p.6). Halliday’s analysis of early modern (post-Latin) science texts (by 
Newton, Galileo, et al) demonstrates that, while scholars worked to develop a 
lexicon that would ‘be effective in constructing technical taxonomies’, and 
capable of unlimited expansion, new ‘grammatical resources’ also evolved (not 
necessarily planned) in English and the other new European languages of science, 
which  
were the constructions of nominal groups and clauses, deployed so they 
could be combined to construe a particular form of argument: a rhetorical 
structure which soon developed as the prototypical discourse pattern of 
experimental science. (p.7) 
 
Thus, technical vocabulary and nominalised grammar are two interdependent (sets 
of) features, which in combination account for the characteristic nature of the 
language of scientific text. Halliday (1993) probed further into the difficulties 
(‘alienation’) experienced by many students when they encounter the language of 
science at secondary school, suggesting seven headings under which these 
difficulties can be illustrated, of which 4, 5 and 6 are discussed below: 
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1 interlocking definitions 
2 technical taxonomies 
3 special expressions 
4 lexical density 
5 syntactic ambiguity 
6 grammatical metaphor 
7 semantic discontinuity (p.71). 
 
Lexical density can be measured (in English) as the number of lexical words per 
clause. Informal spoken English has a lexical density of about two, and more 
formal written English around four to six, but in scientific writing the lexical 
density is often higher; examples with densities of ten or more are not uncommon. 
The tendency of science discourse to use ‘nominal groups’ or ‘noun phrases’ is 
one contributor to this density. Halliday’s examples of difficult-to-understand 
nominal groups, ‘which consist of strings of lexical words without any 
grammatical words in between’, include form recognition laterality patterns 
and glass crack growth rate. 
 
Syntactic ambiguity is highlighted by typical science sentences such as: ‘Lung 
cancer death rates are clearly associated with increased smoking’ (p.77). Here, the 
verbal group ‘are ... associated with’ creates ambiguity, since it could indicate a 
relationship either of cause, or of evidence; and if it is one of cause, it could mean 
either ‘causes’ or ‘is caused by’.  
But the main cause of ambiguity is that clauses are turned into nouns. ... If I 
say Mary announced that she had accepted, I am making it clear who did 
what; but if I say the announcement of Mary’s acceptance, you cannot tell 
... A great deal of semantic information is lost when clausal expressions are 
replaced by nominal ones. (p.78) 
 
These two features, lexical density and syntactic ambiguity, are ‘both by-products 
of a process [Halliday refers] to as ‘grammatical metaphor’:  
[I]nstead of being a substitution of one word for another, as when we say 
you’re talking tripe instead of you’re talking nonsense, it is a substitution 
of one grammatical class, or one grammatical structure, by another; for 
example his departure instead of he departed. (p.79) 
 
Halliday notes the prevalence of such grammatical metaphor in scientific 
discourse, and suggests it is likely to have first evolved in that context, to allow 
the construction of a step-by-step argument, moving at each step from established 
to new information. The simplest way to do this in English ‘is to construct the 
whole step as a single clause, with the two parts turned into nouns, one at the 
beginning and one at the end, and a verb in between saying how the second 
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follows from the first’ (p.81, original emphasis). Halliday concludes that the 
features of scientific language are not arbitrary, but developed in response to the 
needs of science discourse and method. They suit the expert, but cause difficulty 
for the learner. At the same time, Halliday points out that the language of science 
is often written ‘very badly’, ‘us[ing] grammatical metaphor both inappropriately 
and to excess’ (p.84). He also points to the tendency of the language of science to  
take over as the dominant mode for interpreting human existence. Every 
text, from the discourses of technocracy and bureaucracy to the television 
magazine and the blurb on the back of the cereal packet, is in some way 
affected by the modes of meaning that evolved as the scaffolding for 
scientific knowledge. (Halliday, 1993, p.11) 
 
Clearly, successful teaching and learning of ‘science in Māori’ depends on the 
development of te reo Māori into a language of science, which entails the 
development of a ‘scientific register’ in te reo Māori. This involves more than just 
‘kupu hou’, but also the invention of grammatical ways to express nominalised 
Māori verbal clauses with the required precision and unambiguity. No doubt, this 
can be done; the question that perhaps it is already too late to raise, is whether or 
not traditional patterns of Māori thought and language can survive the incursion? 
Here, Harlow’s (2005) comments on widespread syntactical borrowing from 
English in Māori-medium contexts are very relevant. This is an important 
question for KKM because it is there that both language aims, that of modernising 
the dominant register to enable a discourse of science, and that of retaining the 
depths of ‘difference’ of traditional Māori patterns of language and thought, are 
being followed. This section has attempted to show the extent to which these two 
aims are in conflict. 
 
This analysis also helps to explain why the language issues in Pūtaiao are more 
severe than in the other curriculum areas. Part of the increasing invasion of the 
lifeworld (Young, 1989) by the economistic rationality of the market has been the 
increasing global dominance of the scientific register of English noted by 
Halliday. Because economics and its daughter discipline, ‘management’, espouse 
a scientific form of rationality, they adopt many of the linguistic habits of science. 
So not only the effect of the modern products of science and technology on the 
lexicon, but also the grammar of science discourse, begins to dominate in all 
language domains. 
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Ideologies of Translation 
The conflict in position on how to translate science terminology into te reo Māori 
arises from a polarity in the language revitalisation debates between ‘two 
language ideologies. The first one is an instrumentalist ideology, in which 
language is seen as a tool for transforming ideas into new linguistic patterns’ 
(Blommaert, 1999, p.13). Here, the parallel with the ethnicity debates is clear. 
Following Blommaert’s synopsis of the research on Corsican (Jaffe, 1999), in this 
mode, Māori ‘is used as if it were a language of power’ (original emphasis), i.e. a 
language of science. What Blommaert terms ‘penetrating into domains of power’ 
describes the current thinking behind Māori-medium curriculum policy (Harlow, 
2003) such as Pūtaiao. ‘The second one is a romantic ideology, in which language 
is an abstract idea inextricably linked with a people's “soul”’ (Blommaert, 1999, 
p.13). This idea is expressed in kupu kōrero such as ‘ko te reo te mauri o te mana 
Māori’ (the Māori language is the mauri, or life principle, of Māori mana) and ‘ko 
te reo te kākāhu o te whakaaro’ (the Māori language clothes Māori thought). 
 
The concept of mātauranga as an alternative body of knowledge to that of the 
West is allowed only insofar as this ideology is expressed, since the role/existence 
of mātauranga captured in traditional language is denied or repressed by the first, 
instrumentalist ideology. The romantic ideology therefore aligns with the ‘Māori 
science’ pole. This perspective ‘see[s] translations as acts of perversion [which] 
would bring a foreign “essence” into the language’. Adopting the ‘canon’ analogy 
developed earlier, Blommaert’s comments on French-Corsican literature may be 
read for science texts and Pūtaiao: 
Translations of French novels perpetuate the role of French as an input 
language, a source language... Thus translations reinforce the “colonial” ... 
linguistic power relations that hold... Empowerment and alienation are 
played off against each other in a debate of which the outcome is hard to 
foretell (Blommaert, 1999, p.13) 
 
Ironically, the romantic ideology also favours the ‘native root’ or neologism 
approach over the ‘transliteration’ or borrowing approach to lexical development, 
without recognition of the covert negative effects of wholesale importation of 
English forms of grammar (‘extensive syntactical borrowing’, Harlow, 2005), 
particularly in the domain of Māori-medium science education.  
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The comparison with the French-Corsican situation enables us to recognise the 
same ‘ideologies’ at work in our own sociolinguistic situation. It appears the 
trajectory for current Māori-medium education policy development begins with 
the romantic ideology, which maintains widespread support, but during the 
implementational cascade, as the responsibility increasingly devolves onto 
individual contractors, moves towards instrumentalist ideology in order to meet 
output targets, culminating in the current approach to providing Pūtaiao 
curriculum and assessment for qualifications. This also clarifies why both 
ideologies remain in force, despite the paradoxical effects produced (at least in 
part) by the disjunction between the two. It seems this level of understanding is 
lost in pro-Māori discourse that fundamentalizes difference and essentialises 
culture, construing the relevant debate as one of a binary choice between 
languages. In this way, the further language polarity is invoked, of purism against 
anti-purism or ‘compromise’ (Dorian, 1994). This is the means by which lack of 
understanding of the language ideological questions involved in developing a 
Māori science lexicogrammar becomes manifested as a strong language purism in 
Pūtaiao policy (Harlow, 2003).  
The language of science, though forward-looking in its origins, has become 
increasingly anti-democratic: its arcane grammatical metaphor sets apart 
those who understand it and shields them from those who do not. It is elitist 
also in another sense, in that its grammar constantly proclaims the 
uniqueness of the human species. There are signs that people are looking for 
new ways of meaning - for a grammar which, instead of reconstructing 
experience so that it becomes accessible only to a few, takes seriously its 
own beginnings in everyday language and construes a world that is 
recognizable to all those who live in it. We would then no longer be doomed, 
as Prigogine and Stengers32 put it, ‘to choosing between an antiscientific 
philosophy and an alienating science’. (Halliday, 2004, p.225) 
 
Here Halliday goes a long way towards drawing together the debates in language 
and in knowledge which have been explored above. In this quote, the linguist 
echoes the words of indigenous poet Linda Hogan, below, evoking the utopian 
and ultimately universal humanist basis of indigenous politics: 
We are looking for a tongue that speaks with reverence for life, searching for 
an ecology of mind. Without it, we have no home, have no place of our own 
within the creation. It is not only the vocabulary of science that we desire. 
We also want a language of that different yield. A yield rich as the harvests 
of the earth, a yield that returns us to our own sacredness, to a self-love and 
respect that will carry out to others. (Hogan, 2000, p.122) 
 
                                                 
32 Prigogine, I. and Stengers, I. (1984, p.96). 
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These thoughts point towards the potential ‘synergy’ between the language and 
knowledge debates, captured in the nexus of Pūtaiao. 
4.3 Conclusion: Pūtaiao Politics 
Not the advantages of science and technology but in whose pay it is, and for 
what purpose, is the real cause for humanity's concern. (Mihaka, 1989, p.78) 
 
Pūtaiao education, along with all curriculum development and implementation, is 
a political undertaking, a point emphasised by each of the arguments presented so 
far. Although state-organised developments of Māori-medium education tend to 
favour and encourage an apolitical view of curriculum for those involved, it is the 
responsibility of the individual educator to resist any such depoliticising 
tendencies (Young, 1989, p.145-6). This political imperative is part of the 
professional workload widely acknowledged to burden Māori teachers.  
 
How exactly does the political situation of Pūtaiao impact on the questions that 
have been raised about the roles of Māori language and knowledge in its 
development? To return to Said’s insights on the politics of knowledge (see p.88), 
in terms relevant to Kaupapa Māori in general, as well as KKM and Pūtaiao 
specifically:  
where the denied or repressed native essence emerged as the focus of, and 
even the basis for, nationalist recovery ... the nationalist politics of identity 
has nonetheless quickly proved itself to be insufficient for the ensuing 
period. What invariably happens at the level of knowledge is that signs and 
symbols of freedom and status are taken for the reality ... just to be an 
independent postcolonial Arab, or black, or Indonesian is not a program, nor 
a process, nor a vision. It is no more than a convenient starting point from 
which the real work, the hard work, might begin ... that work [is] the 
reintegration of all those people and cultures, once confined and reduced to 
peripheral status, with the rest of the human race. (Said, 1993, p.310) 
 
McLaren exhorts multicultural educators to ‘always totalize!’ (McLaren, 1995, 
p.215) in order to avoid irrelevance to the struggles of minority students 
(‘formlessness’ - Taubman, 1993), as is exemplified by ludic postmodernism 
(McLaren, 1995, p.207) or positions of extreme relativism (Stanley and 
Brickhouse, 2001; Rata, 2004).  
 
In the Pūtaiao curriculum, these comments by Said and McLaren serve to warn 
against the replacement of one knowledge hegemony (W-science) by another - 
that of mātauranga Māori. This could be described as ‘knowledge purism’ by 
analogy with the language debate, and predicted to carry negative consequences 
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for students. For this reason, as well as the incompleteness, inaccessibility, 
property rights and non-standardised nature of mātauranga Māori, Pūtaiao is 
bound to deliver some form of translation of the mainstream science curriculum. 
Apart from the lack of alternatives, not to do so would deny Māori-medium 
students access to the globally-dominant form of knowledge.  
 
While cognisant of this imperative, Pūtaiao curriculum is also obliged, by 
Kaupapa Māori principles, to present science realistically, as one flawed human 
construction (among others) of the natural world. This is how I interpret 
McLaren’s call to ‘totalize’ at the level of science curriculum – telling the whole 
truth of science, rather than the ‘final form’ mythology of the standard/idealised 
school science curriculum, which rests on an underlying philosophy of ‘the weak 
objectivity of objectivism’ (Harding, 1998; see p.193 below). From this angle, 
Pūtaiao is one form of a wider project (with feminist as well as other versions) 
that could be described as reforming scientism and science ideology33 in the 
science curriculum (Lacey, 1999).  
 
As noted above, critical processes in cultural politics must be specific, since they 
rely on the details of the sociopolitical milieu in which they occur. This serves to 
highlight once more the importance of the Kaupapa Māori context. Nevertheless, 
to extend this specificity to the full extent of epistemology and rationality is 
unwarranted, as it effects replacement of one cultural hegemony with another, and 
simultaneously dis-serves the interests of the colonized, once again. 
 
Such symbolic over-extension militates against Césaire’s ‘vision of integration’, 
described34 as ‘a place for all at the rendez-vous of victory’ (cited in Said, 1993, 
p.310). Extending the previous quote (see p.9), Young (1989) echoes this utopian 
(even romantic) note of optimism for the emancipatory potential of postcolonial 
projects such as Kaupapa Māori (Webster, 1998): 
Once the meta-decision is made, and we turn to more limited spheres, 
Habermas’ argument about how we may validly form our wills becomes 
more compelling – we do it together, sharing our experience and on the basis 
of treating others as ends not means, as interlocutors not objects. 
                                                 
33 See p.54 above for the distinction between scientism and science ideology. 
34 Aimé Césaire (1913-) Caribbean poet and dramatist. Quote from poem ‘Cahier d’un retour au 
pays natal [Return to my native land]’ ([1947]1969). (A. Berger and J. Bostock, Trans.) Baltimore: 
Penguin. 
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If this modification is accepted, and the possibility of fallibility is 
maintained, there is room for aesthetic and moral vision ... to take on 
something more than the aspect of a mere analogy for the history of 
emancipation. Some of its genuinely theological content might be reinstated. 
If so, the possibility of a Jewish, Christian or Muslim critical theory must be 
taken seriously. 
Under these circumstances, the possibility of emancipation rests even more 
clearly on the courage and will of individuals; who knows, perhaps it rests 
even upon the grace of God, in the classical sense of the concept of grace – 
an ultimate, spiritual reality, [which] is struggling to come into being in our 
lives and our history. (Young, 1989, p.170-1) 
 
In Wāhanga 4.1 it was argued that the Māori Renaissance, in which Kura 
Kaupapa Māori and the Māori-medium curriculum play prominent part, is 
manifested mostly in the symbolic realms, and has not involved massive change 
in the balance of sociopolitical power held by Māori within Aotearoa New 
Zealand society in the last few decades. Since curriculum symbolically represents 
culture, its political potency is unavoidably clear (Pinar, 1998; 1993; Castenall 
and Pinar, 1993; Doll, 1993). So it is not valid to argue that any Pūtaiao 
curriculum will have exactly the same political effect as any other. Putting it this 
way highlights the need for Pūtaiao developments to be informed by an adequate 
sociopolitical analysis, since anything less will simply fail to meet the needs of 
Māori students for better teaching, learning and achievement in science and 
mathematics. Māori-medium science curriculum policy and practice that provides 
Pūtaiao by end-point translation of the mainstream material, such as translated 
science texts and NCEA examinations, is unlikely to achieve the desired 
curricular aims. Nor will ‘innocent’ (Hall, 1996) substitution or addition of 
mātauranga-based content. A critical or Kaupapa Māori science curriculum 
requires deliberate planning and focus.  
 
Reflecting the lacunae in multicultural science education literature discussed in 
Wāhanga Tuatoru, Robert Young (1990) commented on the difficulties faced by 
postcolonial critique, taking the seminal work in this field, ‘Orientalism’ (Said, 
1978) as an example. Like the earlier quotes from Stuart Hall, these comments 
can be read with ‘Māori’ and ‘Pākehā’ in mind, respectively, in place of ‘Orient’ 
and ‘Europe’:  
What Said’s analysis neglects, therefore, is the extent to which Orientalism 
did not just misrepresent the Orient, but also articulated an internal 
dislocation within Western culture... To some extent Said himself remains 
unselfconsciously within that European cultural heritage. ... The Orient, we 
might say, operates as both poison and cure for Europe: it constitutes the 
greatest threat to European civilisation at the same time as it represents a 
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therapeutic for the lost spiritual values of the West. ... The problem of 
Orientalism is that without a concept of an inner dissension Said is 
constantly led simply to condemn Orientalism’s projections of dissonance on 
to external geographical or racial differences - even as he repeats such a 
structure by identifying Orientalists as ‘for’ or ‘against’. Meanwhile 
Orientalism’s own internal divisions re-emerge inexorably in the series of 
theoretical contradictions and conflicts in Said’s text. (Young, 1990 p.139-
40) 
 
Writing at an early stage of postcolonial scholarship, Said failed to fully account 
for the role played by Orientalism in the concept of Western self-identity, and the 
associated cultural differend between the West and the Other (Lyotard, 1988), as 
it co-evolved during successive phases of the sociopolitical processes of 
imperialism and globalisation (Stewart-Harawira, 2005). To that extent, although 
Said wrote as an Arab person, his academic perspective remained coloured by the 
universalist assumptions of mainstream anthropology. Postcolonial scholars who 
read ‘Orientalism’ without understanding this limitation risk importing it into 
their own work (Battiste, 2000; Cajete, 1999), a point of particular relevance in 
the masculinist domains of science (Harding, 1998).  
 
Various debates swirling around the topic of Pūtaiao have now been shown to 
contain caricatural (straw-man) argumentation, and/or polarized binary 
oppositions (science education, language, ethnicity, philosophy, culture). As 
suggested by Taubman’s model of identity, and May’s model of ethnicity for 
critical multicultural education, in order to negotiate such discursive traps, it is 
important to maintain a productive dialectical tension between the different 
viewpoints or perspectives represented in the debate. To apply this advice to the 
central thesis dialectic means attempting to benefit from both ‘Māori science’ and 
‘science in Māori’, rather than pitting them against each other, which tends to 
result in having one at the expense of the other. This chapter has investigated the 
sociopolitical environment of Pūtaiao, and the language issues that arise in a 
notion of Pūtaiao as ‘science in Māori’. The next chapter moves to the opposite 





Mātauranga Māori Motuhake 
 
[The Māori] had not evolved any true chronological system; he was still 
groping his age-long way on the dim path of progress when our forebears 
appeared from the great ocean and arrested his march. 
Never again will the Māori scan the heavens to note the appearance of the 
revered Pleiades; nevermore will his womenfolk greet the lordly stars with 
dance, and song, and tears. The appearance of Vega is no longer looked for 
in the chill hour of dawn; never again, from hamlet to hamlet, will resound 
the ringing cry, ‘Ko Whānui E! Ko Whānui!’ (Best, 1986, p.51) 
 
According to Māori belief all things have a mauri or life aspect – a piece of 
writing or a speech therefore has its own mauri. As a writer of a paper I am 
engaged in the act of creation which stems from the way that I see creation 
occurring. Just as the carvers who carve the houses by ‘hanga whare’ 
(building houses) so too as Māori academics we build thoughts/feelings 
(hanga whakaaro) and build discourses (hanga kōrero). I am not alone in this 
work, all my ancestors, past, present and future also have to – bear with me. 




This chapter focuses on mātauranga, which occupies a central, yet occluded 
position in current discourses of Pūtaiao education. Here notions of fixity and 
formlessness are again relevant, since the very notion of ‘research’, in a social 
scientific sense, is alien to mātauranga Māori, as is school and the academy, 
indeed print (the written language), let alone cyberspace - must all be considered 
tauiwi (alien) abstractions of ‘authentic’ traditional Māori knowledge – ‘so far 
removed through these layers of presentation and interpretation’ (Jocks, 1998, 
p.232). This serves as a caution in any reading or writing about mātauranga, and 
indicates that ‘abstraction’ is an important factor (closely related to discourse 
notions of voice, authority and authenticity) to be considered in analysing 
discourses of mātauranga. A related discussion of the misleading nature of 
abstractions in anthropology appears in Winch (1970, p.10ff). 
  
Another important point is that mātauranga is holistic, without the 
compartmentalisation of Western conceptions of knowledge. Therefore, 
‘mātauranga’ is a whole, seamless body of knowledge, covering the entire 
academic territory, including all disciplines of science, in any comparative 
discussion. Cherryl Smith (2000) contrasts the ‘defended territories of knowledge’ 
of Philosophy, which has attracted few Māori scholars, and Māori Studies (‘is it a 
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“real” discipline?’ p.44), and asks ‘what was left outside the gate when the 
language and culture began to be taught inside the university?’ (p.45). Smith 
issues ‘a challenge to Māori academics that we are to more strongly bring forward 
into our work and lived reality, the epistemologies that we so often put to one side 
as “separate” spheres or relegate to formalised ritual’ (p.50).  
 
Mātauranga is central in that it substantiates the ‘point of difference’ (Hall, 1996) 
for Pūtaiao, and, foundationally, for the modern Māori identity overall, within 
which Kaupapa Māori is situated. Yet, as the previous chapters argue, it is 
excluded from current Pūtaiao policy and practice. While mātauranga forms a key 
part of the rationale of Māori science educators in favour of teaching science 
through the medium of te reo (McKinley, 2005; Smith, 1995), failure of the 
current approach to achieve the stated aims of the Pūtaiao curriculum is becoming 
increasingly evident.  
 
The Pūtaiao curriculum paradox has two aspects, one linguistic, the other 
philosophical. The language irony is the increased difficulty of teaching and 
learning mainstream science (especially senior secondary) using te reo Māori 
only, exacerbated by the policy against borrowing from English which, followed 
in the science curriculum, has led to an extra barrier (already formidable for many 
mainstream students) to the internationalisms of science language. The 
philosophical irony is that the current system of Pūtaiao education acts to inhibit 
critique of scientism in mainstream science or science education, a critique which 
might fruitfully be based on consideration of the contrast between traditional 
Māori knowledge forms, texts, philosophies or values, and modern science, 
technology and philosophy. There is further irony in the possibility that such 
critique would be equally as effective in English as in te reo, possibly most 
effective in a mixture of both (a belief which underwrites the paradigm of this 
thesis), although the current separate/parallel policy trajectory for Māori-medium 
education militates against the promotion of such complementary approaches.  
 
Despite the emphasis on mātauranga in the literature on Kaupapa Māori, 
reflecting the wider emphasis on IK in multicultural education, therefore, it is of 
little or no everyday relevance to Pūtaiao teachers, especially at senior secondary 
levels. These disjunctions echo those found in the Pūtaiao curriculum document 
 141
and current examination system, as discussed above in Wāhanga Tuatahi and 
Tuarua. 
5.1 Historical Discourses of Māori Science and Philosophy 
In science education, the term ‘Māori science’ has been used to mean ‘traditional 
Māori knowledge’ (McKinley, 1992), or ‘mātauranga’ (Kapua, 1997), and 
considered as one of several divergent issues in science teaching for Māori 
students (McKinley, McPherson Waiti et al., 1992; McNaught, 1993; Waiti and 
Hipkins, 2002). Few educators writing from this angle claim expertise in 
mātauranga itself, however, with their interest primarily in developing science 
education to better meet the needs of Māori students, so as to enhance Māori 
achievement in science education. Other than school curriculum policy, the 
mātauranga debate has appeared in few recent contexts, with conservation 
(Roberts, Norman et al., 1996; Peters, 1993) and the university35 being the most 
important of these. It is necessary to go further afield, to wider disciplines and 
further back in time, in order to find the discussions fundamental to the 
investigation of the notion of ‘Māori science’ as mātauranga. 
Eurocentric Foundations: Early Debate on ‘Māori Science’ 
Literature on Māori philosophy might be considered to begin with authors such as 
Elsdon Best (1952), Percy Smith (1913), John White (1887), and others, based on 
ethnographic field work mostly dating from the late 1800s to early 1900s - or it 
could reach back to traditional oral texts - such as that analysed in Wāhanga 1.5 
above. Two early Pākehā examples are included here. Despite the inherent 
limitations of these texts, tainted by sexism, ethnocentrism, and scientism, they 
remain immensely important records of mātauranga, which continue to be heavily 
drawn on in contemporary work (Webster, 1996; Roberts, 1998). For analogous 
North American discussion, see Jocks (1998, p.223).  
 
The first example, cited in Wāhanga 2 (p.45) and again in this chapter’s epigraph, 
is ‘The Māori Division of Time’ (Best, 1986), first published in 1922. Much of 
Best’s writing can be considered ‘primary’ mātauranga text, in that he recorded 
directly from Māori informants or personal observation. This monograph, 
however, is a thematic collation of his own and others’ previous ethnography on 
                                                 
35 See, for example, www.vuw.ac.nz/home/catalogue/index.aspx?course=MAOR-124&t=_2006 
(accessed 12/2005). 
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this specific topic, situating the Māori content within ‘the Polynesian system of 
division of time’ (p.5) as a further level of abstraction, including a number of 
comparative lists of names for the lunar nights and months, seasons, etc. I have 
found this monograph a useful resource for teaching topics in astronomy, one area 
of school science that translates relatively well, and also enables use of traditional 
language in star and planet names (although standardisation is the next language 
issue that arises when traditional language is available, as the various iwi lists in 
this monograph indicate).  
 
The second example, by Raymond Firth (1972), first published in 1929, is titled 
‘Economics of the New Zealand Māori’. Like the above, this is also a ‘secondary’ 
text, because the author reads Best (‘unrivalled’ p.17) and the other earlier 
scholars for information on mātauranga, in this case pertaining to the 
encompassing topic or theme of economics. Thus, in these texts the living Māori 
person has been entirely removed from the research. It is an early form of 
discourse analysis, where the discourse being analysed is mātauranga, or more 
exactly, the European transcription thereof.36 The agent is referred to throughout 
as ‘the Māori’, ‘the native’ (used to refer both to Māori, and as a general reified 
racial category), or ‘he’, and consistently in the past tense (Ninnes and Burnett, 
2001). These once-standard textual practices arose from the research paradigm 
and the science of the time, as earlier discussed. Making these practices explicit is 
helpful in re-reading such older texts from a Kaupapa Māori research perspective.  
 
For example, an interesting language note is Firth’s dedication (centred in the 
otherwise blank page preceding the Table of Contents): ‘To Dr Bronislaw 
Malinowski, Teacher and Friend, under whose Mana this book was written’. The 
use of a Māori word here is clearly tactical – but what is the tactic? One possible 
reading is that it is an example of local Orientalism (Said, 1978), where the word 
adds elitist mystery (acts as gate-keeper) in this address, while demonstrating the 
scholar’s knowledge (appropriation/control) of the Other. It is not simply ‘a Māori 
word’: this particular word (mana) is one ‘item’ of mātauranga that Western 
knowledge has found most useful to appropriate – one of the most powerful words 
in ‘Māori English’. 
                                                 
36 Evans-Pritchard reflected in 1962 that his work was ‘a kind of historiography’ (cited in Moody-
Adams, 1997, p.74). 
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Another example is the ‘slogan’ for the frontispiece photograph of ‘Waewae Te 
Kotahitanga of Ohaua-te-Rangi with the spear and cloak of former days’ (Firth, 
1972, Plate I Frontispiece). Centred directly under the photo, above the legend 
just cited, are the words ‘THE PASSING OF THE OLD ORDER’. The tone is of 
eulogy, echoing the admiration prevalent in such early writing on Māori, and not 
unexpected in any study for which the writer clearly shows such interest. 
Nevertheless, the point being made, by the choice of both image and words, is that 
Māori power is extinct (a requisite for eulogy). 
 
Thus, the underlying premise in these analyses of Māori knowledge and society is 
that the people and practices being discussed no longer exist, as the Best quotation 
which opens this chapter makes explicit. This is consistent with the politics of 
‘smoothing the pillow of a dying race’, which dominated race relations (from a 
Pākehā viewpoint) following the cessation of war from about 1870. While Best 
described Māori astronomical knowledge entirely in the past tense, Firth extends 
his survey to include the contemporary status and future economic prospects of 
living Māori communities, since a primary purpose of his work is ‘the possibility 
of applying our conclusions to the wider problems of economic anthropology and 
the science of human culture’ (p.492). Firth’s commentary on then-recent 
developments in Māori society are clearly more relevant to today’s situation than 
the earlier pre-1900 ethnography, as Webster (1996) has noted.  
 
While most chapters treat various aspects of ‘the economic organisation of the 
Māori in pre-European times’, the penultimate chapter focuses on ‘the period of 
transition during the last hundred years and the new Māori economy as it appears 
today’ (Firth, 1972, p.433). This is the revised (1959) edition, published 30 years 
after the original, and in the Foreword the author notes that this chapter in 
particular was substantially updated in revision, which may account for some 
mismatch in textual tone. At the start of the chapter, for example, describing ‘the 
status of the Māori’, he notes 
the Māori himself – where he is still to be seen – is greatly altered ... To the 
casual eye the culture change is complete. But ... despite the progress made 




Here the effect of the parenthetical phrase – ‘where he is still to be seen’ – is both 
chilling, and at odds with the tendency of the discussion, which leads into the 
following caution: 
It is neither necessary nor desirable ... to endeavour to turn the Māori into a 
European ... the best interests of the native may be served by retaining 
certain aspects of his social scheme and attempting to modify them ... rather 
than ... supplement them wholly by our own culture patterns. 
The abolition or replacement of any native institution, however crude and 
undesirable it may seem to us, should never be lightly undertaken. To glance 
at the Pacific alone, it is clearly proven ... that the elimination of native 
customs, though well intentioned, has too often meant the elimination of the 
native as well. (p.438) 
 
The bulk of the chapter describes the ‘four main phases ... in the transformation 
from the former to the present Māori economy’ (p.439) as: 
I. The Phase of Initial Contact (pre-1840) 
II. The Enthusiastic Adoption of Culture Forms (1840 - end of war in 1872)  
III. The Mood of Reaction (1872 - 1880) 
IV. The Acceptance of European Standards (from 1880 – 1927). (p.439-457) 
 
An important point concerns the transition between the first and second of these 
phases. Firth gives two reasons for selecting the year 1840 to mark this: first, that 
it marks the beginning of permanent European settlement, on land purchased at 
Pōneke (Port Nicholson) in late 1839 by the New Zealand Company; and second, 
‘by the Treaty of Waitangi the sovereignty of the lands was handed over to the 
English Queen’ (p.446-7). Firth’s interpretation of this event is further clarified: 
‘the Treaty represents the first overt acknowledgement of the interest of external 
authority in [Māori lands]’ and ‘the formal notification of the first steps towards a 
comprehensive European control of the native lands’. This is the only mention of 
the Treaty of Waitangi in this substantial volume, and it indicates usurpation, 
rather than economic partnership, as the Treaty’s intent. Firth notes, ‘the powers 
of the English authority were utilised – through the Native Land Court, Acts of 
Parliament, and even armed intervention’ to this end, adding, ‘I pass no criticism 
here of our native land policy; it is sufficient for my purpose to record the facts.’ 
 
Recording that land disputes led to ‘open hostility’ in the latter stage of Phase II, 
Firth writes: ‘With the conduct of the war it is for the historian, not the economist 
or anthropologist to deal’ (p.454). The third phase is termed an 8-year fit of 
‘mental depression’ on the part of Māori, brought on by military defeat and 
prediction of the end of their own race, and a ‘shaken confidence in the 
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European’. Noting the rapid increase in European settlement during these years, 
the transition to Phase IV is heralded by ‘a revived interest’ of Māori in Pākehā:  
Even in the King Country, where Tāwhiao and his followers had sat with 
averted face, a more friendly feeling was made to prevail. A policy of 
conciliation was adopted, the seclusion of their land was broken by the 
arrangement with the Government which enabled the latter to throw open the 
interior for settlement... The effect on the Māori of this influx of white 
settlers was very marked. At first taciturn and holding rather aloof, they 
speedily became on good terms with the new-comers. (p.457) 
 
The 1959 extension of this review included a further phase of ‘Acceleration of 
Economic Development’, fueled primarily by rapid growth of the Māori 
population from 1900 - 1950. This discussion prophetically considers the 
‘interesting and thorny problem’ of ‘assimilation or not’ which the author asserts 
is ‘a false statement of choice’, reasoning that Māori will continue to retain their 
own identity through the memory of traditions and associated values, and through 
continuing practices of hui, tangi and marae, their own language, ‘patterns of 
kinship and loyalty’, and customary foods, all of which are ‘symbols of group 
differentiation’:   
The importance lies in the symbols of group consciousness and group unity 
thus presented. In themselves these things have no absolute value. Moreover, 
if they assume a politically aggressive form they can be dangerous to the life 
of the wider community, of which the Māori now form an inextricable part. 
On the other hand, if they retain a cultural form, then they are 
exemplifications of that desire for separateness, individuality and 
personalisation of characteristics which are to be found in all human 
societies (p.481, my emphasis). 
 
The above quotes form candid commentary on local notions of symbolic power, 
habitus, and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1991) - thought-provoking for anyone 
involved today in the symbolic ‘industry’ (Widdowson and Howard, 2002) of 
Māori-medium education. Firth echoed the change in trajectory of the time 
(famously associated with the Hunn Report of 1960) from ‘assimilation’ to 
‘integration’ as the prevailing Māori education policy discourse: 
If the watchword be not assimilation but incorporation into the political, 
social and economic body of the New Zealand community, then the Māori 
and the Pākehā with whom they share the country should hope in the long 
run for a working solution to their relationships. (p.482, original emphasis) 
 
From the perspective of 45-plus years later, two interesting phrases here are ‘share 
the country’ and ‘working solution’. Webster (1996) ‘credited [Firth’s analysis of 
Māori kinship in the 1950s] with beginning to move beyond th[e] dogma’ of 
cultural anthropology’s primordialist orthodoxy on Māori, i.e. the waka-iwi-hapū-
whānau model. ‘However, because [Firth] did little fieldwork and assumed hapū 
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no longer functioned in contemporary Māori society, his insights were largely 
stillborn’ (Webster, 1996, p.242). 
 
An ambivalent note returns in Firth’s florid closing words:  
We have stood by him in his struggle for subsistence and the sweets of life; 
we have followed him in his fowling, his fishing, his planting, and his other 
daily tasks; we have listened patiently while he sought with muttered spells 
and the simple ritual of magic to bend Nature to his will; we have sat by his 
side at the feast and have travelled with him along weary trails in search of 
the precious nephrite [pounamu]. We have watched with curious eyes his 
first meeting with the pakeha, and have seen the tragedy and the courage of 
that encounter – to turn and bid him farewell at the last, not with the 
mourner’s cry, but with the augury of a more lustrous future as a member of 
a community wider and more strongly knit than his fathers ever knew. 
And now we may say with the native of old: “The children of Tane, the trees 
of the forest, have fallen” – our task is finished. TAKOTO KAU ANA TE 
WHANAU A TANE (Firth, 1972, p.494) 
 
While ‘bid him farewell’, coupled with the final death image, sound dire for 
Māori, presumably they are intended merely as a metaphor for ‘closing the book’, 
addressed (as is the entire study) to the European reader, who is perhaps assumed 
not to have direct contact with Māori. In a sense, however, the discursive style 
and choices discussed above act to reinforce, as well as record, Pākehā security. It 
is as though, to the reader, such ambivalences as those speculatively highlighted 
above, might be subconsciously reassuring - that Māori are no threat, all in the 
past, interesting but incapacitated now. The wider relevance is that such a text 
contributes to the written canons of history that construct societal truths - the 
‘dominant detrimental stories’ referred to above, against which Kaupapa Māori 
theory has arisen (see p.9). Once again there is the strategic use of the voice (reo) 
of the Other, in the whakataukī (proverb) used to end the text (centred, in capitals, 
below the preceding sentence) – a final demonstration of Orientalist symbolic 
power.  
 
It is time to turn to Firth’s sections most relevant to Pūtaiao, and the issue of 
mātauranga and science. The collated information on mātauranga in this volume is 
substantial, since most mātauranga can be connected to some aspect of ‘economic 
activity’. Three interesting examples of mātauranga change appear in the 
penultimate chapter. The first of these concerns heitiki, the pounamu (greenstone) 
neck ornaments symbolic of Māori wealth and rangatiratanga (aristocracy). Firth 
cites the heitiki – or rather, the ‘greenstone adze’ that in many cases they were 
carved from - as ‘an interesting example of the substitution of goods and the 
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replacement of values’. Since these adzes were rendered obsolete as implements 
by the steel axe, ‘they were turned into the next most suitable form of wealth – 
namely, ornament’ (Firth, 1972, p.485-6). The second example is the description 
of the ‘recent innovation [of] an action song consisting of haka movements, 
though less vigorous, with words linked to a popular (Western) melody’ (p.481). 
The third example is a new meaning for an old whakataukī (traditional saying):  
‘By feathers alone can the bird fly, by clouds are the heavens covered’, said 
the old Māori, meaning that only by means of the proper assistance can 
anything be performed. To this the modern Māori has supplied a new 
referent, so that as used today, it carries the force of ‘money is the sinews of 
war’ [often just the ‘feathers make the bird fly’ part is heard today]. (p.490)  
 
These are interesting examples, since today all three cultural items – the pounamu 
heitiki, the waiata-a-ringa, and the modern meaning of this whakataukī – are 
widely regarded as part of ancestral (pre-European) Māori heritage, not post-
European modifications thereof. They could be considered explicit examples of 
Hall’s ‘impure’ or ‘hybridised’ cultural forms (discussed in Wāhanga 4.1). Such 
changes of meaning and nuances of history are largely invisible within the 
educational discourses that would draw on ‘Māori culture’ as curricular content 
for today’s Māori students. This point returns to the question of relative 
authenticity of knowledge, which must be raised in parallel with that of language. 
 
These two texts (by Best and Firth) are examples of the corpus of older European 
scholarship that is the foundation for recent literature concerning the status of 
mātauranga as science, discussed below (Roberts, 1998; Stewart-Harawira, 2005). 
In his initial purview of Māori economic resources, Firth noted ‘there existed, 
nevertheless, a distinct and comprehensive body of scientific data founded upon 
keenness of observation and an acute perception of minute differences’ (Firth, 
1972, p.64). His discussion on ‘Māori science’ is worth recording here in full: 
The statement has been made that the native lacks any intelligent interest in 
plants, trees, insects, and the like, save where they help to satisfy his wants, 
or by some striking peculiarity appeal to his sense of the strange or 
grotesque. With the Maori this hardly seems to be the case. It is only natural 
that the knowledge of the features of his environment should be much fuller 
and more detailed in respect of those objects which have a definite practical 
interest for him; it is unquestionable that the greater part of the fund of 
information pertaining to birds, plants, and minerals was accumulated 
directly on this basis of economic interest. At the same time this is not 
inconsistent with a certain desire to obtain knowledge for its own sake, to 
observe and describe with accuracy, with the object of better classification. 
This state of mind, akin to scientific curiosity, does not seem to be entirely 
lacking in primitive man, if one is to judge from Maori evidence. But this is 
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a subject which so far has attracted little attention from field workers. For 
further and conclusive evidence we must rely on more extensive research.  
A scrutiny of the mass of data setting forth the nature lore of the Maori, 
however, indicates that some portion of this knowledge, such as that 
regarding the habits of the smaller birds and the characteristics of the less 
important plants and insects, was not founded on purely practical 
considerations or on the exceptional qualities of the objects. Moreover, the 
native displayed considerable accuracy of observation, enabling him to 
discover certain of the less obvious of natural phenomena, and also to 
elucidate the affinities of a number of animals and plants. ... On the other 
hand, extensive discrimination between closely allied species seems to have 
been lacking, and the criteria of differentiation were often those which 
botanical science has shown to be subordinate or irrelevant. Also, errors in 
classification often seem to have been made. Thus natives attribute a 
difference in sex to some forest trees which the botanist recognises as being 
of different species, though of the same genus; also they classify the bat as a 
bird (manu). But on the whole, the categories which they employ in the 
classification of birds, plants, etc, are surprisingly exact, and indicate close 
observation. Mixed with much crude statement is a lot of real botanical and 
zoological knowledge. (p.59-60) 
 
Firth’s use of words such as ‘surprisingly’, ‘crude’ and ‘real’ is very telling in 
terms of an implied hierarchy of knowledge, reinforcing the view of his research 
paradigm as Eurocentric. Firth restricts ‘Māori science’37 to certain aspects of 
zoology (e.g. ornithology and entomology), botany, and geology (though Firth 
would probably agree to add astronomy and meteorology, maybe more, to this list 
of science domains represented in mātauranga). Curiosity, close observation of 
nature, and being a ‘prolific name-giver’ (Firth, 1972, p.60 fn.3) comprise the 
basis that Firth extrapolates to suggest it is valid to speak of Māori science. In 
terms of the Standard Account, however, this comparison is insufficient (see 
p.48). With cognisance of Duschl (1990)’s thesis, what is lacking in Firth’s 
account of ‘Māori science’ is a framework of organising theories and concepts, 
and a philosophy or epistemology underlying the ‘knowledge’. Firth tends to 
compare mātauranga with a caricature of science as nature study (also seen in the 
multicultural science education literature, discussed in Wāhanga Tuatoru). To take 
Firth as authoritative on the question of Māori science, therefore, is reckless, 
however tempting.  
 
The contemporary acceptance of this ‘indigenous science as nature study’ 
interpretation is shown in the following recent version of Firth’s comments cited 
above: 
                                                 
37 Firth did not actually use the term ‘Māori science’, although in precursors to this modern usage, 
Malinowski made reference to ‘primitive science’ (cited in Jarvie, 1970, p.56) while I.C. Jarvie 
himself wrote of ‘native science’ (Jarvie, 1970). 
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Indigenous scientific knowledge includes minutely detailed knowledge of 
the natural world and a comprehensive understanding of the smallest phases 
of change that occur in the natural world, as demonstrated in the extremely 
specific inscription of names by characteristics or phases of growth. 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005, p.37) 
 
The general acceptance of this view of Māori science owes much to the successes 
of international indigenous scholarship, such as Kaupapa Māori, as well as the rise 
of pluralist notions of science (as discussed in Wāhanga 2.1), supported by 
politically sympathetic W-scientists (see p.65) and philosophers (Peters, 1993). 
While apparently politically attractive, this claim bolsters a position calling for the 
replacement of W-science by mātauranga in the Māori-medium science 
curriculum. In this way, under the banner of ‘Māori science’, this position heads 
towards the ‘anti-science’ pole of the knowledge dialectic of ‘scientism’ versus 
‘anti-science’ (Sorell, 1991; Durie, 2005), and ultimately serves the educational 
interests of Māori students very poorly. The impact in Pūtaiao is discussed further 
below (p.161). 
 
Firth’s viewpoint on Māori science provides a final, important illustration of his 
Eurocentric research paradigm. While there is no reference to Māori ideas, 
theories or concepts of the natural world in his discussion of Māori science, cited 
above (except as pejoratively implied by terms like ‘crude statement’), brief 
mention of Māori cosmology appears in another chapter, on the psychology of 
work, as part of ‘avian mythology’ (Firth, 1972, p.151), during consideration of 
motives for economic activities - in this case, fowling.  
When anything is looked upon by a native people as being of some 
importance in their life, one nearly always finds some piece of mythology in 
connection with it, a story which purports to account for its origin, which 
sets it in a definite position in the scheme of existence, and as a general rule, 
brings it into relation with the pantheon of gods or culture-heroes. (p.149) 
 
Firth goes on to mention Rangi and Papa as parents of Tāne, before briefly 
outlining the origin narratives and kōrero pūrakau (‘fireside tales’) relating to 
birds, the ‘real importance of [which] is that it allows us to realise the place of 
birds in the cosmic scheme of the Māori ... under the direct care of Tāne ... [as] 
the explanation of the placatory rites and ceremonies which encrust the economic 
activities of the fowler at every turn’ (p.151).  
 
This example demonstrates how, in the process of abstraction, mātauranga 
becomes disrupted and reinterpreted through European concepts of knowledge. 
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Māori observational knowledge of the natural world, extracted from its matrix of 
value concepts and philosophies, was recognised (claimed) as scientific when 
viewed through economistic Western eyes, while the underlying framework of 
philosophy was dismissed as ‘tales’. Takirirangi Smith describes the process as 
follows:  
By framing whakapapa kōrero within the context of history and myth the 
process commences with the decontextualising of discourses from the 
particular landscapes, environments, or physical and spatial context to which 
they relate. This objectification process then renders them into an abstraction 
which is then recontextualised within the lineal time frame of history where 
European/Western analysis has in the past applied its own criteria. (T. Smith, 
2000, p.54) 
 
If Firth’s text, and others like it, form the discursive foundation for the modern 
promotion of ‘Māori science’, it also throws light on the wider lacuna in 
multicultural science education discourse, discussed above as a disjunction 
between the empirical and philosophical aspects of science and IK. In contrast, a 
contemporary mātauranga text on the theme of conservation (Roberts, Norman et 
al., 1996) reverses this discursive practice, by beginning with a synopsis of Māori 
cosmology as the explanatory framework of analysis. 
 
While highlighting its Eurocentric paradigm, this review indicates the richness of 
Firth’s book as a reference on mātauranga. At the same time Firth offers critique 
of the economics of his own culture, including the notion of homo economicus. In 
his brief final chapter, the closing words of which were cited above, Firth 
concluded that the ‘communal ideal’ (which he had already firmly differentiated 
from ‘communism’ in a previous chapter) was largely responsible for the absence 
of extreme poverty, unemployed or leisured classes in traditional Māori society. 
[T]he compulsion to work, to save, and to expend is given not so much by a 
rational appreciation of the benefits to be received as by the desire for social 
recognition, through such behaviour. The entire scheme of motivation in 
industry is thus lifted from the biological to the social plane. In this 
conversion of instinctive to cultural drives in the case of the food-producing 
activities of the human animal lies one of the fundamental problems for 
future economic study. (Firth, 1972, p.494). 
 
This point is expanded in the book’s Preface by R. H. Tawney (1880-1962), who 
discusses the usefulness of Firth’s research as a basis for economic science to 
critique its own assumptions, which otherwise tend towards ‘economic 
fundamentalism’. The relevance to Pūtaiao is that the assumptions mentioned also 
underwrite scientistic doctrines such as evolutionism (see p.187). 
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Economic fundamentalism of this kind is less tyrannous than it was, but, 
outside the ranks of economists themselves, it is still a power. The 
assumption that effort is always a ‘cost’, and that the ‘motive’ which causes 
the cost to be incurred is the desire of the individual to ‘satisfy his wants’; 
the crude antithesis between ‘self-interest’, which is supposed to be all-
powerful, and ‘altruism’, which is supposed to be weak; the common asser-
tion that no one will work except under the spur of immediate economic 
necessity ... - how familiar it all is in current discussions of industrial policy! 
And how fantastic and remote from human realities! ... To understand our 
own problems, it is sometimes expedient to stand outside them, in a world 
with different standards and presuppositions. Civilised peoples are disposed, 
perhaps, both to underestimate the part played by economic rationalism in 
primitive society, and to exaggerate that which it plays in their own. Studies 
such as that contained in the following pages, by correcting the first error, 
help indirectly to remove the second. (Firth, 1972, p.13) 
 
Given the intervening development of the ‘market society’ since these sentences 
were written, nearly 80 years ago, they appear prophetic today (except for the 
claim that economic fundamentalism was waning). Another link to Pūtaiao is 
McLaren’s ‘critical pedagogy’ challenge to schools, to resist control by the market 
(McLaren, 1995; see p.101). Firth’s old text on Māori economics thus helps to 
illuminate and critique the basis of contemporary global afflictions unleashed by 
late capitalism.  
Rationality Debates in Anthropology: Reichenbach and Māori Logic 
The philosopher of science Hans Reichenbach was cited above in connection with 
the question of ethics and science (p.50). Reichenbach enters the Māori science 
arena once more in the cross-cultural epistemological debates impacting on 
Pūtaiao. This link is traced in the following discussion through a series of four 
relevant papers (Horton, 1970; Cooper, 1975; Salmon, 1978; Salmond, 1985). 
 
Terminology, disciplinary relationships, and political contexts have gradually 
changed in the longstanding debate about the relationship between W-science and 
‘primitive’ thinking (Levi-Strauss, 1978). What became clear to me, after reading 
the literature reviewed here, is that multicultural science education research is an 
important current ‘inheritor’ of these debates. A chapter from the classic 
collection ‘Rationality’, edited by Bryan Wilson (1970) is taken here as an 
arbitrary starting point, and the first Riechenbach link, while recognising (with the 
editor, p.vii) that the discussion of rationality reaches back to the very beginnings 
of social science. This chapter by Robin Horton (1970), entitled ‘African 
Traditional Thought and Western Science’ is described as ‘a brilliant paper’ by 
another contributor to the collection (Lukes, 1970). Horton lists the similarities 
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and differences between IK and science, claiming the key difference between 
them as knowledge systems arises from the fact that ‘traditional’ culture is 
‘closed’, while ‘scientifically-orientated’ culture is ‘open’ (see also Lukes, 1970, 
p.200). This assertion, however, was disputed by Anne Salmond (1985) on two 
bases: first, documentary evidence of intense 19th century Māori interest and 
debate around the conflicts between various iwi accounts of mātauranga, and 
those between Māori and European beliefs; and secondly, the existence of 
liminality in Māori systems of knowledge (see p.167 below).  
 
In the second ‘Reichenbach’ reference, David E. Cooper (1975) endorsed 
Horton’s claim of analogy between ‘magico-religious’ and ‘theoretical science’ 
propositions, and extended it to ‘the question of primitive logic’ (p.238, original 
emphasis), based on classic anthropological examples.38 Cooper pointed out that 
‘some writers use “logic” to refer to just about any aspect of native thoughts and 
beliefs’, a practice he labeled ‘obfuscating’, and stated his intent to discuss logic 
as understood by logicians. This clarification is vital in the debate. Cooper begins 
with the ‘peculiarity’ of certain ‘native propositions’, and the range of responses 
by anthropologists, which he classifies as follows (A-C), before arguing for his 
own position, D: 
A1: primitives are child-like, pre-logical or illogical (the ‘intellectualist’ 
approach); 
A2: primitives are contra-logical, irrational, or value non-logical principles 
above logic (e.g. Levy-Bruhl);  
B: native propositions appear inconsistent due to anthropological errors - 
expressed either as a principle of charity towards alien thought (e.g. Evans-
Pritchard), or holding that a condition of adequacy of translation is that it 
should preserve logic (e.g. W. V. O. Quine); 
C: Such native propositions are not of a type to which truth-value can be 
assigned, being essentially symbolic or expressive, so logic is irrelevant (e.g. 
Firth, Beattie, Leach, et al); 
D: ‘Primitive magico-religious thought incorporates an alternative logic ... 
one that certain Western logicians have constructed in ... some areas of 
theoretical science’. (Cooper, 1975, p.240-241) 
 
Cooper proceeds to characterise standard (orthodox/classical) logic as binary (as 
in true or false), explaining the logic operators ‘either ... or’ and ‘not’. He then 
introduces L3 or three-valued logic, attributed to logician Jan Lukasiewicz (1878-
1956), which was later (1944) applied in quantum mechanics by Reichenbach. L3 
                                                 
38 Zande beliefs about the heritability of witchcraft, and Nuer beliefs about the souls of twins, are 
the main examples of alternative logic cited by Cooper. 
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contains an additional truth-value of ‘indeterminate’. Cooper describes the 
problem in drastic terms: 
Faced by the anomalies of quantum mechanics [from Heisenberg’s principle, 
that if momentum is measured for a particle such as an electron, position 
cannot be, and vice versa], something has to give. Either the principles of 
quantum physics must be rejected, or they must be amended by introducing 
ad hoc ‘hidden variables’; or the principles of probability must be given up; 
or such apparently fundamental principles as ‘No action at a distance’ must 
be sacrificed - or standard, two-valued logic must be revised in this context. 
(p.244, original emphasis) 
 
Clearly, the last option is best. Cooper comes to his central point: 
Reichenbach’s originality consists in regarding logic as one of the candidates 
for revision, as itself an instrument in science, and not an inviolable measure 
against which all other scientific instruments must be cut. The possibility 
then emerges of preferring the claims of some scientific theory against those 
of standard logic should conflict between the two arise. (ibid) 
 
Cooper then discusses the anthropological evidence for and against the various 
positions (A-D above), arguing that Reichenbachian application of L3 to primitive 
thought ‘dissolves’ its contentious anomalies better than the competing accounts. 
This paper dates back over 30 years, but the following sentence is still surprising: 
‘I do so [argue for such application] partly to show that it would be nice if my 
approach can be made out, since these others [A-C] are all more or less defective’ 
(Cooper, 1975, p.247, original emphasis). Cooper’s apparently ludic approach to 
the thought processes of ‘natives’ continues through to his conclusion: 
It is quite possible, if the spirit of this approach wins favour, that different 
non-standard logics might be suitable for different aspects or different 
peoples. I hope, in other words, to have suggested an area of ethnographical 
research and a methodology - an area, moreover, in which philosophers and 
ethnographers could, and would have to, collaborate. (p.255) 
 
Politically unsavoury aspects of Cooper’s thinking are shown here, including 
Eurocentrism, in treating other ‘peoples’ as objects of study, source material for a 
productive programme of research (implicitly, research conducted by Euro-
American scholars). This quote reveals Cooper’s implicit acceptance of the 
‘windowless monad’ view of culture, attributed to classical anthropology (in the 
tradition of which Cooper was writing), and shown to be grounds for modern 
moral relativism (Moody-Adams, 1997). Relatedly, Salmond mused that 
even in a lifetime of dedicated fieldwork (as in the case of Elsdon Best), 
assumptions of superiority may serve to objectify the thought-world of 
others for scrutiny, while closing off one's own. Under such conditions and 
particularly in colonial and neo-colonial contexts, accounts of ‘traditional 
thought’ are likely to be ethnographically insecure and ideologically 
distorted, and they are also likely to have damaging practical effects for 
those whose thought is being described. (Salmond, 1985, p.255) 
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Despite the usefulness of Cooper’s explication of the terms of the rationality 
debate, his own anthropology exemplifies the concerns of ethnocentrism 
expressed here by Salmond. That Cooper also adheres to strong academic-internal 
reductive scientism (Stenmark, 2001; see p.51) is a further, related charge, 
supported by such statements as ‘the virus-illness connexion will, we assume, be 
eventually subsumable under the laws of sub-atomic physics’ (Cooper, 1975, 
p.247). 
 
Three years later in 1978, the same journal (‘Man’) published Merrilee Salmon‘s 
(1978) rebuttal of Cooper’s paper. Salmon dismantled Cooper’s argument by 
‘show[ing] that the Zande and Nuer examples [used by Cooper] are not 
sufficiently similar to the quantum physics examples to justify the claim that a 
three-valued logic is applicable’ (p.444). She examines the difference between 
statements that are ‘meaningless’, e.g. ‘God exists’, which are outside scientific 
discourse and denied truth-value, and those that are ‘indeterminate’, i.e. testable in 
some circumstances, though not in others, such as statements about the 
momentum of a sub-atomic particle, noting it was ‘somewhat unfortunate that the 
expression “untestable in principle” is used to apply to these two different types of 
untestability’ (p.447). Salmon demonstrates that Cooper conflated these two 
meanings, and hence made an invalid assignment of the truth-value 
‘indeterminate’, in the sense used by Reichenbach for quantum physics, to Zande 
statements about witchcraft. 
 
As part of this argument, Salmon points out Cooper’s disregard of Putnam’s 
warning that ‘it is dangerous to regard any sentences about the macrocosmic 
world as indeterminate’ (p.448). She then shows the invalidity of Cooper’s appeal, 
in support of his claims, to Putnam’s test for three-valued logic, which rests on 
Cooper’s claim that Azande are indifferent to, or lack interest in, the contradiction 
shown by such statements as ‘All Azande are witches and not all Azande are 
witches’ that arise from certain combinations of their beliefs, when it is pointed 
out to them by the anthropologist (in this case, Evans-Pritchard). Salmon ‘think[s] 
this is a serious misreading of Evans-Pritchard’ (p.452), whose data she rather 
interprets as indicating rejection of the contradiction, as explained by two further 
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Zande beliefs: that witchcraft heritability weakens over generations; and that 
witchcraft-substance, even if possessed, may be ‘cool’ or inoperative.  
 
For Cooper’s other major example of putative ‘non-standard logic’, concerning 
Nuer beliefs about the souls of infant twins, Salmon points out several more 
mundane explanations, which do not necessitate invoking three-valued logic. 
These include disagreement among informants, which Evans-Pritchard suggests 
by saying ‘Nuer hold no decided opinions about the nature of the soul’ and 
incompleteness of data, due in part to the ‘difficulty of extracting information 
about souls from his informants’ noted by Evans-Pritchard (p.453). Salmon 
concludes: 
However, it would be a serious mistake to equate reluctance to discuss a 
topic with indifference to a topic... The scanty evidence available tends to 
support the view that Nuer regard some difficult propositions about souls as 
“not known to be true or false”, but this is a case of suspended belief rather 
than an alternative truth-value assignment. (p.454) 
 
In critiquing Cooper’s position, Salmon notes: 
Explicit attention to systems of logic is not a feature of Zande or Nuer belief. 
Nevertheless, on an intuitive level without appeal to any formal rules of 
logic, they construct logically correct arguments and can distinguish correct 
from incorrect reasoning. (p.449) 
 
This acknowledgement is consistent with Cooper’s own observation: 
What is implausible is not the postulate of ‘child-like’ mentalities as such, 
but this together with the admission that outside the magico-religious arena 
primitives typically think in logical, sensible ways. That whole peoples, 
capable of consistent thought in general, should suddenly become ‘child-
like’ when thinking within a particular field, would imply a schizoid 
intelligence that we should resist having to admit. (Cooper, 1975, p.247) 
 
These statements reflect Salmond’s claim to be unable to ‘find any evidence that 
Māori use of logic differs in any essential way from European reasoning’ 
(Salmond, 1985, p.253). This is central to Salmond’s critique of the ‘populist’ 
colonial claim that Māori ‘ha[d] no knowledge, only superstition and myth; their 
thought was held to be inferior to European reason’ (p.256). This 1985 paper by 
Salmond is the fourth and final Reichenbach link, and lists as references the works 
by Cooper, Salmon, and Wilson previously mentioned. To return to the point 
about logic raised by Cooper, it is an important question as to the meaning 
intended for ‘rationality’ in Salmond’s assertion that ‘Western thought’ remains 
largely closed to ‘traditional rationalities’ (p.260). (Also see p.167.) Furthermore, 
how is the term ‘Māori epistemologies’, which is the title of Salmond’s paper, to 
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be understood? This question is highly relevant to the task in hand, of clarifying 
and evaluating the possible meanings of ‘Māori science’. 
 
The relevance of the rationality debate to Pūtaiao is that references to ‘alternative 
logic’ are often included in support of indigenous science. Besides the challenging 
of Eurocentrism, and the alignment with traditions of critique, this is another link 
between Pūtaiao/Indigenous science and postmodernist/poststructuralist 
philosophies. Greg Cajete (1999), for example, claims that Indigenous science is 
‘unquantifiable [as] associated with Western Science, as reflected in the 
Heisenberg Principle’ (p.82). This comment appears to fall into the trap of Cooper 
discussed above, by supporting a differend of cultural logic, and to subscribe to 
the ‘doctrine of descriptive cultural relativism’ (Moody-Adams, 1997). 
Unfortunately, as previously discussed (p.98), by leaving the ‘royal road’ to 
science (Phillips, 1987), such ideas collapse in practice into ‘soft options’. 
 
The collection ‘Rationality’ (Wilson, 1970), in which the Horton chapter was 
included, is a widely-cited early reference in specific fields of debate between 
science and other knowledges such as religion or ethics (e.g. Gould, 2004; 
Moody-Adams, 1997). Many of the chapters cross-refer, and/or call on the same 
original fieldwork data, collected by classical anthropologists such as Lévy-Bruhl, 
Evans-Pritchard, Radcliffe-Brown, Frazer, Firth and Malinowski. All except the 
final chapter had previously been published elsewhere, and the author of that 
chapter, J. H. M. Beattie, noted his ‘grat[itude] for the opportunity to continue 
here this in many respects fruitful dialogue’ (p.241 fn.4), in a chapter consisting 
mostly of responses to three of the earlier chapters, including that of Horton, 
engaging with the other authors’ critiques of his own prior work on the subject of 
rationality and culture. Besides the importance of its contribution to the rationality 
debate, this volume as a whole exemplifies major processes of academic discourse 
in social science - argument and rebuttal, critique and counter-critique. 
 
Beattie’s comments on Horton’s paper form an appropriate conclusion to the 
volume, and this section. Beattie concluded that the differences between their 
positions in the debate were more of emphasis than substance. Beattie summarised 
the differences seen by Horton between science and ‘traditional’ thought:  
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1. In ‘traditional’ thinking a special power is ascribed to symbols, [a power] 
not based on hypothesis or experiment, since ritual’s essential quality [is] its 
expressive character, from which the belief in its causal efficacy is derived. 
2. In a ‘traditional’ culture ideas are seen as bound to particular contexts 
rather than to other ideas, as in science. 
3. Concern with the nature and rules of logical inference is characteristic of 
science, rather than the ‘traditional’ outlook. 
4. The aims of science are explicit and specific, whereas in ‘traditional’ 
thought a variety of non-specific ends may be sought at the same time. 
5. There is in traditional39 thought a gradual shading of the cognitive into the 
expressive; dramatic representations of the gods are thought to be both 
causally effective in influencing them, and enjoyable for their own sakes. 
This differs radically from ‘the scientific ideal’, whose primary canon is that 
‘every new theory be subjected to the widest possible testing and criticism’. 
6. The traditional view of the anomalous and exceptional is as something 
dangerous, but to the scientist the anomalous offers an intriguing challenge. 
Thus ‘taboo’, a characteristic concept of traditional thinking, essentially 
implies symbolizing; for the ground of avoidance lies not in the experienced 
qualities of the object itself, but in what it represents. 
7. For ‘traditional’ thought the passage of time (the vehicle par excellence of 
the new and the strange) is dangerous and unwanted, and attempts are made 
to annul it through rites of renewal and recreation. To a scientist, on the 
other hand, the temporal process, with the associated - and now rather 
threadbare - idea of progress, is welcome and indispensable. (Beattie, 1970, 
p.265) 
 
To see in the last sentence, ‘the threadbare idea of progress’ is heartening, because 
it indicates this author’s sensitivity to the political implications of this scholarship, 
compared with Cooper (1975), and highlights once again the close link between 
the science of anthropology, the scientism of evolutionism, the evolutionist 
doctrines of economism, and the Pūtaiao curriculum (see also p.187). Having 
reviewed various sides of the rationality debate, Beattie concluded that, while he 
and Horton agreed in most areas, 
I find it useful to regard the scientific and the ‘traditional’ as two approaches 
representing fundamentally different and mutually irreducible ways of 
looking at the world, [but] Horton thinks that they can be understood in 
terms of the difference between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ societies. (Beattie, 1970, 
p.264, my emphasis) 
 
Agreeing with Beattie’s rejection of Horton’s explanation in terms of ‘open’ and 
‘closed’ societies, I am happy to call on Beattie’s support, in the emphasised 
phrase, for my argument that the ‘whakapapa/standing-reserve’ conflict, at the 
philosophical-epistemological-ethical level, is the key ‘differend’ between science 
and mātauranga. 
                                                 
39 The use of inverted commas around the word ‘traditional’ is inconsistent in this section of the 
text, and the quote follows Beattie’s usages. 
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The 1990s: Does Māori Science Exist? 
Mātauranga discourse in the 1990s generally remained focused on the relationship 
between traditional Māori knowledge and modern science (Dickison, 1994; 
Lomax, 1996), as a local strand of the wider debate on science versus IK in 
science and science education, reviewed above in Wāhanga Tuatoru. The local 
debate included views of Māori and non-Māori, scientists and non-scientists, 
arguing either for (Mohi, 1993; Parsons, 1992) or against (Durie, 1996; Dickison, 
1994) the proposition that traditional Māori knowledge constituted a science. The 
formation of NAMMSAT (National Association of Māori Mathematicians, 
Scientists and Technologists) in the 1990s was a significant attempt to facilitate a 
greater level of discourse for the issues in Māori science, with conferences held in 
1995 and 1996, but limited activity since (NAMMSAT, 1995). One possible 
reason for this (apart from lack of funding) was that NAMMSAT participants 
were involved in fields as diverse as forestry, primary health services, and Pūtaiao 
education, making meaningful professional conversations difficult to maintain. 
 
A relevant policy discourse is that of science as an activity (reason) of the state. In 
a report on mātauranga completed during the mid-1990s review of publicly-
funded science (MoRST, 1995), as part of the economic re-structuring of the state 
sector, the author, Terry Lomax, concluded that mātauranga Māori was in urgent 
need of preservation and worthy of research, even though ‘[t]he discussion 
whether mātauranga Māori is “science” or not is largely irrelevant.’ (MoRST, 
1995, p.10). The report proposed specific funding of mātauranga Māori research, 
as it does not fit within contestable public-good science funding criteria. 
Nevertheless, by emphasising its ‘potentially useful knowledge’ (p.6), such as 
‘jewels of information pointing towards methods of utilising and preserving the 
environment’ and in noting that ‘the Māori cultural paradigm has a commercial 
value’, the report suggests utilization of mātauranga Māori by mainstream 
science, culture or the economy, is the underlying purpose of its preservation. 
This is an example (in this case, pre-dating widespread use of the term) of the 
‘knowledge economy’ perspective on mātauranga Māori (Devine, 2001). A 
subsequent paper by Lomax again displayed this instrumentalist (imperialist) 
stance: ‘The challenge for “science” is to firstly understand and then verify that 
knowledge base so as to distinguish fact from myth and fiction, and thereby allow 
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mātauranga Māori to become a valuable part of mainstream science’ (Lomax, 
1996, p.13). 
 
In a seminar for the (then recently-established) Department of Conservation 
(DOC), Michael Peters related the development of ‘postmodern science’ to 
current issues of concern to DOC (Peters, 1993). Conservation, and hence DOC, 
is a relatively important context for discourse of Māori science (Roberts, Norman 
et al., 1996; Marsden and Henare, 2003), due to the fact that it is concerned with 
the ‘environment’; that its establishing statute included a directive to give effect to 
the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi in its work (Conservation Act, 1987), and 
perhaps also because conservationists line up with Māori as groups whose 
interests have traditionally been excluded by the state and economic interests.  
 
Peters poses a number of questions in this paper (to which he views the answers 
as ‘quite plain’) that focus on the contemporary science policy restructuring 
referred to above, which he interprets as the ‘commodification of science’, and its 
implications for both Māori and conservation interests:  
• Can the practice of science be separated from the policy context which articulates 
strategic goals concerning the overall direction of research emphasising its 
contribution to economic performance? 
• How compatible is the notion of ‘sustainability’ with an emphasis on science for 
economic growth? 
• How do Māori get recognition for mātauranga Māori within the present science 
policy regime? (Peters, 1993, p.23-6) 
 
Peters describes two accounts of postmodern science, one that re-integrates 
science with philosophy in a ‘return to cosmology’, the other that ‘functions as a 
critique of contemporary science, and the way in which science as a reason of the 
state has been put in the service of economic development’; both accounts seeing 
science as ‘a set of social practices belonging to a culture’, and both thus 
‘sympathetic to the claims of those who have been excluded from science or who 
have suffered as a result of it’ (p.14). 
 
Peters suggests that according to these criteria, traditional Māori knowledge or 
mātauranga is postmodern science. Reiterating Anne Salmond’s prophetic words, 
‘the process of opening Western knowledge to traditional rationalities has hardly 
yet begun’ (Salmond, 1985, p.260), he mentions 3 examples that have begun this 
process, including a report by the Ministerial Task Group Reviewing Science and 
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Technology Education, 1992, which ‘acknowledges that “an enormous body of 
knowledge would be lost if indigenous peoples lose or are deprived of their 
culture and heritage” and argues for the inclusion of such knowledge in the school 
curriculum’ (Peters, 1993, p.27). Māori representatives on the Task Group 
requested that the existence of a Māori body of scientific knowledge be 
acknowledged. The other cited examples are the two developing discourses of 
Kaupapa Māori research, and of Māori intellectual property rights. Thus, Peters 
suggests Māori science could be a ‘postmodern science which might serve as a 
framework within the local context to take account of the voices of Māori and 
conservationists’ (p.6).  
 
Divergent thoughts by Mason Durie were reported in a recent review of the 
‘science/mātauranga dichotomy’ for Waitangi Tribunal research (Williams, 2001), 
which included each of the above-mentioned references. Durie states, 
‘mātauranga Māori is not a type of science (even if it does contain elements of 
scientific thinking) any more than science is a substrate for religious beliefs and 
understanding’ (cited in Williams, 2001, p.21). This assertion contrasts with 
Peters’ argument above. Further, Durie makes a language/knowledge distinction: 
‘The retention of mātauranga Māori is as important as the retention of te reo 
Māori. One feeds the other though the promotion of te reo Māori and the 
promotion of Mātauranga Māori are different issues and require different 
approaches’ (p.22). Unfortunately, Durie does not explicate further the two 
different approaches he refers to here. He identifies the major sites of Māori 
science discourse: ‘Education curricula, science and research goals, and 
environmental education make liberal use of mātauranga Māori and do so in a 
manner which runs the risk of distorting both context and content’ (Durie, 1996, 
cited in Williams, 2001, p.23). 
 
Durie’s comments complicate the epistemological issues involved in Māori 
knowledge, compared with their usual treatment in contemporary science 
education materials. On the other hand, his comments reflect a viewpoint on 
science that does not explicitly problematize its claims to objectivity and 
ethical/cultural neutrality, as does, for example, Peters (1993). While Durie’s 
main point is that mātauranga Māori ‘belongs to iwi’ and ‘should be under Māori 
control’, he also calls on the Crown to ‘make funding available for its retention, 
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transmission and development’ (cited in Williams, 2001, p.20). The conflict 
inherent in these two claims is a dialectic that arises repeatedly in policies and 
issues of tino rangatiratanga, related to the argument in Wāhanga 4.1 (p.104) that 
‘power-sharing’ between the state and iwi is more symbolic than real. 
 
Regarding education, Durie comments ‘traditional Māori knowledge has been 
incorporated into mainstream frameworks as part of a determined bid to make 
mātauranga Māori widely available in educational curricula. In this process there 
has often been Māori support if not Māori initiative’ (cited in Williams, 2001, 
p.22). Such commentary, at a hui attended mainly by university academics, 
highlights the lack of direct communication between those concerned with 
mātauranga Māori in the school sector, university, state science, and conservation. 
This segmented and limited nature of Māori science discourse contributes 
significantly to the curricular problems identified above. It also reflects and 
further complicates the reported gaps in wider discourses of philosophy of science 
and science education (Benson, 1989; Duschl, 1990). 
 
Williams concludes his review of the mātauranga/science ‘dichotomy’ by 
suggesting there is no point in debating whether or not mātauranga Māori is 
science. ‘If calling ‘mātauranga Māori’ ‘Māori science’ is seen to be a way of 
validating indigenous knowledge, and equating it with Western science by giving 
it a Pākehā name, then I believe this to be both unnecessary and unwise’ (M. 
Roberts, cited in Williams, 2001, p.25). Hence, the ‘validity’ of the notion of 
Māori science is related to an understanding of the notion of science: the use of 
the term ‘Māori science’ problematises the universal claims made by ‘science’. 
The point is not to show that mātauranga is a type of Western science, but rather 
to reflect that both are cultural ways of knowing about the world. As McKinley 
notes, ‘science knowledge is designed specifically to marginalise other knowledge 
(indigenous or not). I therefore make selective use of the term ‘Māori science’ to 
challenge and provoke thought on this matter’ (McKinley, cited in Roberts, 1998, 
p.69).  
 
This politicised or strategic understanding of the term ‘Māori science’, espoused, 
as discussed above, in work by Parsons (1992), Peters (1993), McKinley and 
Roberts (1998), clearly is not shared by all participants in the debate (Matthews, 
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1995), as evidenced by, for example, the reference to ‘Māori scientific 
knowledge’ in Science (M.O.E., 1993).  Arguments in support of ‘Māori science’ 
often indicate this confusion:  
The existence of Māori science is indisputable, but as an individual term, 
‘science’ is irrelevant. Science is but a small part of mātauranga, yet it 
permeates nearly every aspect of it. (Kapua, 1997, p.97) 
 
This conclusion is in direct contrast to that of Smith (1995), who points out that 
‘the notions of western science or Māori science can be somewhat misleading’ 
(p.105, original emphasis). Intended as strategy, this notion of ‘Māori science’ has 
at times been unproblematically accepted, aided by a sympathy towards cultural 
relativism (in opposition to cultural imperialism, see p.102 above) in indigenous 
and postcolonial scholarship (Stewart-Harawira, 2005). As with the earlier 
discussion of scientism (p.50), this confusion may cause problems particularly 
outside academic circles of science and philosophy. To cite a Canadian example, 
in evidence to the government on the role of IK in establishing a new diamond 
mine, an Aboriginal Dene Nation elder explained, ‘I call it Dene science because 
in the literature it is regarded as a science’ (Widdowson and Howard, 2002, p.31). 
It leads to the currency, for example, of the idea amongst the KKM community 
that the Pūtaiao curriculum can, and should, be based on distinctively ‘Māori’ 
science.  
 
Understanding how this confusion can easily arise, based on an earlier Eurocentric 
notion of ‘Māori science’ as ‘primitive science’, promoted as a strategy against 
the hegemony of ‘Western science’, and promulgated as a purported alternative 
science curriculum through Kaupapa Māori networks, provides a cogent reason to 
discontinue the use of the term ‘Māori science’, except under close advisement, as 
well as a signal story concerning academic responsibilities in regard to the effects 
of discourse, particularly in politically charged fields (and which are not?). 
 
As presaged in Wāhanga Tuarua, it may be more productive to make comparisons 
between the philosophy of mātauranga, and that of modern science, since ‘it is at 
the philosophical level that the greatest discrepancies between positivist science 
(as well as some other views of science) and indigenous knowledge are to be 
found’ (McKinley, 1995, p.69), and because it allows consideration of a wider 
range of literature. The sites of enquiry involved in Pūtaiao curriculum research 
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can be written exploratively in layers, below. On the left, however, the four terms 
underneath the heading are more-or-less synonymous.  
Pūtaiao curriculum Science curriculum 
↓ ↓ 
philosophy of Māori science philosophy of modern science 
↓ ↓ 
nature of Māori knowledge nature of science knowledge 
↓ ↓ 
mātauranga instrumental rationality 
↓ ↓ 
Māori philosophy ‘economistic’ philosophy 
 
In the last section of this chapter (Wāhanga 5.3), I write about my own 
‘abstraction’ (hanga), and compare some key notions in philosophy of mātauranga 
and science, but first, the following section reviews two prominent published 
models. 
5.2  Voice and Authenticity in Contemporary Mātauranga 
Discourse 
From earliest contact, Māori people and culture inspired many European writers, 
in time joined by Māori authors, with some early names including Ngata, Buck/Te 
Rangi Hiroa, Tamihana-Tarapipi, Makareti and Winiata (who in 1952 became the 
first Māori PhD, Winiata, 1967). Many new (and republished) books on all 
aspects of mātauranga continue to appear, with a few recent examples including: 
Māori Games and Haka (Armstrong, 2005) 
Māori Bird Lore (Riley, 2001) 
Song of Waitaha (Brailsford, 2003) 
The Woven Universe (Royal, 2003) 
Tohunga: The Revival: Ancient Knowledge for the Modern Era 
(Robinson, 2005). 
  
The first two of these, like those of Firth and Best reviewed in the preceding 
section, use a theme from European knowledge schema to organise and interpret 
mātauranga. ‘Song of Waitaha’ contains traditional wānanga narratives shared by 
the author’s informants/supervisors. This book is cited as an ‘identity paradigm 
text’ by Makere Stewart-Harawira (2005), in a way similar to my own use of ‘Te 
Whare Tapu o Ngāpuhi’ (p.197 below). These first three books have Pākehā 
authors (with varying degrees of Māori collaboration/reference), while the latter 
two treat mātauranga from a Māori author’s personal perspective, and focus on 
Māori philosophy as much as practical knowledge, or re-telling detailed 
narratives. While such books are outside (or peripheral to) the academic canon, 
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they record and interpret mātauranga as learned directly from Māori antecedents, 
and thus are relevant and valuable in Kaupapa Māori terms (see also quote below, 
p.179, from Royal, 2003).  
 
In terms of the voice or identity represented, it seems logical to argue that new 
publications on mātauranga must, by definition of temporal remove from 
traditional Māori society, be regarded as even further levels of ‘abstraction’, in 
comparison, say, with the two early examples by Best and Firth, reviewed above. 
Yet, as the Kaupapa Māori paradigm attests, the intergenerational continuity of 
traditions of mātauranga, while exceedingly attenuated and modified, has never 
been entirely extinguished (Salmond, 1985; May, 2002). Thus the three latter 
examples make some claim as ‘primary’ mātauranga texts, although this claim 
cannot be considered to make them ‘authentic’, a notion which is inherently 
problematic in relation to mātauranga (and knowledge, and culture in general), as 
previously discussed. 
 
The following discussion focuses on seven texts, by four diverse40 authors, 
namely, John Patterson, Mere Roberts, Anne Salmond and Katerina Simon, as a 
small sample of the contemporary academic corpus on mātauranga. These 
particular texts have been selected because they illustrate two different approaches 
to analysing mātauranga, as discussed below. 
 
Mere Roberts (1998) compared the knowledge systems of Western science (WS) 
and indigenous knowledge (IK), noting ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ leads to 
a ‘cultural filter’ which ‘operates to produce markedly different cultural 
perspectives or worldviews held by Māori and non-Māori’ (p.60-1). Roberts 
modelled ‘humankind’s various knowledge systems’ as circles in a simple set 
diagram, in which the two circles representing WS and IK begin with significant 
overlap, involving ‘the apparently universal cognitive properties of classification 
... as well as elements of myth, magic and religion’ (p.61). The Scientific 
Revolution led to ‘progressive epistemological divergence on the part of WS’, 
which in the model is represented by a reduced area of intersection between the 
two circles.  
                                                 
40 Since they include: two Māori, two Pākehā; a biologist, an anthropologist, and a philosopher; a 
professor emeritus and a doctoral student... 
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Roberts’ analysis balances similarities against differences in comparing the two 
knowledge systems, thus accommodating the diversity of perspectives found in 
the literature, including the previously discussed (p.160) ‘dissenting opinion’ of 
Durie (Roberts, 1998, p.69), by asserting that each knowledge system ‘has 
validity within its own cultural context’ (p.68). The implications of this condition, 
while not discussed by Roberts, are obviously vital, as it returns the discussion to 
the level of politics and history (perhaps even space and time). On one hand, it 
could be interpreted as an uncontroversial statement that mātauranga was a valid 
knowledge system in traditional pre-European Māori society. On the other hand, 
to say that mātauranga, rather than science, is valid in contemporary Māori 
cultural contexts, is a far more nebulous and contentious claim, and easily 
succumbs to the doctrine of cultural relativism (Moody-Adams, 1997), which 
allows the dominant culture to ignore real moral disagreements, and thus serves 
the interests of indigenous ethnies such as Māori very poorly. 
 
Katerina Simon (2003) employs a similar model containing two intersecting 
circles, labelled ‘scientific ways of knowing’ and ‘Māori/indigenous ways of 
knowing’ (p.53). Simon identifies ‘scientific conservatory values’ relating to the 
environment as an important area of overlap or ‘convergence’ between Māori and 
scientific values, which can lead to the ‘synergy [of] a shared discourse that is 
characteristic of post-materialist green understandings of the humankind-
environment relationship ... [with] potential as a means of reconciliation and of 
mobilisation around the notion of sustainability’ (p.54). This is consistent with the 
previous observation that conservation is one of the primary sites of Māori science 
discourse. The paper can be viewed as attempting to theorise this discursive link, 
although some issues remain unaddressed. 
 
For example, while Mere Roberts is referenced in this paper (though not the 
specific paper discussed above), there is no acknowledgement of the similarity 
between their models of IK and WS. Indeed, Simon states there has been ‘a 
preoccupation with contrast’ (Simon, 2003, p.69) by previous authors on 
mātauranga/IK versus science. In choosing to focus on areas of overlap, she fails 
to address the opposing arguments, such as that the Māori conservation ethic is 
‘more akin to game management than to conservation ... in the preservationist 
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sense as the altruistic management of bird species for their own good rather than 
for the good also of the harvesters’ (Kirikiri and Nugent, cited in Roberts, Norman 
et al., 1996, p.12). Simon’s assertion that Māori and conservation perspectives can 
be unproblematically aligned belies the ongoing disputes between DOC and iwi 
groups in many areas of Aotearoa New Zealand.  
 
Simon frames the issue of Māori versus scientific values within notions of 
‘similarity/affinity and difference/distinction’, stating that reconciliation of these 
is ‘one of the most important development issues of our contemporary period’ 
(Simon, 2003, p.44). Simon does not explicate or attribute this assertion, but it is 
plausibly related to the ‘differend’ notion of cultural difference (Lyotard, 1989) 
(see also p.138). The ‘notions of difference and sameness’ are used by Simon to 
link Māori values to Māori identity, arguing that these change in concert. This 
apparently leads Simon to the conclusion that, as Māori identity has changed 
under the impact of colonisation, Māori conservation values have also ‘evolved’ 
(Simon, 2003, p.49, 54) so that they are (or can be) aligned with those of science, 
and that focusing on this ‘convergence’ is beneficial for Māori interests (‘greater 
political viability’, ‘more pragmatic’, p.54). This reasoning seems dubious, 
nevertheless, considering that all the ‘convergence’ so far has entailed Māori 
adapting to science, and possibly amounts to a variant of the ‘knowledge 
economy’ argument, which is unable to account for value (or, indeed, cultural) 
differences from those of economistic rationality (Devine, 2001).  
 
 While both Roberts (‘reversing the usual assumptions’, Roberts, 1998, p.61) and 
Simon (‘the Māori/indigenous standpoint’, Simon, 2003, p.49) explicitly reject a 
Eurocentric position on mātauranga, both papers are written largely in the 
universalised academic voice, and both conclude with similar general claims 
(below), claims which, while clearly pro-Māori, do not obviously follow from the 
preceding argumentation, and are couched in terms which make them difficult to 
accurately evaluate.  
[A]ll New Zealanders stand to benefit by [mātauranga Māori]. (Roberts, 
1998, p.71) 
 
In [determining the shape of the future], Māori and other indigenous peoples 
have a very important role to play. (Simon, 2003, p.55) 
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Anne Salmond (1978; 1985) and John Patterson (1992; 1994; 2000) are two 
contemporary Pākehā scholars who have written extensively on mātauranga, and 
the following discussion of their work is based on these five texts. Both scholars 
employ a similar approach to representing mātauranga, which is quite different 
from the ‘set diagram’ approach described above. Salmond and Patterson 
structure their respective analyses according to what they identify as key Māori 
philosophical notions and institutions. Thus, they discuss certain topics in 
common, including mana, tapu, mauri, the cosmogonic narratives (these are 
included in most writings on mātauranga), and the themes of balance and 
opposites. Through all three texts, Patterson develops an analysis of ‘Māori 
philosophy’ as a set of ideas relevant to contemporary Pākehā readers; while the 
two Salmond papers (1978; 1985) differ from each other in level of perspective, 
and specific focus.  
 
Salmond’s first paper (Salmond, 1978) presents detailed results of exploring ‘the 
traditional Māori cosmos’ semantically, that is, using ‘the Māori language itself 
[as] the main line of evidence’ (p.5). Although Salmond does not discuss it in this 
paper, ‘semantic anthropology’ is a ‘critical’ or ‘reflexive’ approach to 
anthropology (Parkin, 1982, p.xvi, 16). Salmond’s study uses various Māori 
language sources and modes of discourse to investigate the notion of ‘pae’ 
(threshold, liminal zone), defined by (and defining) the series of polar opposites or 
notional pou (posts), such as tapu/noa, ao/pō etc, which structure the Māori 
cosmos. ‘The emerging picture is one of an orderly cosmos, where meaning 
assigned in one metaphorical system is clearly correlated with meaning assigned 
in others’ (Salmond, 1978, p.15). She concludes the paper by using this model to 
‘look at the hitherto unexplained and apparently eccentric ritual of “biting the 
latrine beam”’ (p.25). This was part of a rite traditionally conducted to forestall 
danger, ‘if a person became ill or was about to visit a strange area’ (ibid), and 
formed a specific Māori example of Cooper’s ‘peculiar beliefs’ (Cooper, 1975, 
p.25). But as part of the ‘web of ideas’ of mātauranga which Salmond (1978) 
describes in this paper, it is recognised as a rational practice, in the common 




Her second paper (Salmond, 1985) is based on old written Māori texts, early 
European records, and oral evidence collected from ‘tribal elders between 1964 
and 1984’ (p.240), to comment from a much wider perspective on mātauranga as 
a system, and on the distorting prevalence of ‘intellectual evolutionism’ in past 
and present Pākehā thinking about Māori knowledge. The doctrine of 
evolutionism makes repeated appearances in the literature fields relevant to 
Pūtaiao, and in the following section I argue for its particular relevance to 
Kaupapa Māori science. 
 
An important difference between these two authors, Patterson and Salmond, is 
methodological, concerned with the ‘voice’ or level of abstraction in their texts. 
Patterson makes reference to Salmond’s work, but not the reverse, while both 
refer to major authors such as Best and George Grey. Salmond’s work, which 
might fairly be included in Patterson’s description (below) of ‘historical or 
scientific’ (or both), aims to engage with mātauranga on its own terms, favouring 
primary sources (both historical and contemporary) in te reo Māori, in cognisance 
of the problems and complexities of knowledge authenticity, Eurocentric 
distortions, and cultural hybridity. It is especially important to relate Salmond’s 
observations to the discussion in Wāhanga Tuawhā of the nature of the language 
of science. 
The mysteries of tapu and the placing of left and right are linked in the 
meeting house, and if contemporary informants could not reliably construe 
their precontact meaning, some other line of evidence had to be found. I 
have looked for this in the Māori language itself, particularly in the semantic 
structures of the lexicon. (Salmond, 1978, p.7) 
 
In contrast, Patterson explains his deliberate aim for abstraction: 
Both Māori and Pākehā writers have on occasion glossed over some of the 
less attractive aspects of history. ... [I]n any work that purports to be either 
historical or scientific, that would be regrettable, but when our interest is in 
values rather than facts I believe that - surprisingly - it can be an advantage 
rather than a disadvantage. As a philosopher I am interested in what matters 
rather than what happens ... Values are concerned with ideals, and ideals are 
only rarely achieved. So rather paradoxically, sources that romanticize the 
facts and present an idealized view of the past or the present can be of more 
use to the philosopher than sources that are strictly accurate. (Patterson, 
1992, p.13) 
 
Patterson carefully frames his work as ‘an attempt by a Pākehā to explore Māori 
values’ (p.9): in Tuhiwai Smith’s words (cited in Wāhanga 1.3), ‘positioning 
[himself] as a non-Māori’. The later book (Patterson, 2000) begins with a personal 
introduction, in avowed contravention of academic norms, and ends with a waiata 
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(song), a final piece of discourse analysed as supporting his thesis for non-Māori 
to become ‘people of the land’. These formatting choices could be considered a 
more subtle appropriation of Māori symbolic form than the emblematic use of te 
reo by Firth (1972), discussed above. Patterson explains his perspective on 
‘abstraction’ issues in research on mātauranga: 
I am not a Māori. Even if I were, I would not have access to all of the ideas 
that could be included under the heading ‘Māori Philosophy’. Further, I have 
taken notice of some Māori ideas but not of others. Even if I could, I would 
not be interested in trying to give a ‘complete’ picture (although I would 
love to be able to meet one). So all that I am offering is a series of fragments 
which I hope add up to something of interest, something of value, to my 
fellow Pākehā and maybe to the world at large. (Patterson, 1992, p.9) 
 
In contrast, Salmond’s personal voice is less obvious, as she writes (in these two 
papers) largely in the neutral academic voice of ‘science’. Nevertheless, it is 
apparent Salmond has far greater knowledge of te reo me ōna tikanga than 
Patterson, who makes transparent his lack of expertise, making it work for (rather 
than against) him. At the end of the first book, recalling the words of Te Rangi 
Hiroa (Sir Peter Buck) ‘that the traditions of the Māori are also the traditions of 
New Zealand and therefore also the traditions of the Pākehā’ (Patterson, 1992, 
p.184), Patterson turns to the issue raised by Cherryl Smith (2000) at the start of 
this chapter (p.139), noting ‘the fact that the traditions of the Pākehā [including 
academic philosophy] also form part of the traditions of New Zealand and 
therefore belong as much to the Māori as to the Pākehā’ (Patterson, 1992, p.184).  
 
Despite the fruitfulness of Patterson’s approach for usefully articulating the major 
characteristics of similarity and difference between mātauranga and Western 
knowledge, the thesis that ‘Pākehā really can also become people of the land’ 
(Patterson, 2000, p.11), could be seen by Māori as irrelevant, if not unhelpful. For 
example, the claim has appeared in recent political discourse that Pākehā are now 
tangata whenua (e.g. in debate surrounding the Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004), 
undermining the traditionally accepted status of Māori in this country. This 
indicates how worthy ideas such as Patterson’s can be distorted into new, more 
subtle levels of colonisation. Patterson explains that his ‘people of the land’ 
notion, which is the title of his second book (Patterson, 2000), is 
a translation of tangata whenua, and this concept presents a model of 
harmonious interdependence between all creatures based upon a web of 
universal kinship’. (p.131) 
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The problem is, ‘people of the land’, while common, is an inadequate translation 
of ‘tangata whenua’, at best shorthand for its actual meaning, which is better 
approached by a combination of ‘landed people’, ‘hosts’, and ‘indigenous’. While 
Patterson’s ‘people of the land’ concept is certainly consistent with Māori 
genealogical notions of cosmology, these cannot be extrapolated from the actual 
meaning of ‘tangata whenua’, which expresses political relationships between 
groups of people, and specific relationships between people and the natural 
environment. Patterson acknowledges this point by making a distinction between 
his universalised version and the ‘authentic’ meaning41: 
The idea of tangata whenua (people of the land), though, usually relates to 
particular places and particular people. We are all children of Earth and Sky, 
but we are not all tangata whenua in all places. (p.16) 
 
While not invalidating Patterson’s thesis, it is important to pay attention to 
‘authentic’ meanings in a Kaupapa Māori research perspective, where te reo me 
ōna tikanga are paramount. The concept ‘people of the land’, as Patterson 
employs it, would be better conveyed in te reo as ‘iwi nō te whenua’,42 where the 
word ‘nō’, usually translated as ‘from’ or ‘of’, literally means ‘belonging to’.  
 
The distorted representation of mātauranga by European writers is the focus of the 
second Salmond paper (Salmond, 1985), which ends with the observation, cited 
above, that ‘opening Western knowledge to traditional rationalities has hardly yet 
begun’ (p.260). Salmond uses the terms ‘not adequate’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘potent 
colonial ideology’ to describe past and present research praxis concerning 
mātauranga. In self-reflexive critique, she addresses her own paradigm: 
In anthropology, the discipline where epistemological hazard and challenge 
could perhaps most readily proceed, Western thought is often closed by 
premises of intellectual superiority to radical cross-cultural reflection and 
thorough-going enquiry. (p.260) 
 
Comparing Māori and Pākehā texts from 1840 – 1860, Salmond finds the 
following faults with mainstream discourse: 
1. A ‘harsh disparity in the evidence of Māori philosophical speculations and 
debates in the 1840s and 1860s, and European accounts of Māori intellectual 
capacities in the same period ... which became institutionalized with ... the 
suppression of Māori language and culture in education and official life’; 
                                                 
41 The ambiguity could be related to ‘the two senses of “of”’ in the phrase ‘people of the land’, a 
language point raised by Tom Sorell (1991, p.3). 
42 This is a translation from the English phrase ‘people of the land’ and does not imply that ‘iwi nō 
te whenua’ is an example of ‘authentic’ Māori phraseology (although the idea, of course, is 
captured in traditions of whakapapa ki a Papatūānuku). 
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2. Lack of openness and curiosity about a different knowledge system or 
culture; 
3. Self-contradiction in ‘claim[ing] both superiority and freedom from 
evaluation’. (p.238-9) 
 
Salmond attributes these faults to ‘implicit, sometimes explicit, evolutionism’, and 
gives some contemporary examples of its ongoing influence. Her final paragraph 
in this discussion, where the personal voice emerges most fully, is exceedingly 
relevant to Pūtaiao: 
It is true that guns, for instance, offered a retort to Māori reasoning that 
could not be gainsaid, but this does not mean that Māori reasoning was 
fallacious or unwise. Power in the sense of control implies no necessary 
moral advantage; Western science may have achieved a measure of truth 
(and so efficacy) in its accounts of the physical world, but this guarantees 
nothing whatsoever about its thoughts on other matters. I do not accept the 
proposition that technological control is a final form of wisdom, nor that 
other forms of thought simply do not count. That is an old idea in New 
Zealand and a very destructive one indeed.  
 
The last sentence uses a country name to localise a point about rationality that is 
universal (‘locating the global’, McKinley, 2005). Also, calling it ‘New Zealand’ 
implies the scale of ‘old’ in this sentence begins with European experiences. A 
similar critique of Eurocentrism appears in Patterson’s discussion of the 
divergence between Māori and scientific ideas on kinship with nature, which leads 
into more general commentary on ethics and knowledge:  
Although biological science provides links between humans and other 
species in so far as it sees all creatures as linked through evolutionary chains, 
typically it claims to deal only with matters of fact, disclaiming any 
conclusions about how we ought to treat others. That at least is the theory or 
the dogma. It is not always borne out in practice, as we see when some 
scientists unthinkingly and unhesitatingly draw prescriptive conclusions 
from the officially descriptive data and theories of evolutionary biology. We 
might insist on the theory that science is purely descriptive and explanatory 
and simply say that scientists are being slack when they do this, but if it 
happens at all frequently we might consider rejecting the idea of scientific 
objectivity as a myth - maybe even a totally unrealistic myth - which 
overlooks the intimate relation between facts and values (Patterson, 2000, 
p.29, my emphasis). 
 
Clearly, the research paradigm in these texts by Salmond and Patterson is very 
different from that found in the scholarship of Best and Firth, discussed above in 
Wāhanga 5.1. For example, both Salmond and Patterson explicitly refer to ‘Māori 
sources’ to validate their analyses; and both also make the point that mātauranga 
is a living system. Despite the different ways they deal with authenticity and 
abstraction in their work on mātauranga, from divergent perspectives in 
Philosophy and Anthropology, their conclusions are similar, in arguing that 
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mātauranga contains much value that the mainstream (‘metropolitan’, Salmond, 
1985, p.240) has consistently overlooked, due to Eurocentric chauvinism. 
 
Salmond offers a very concise definition of mātauranga as ‘reliable knowledge ... 
almost synonymous with mōhiotanga, knowledge acquired by familiarity and the 
exercise of intelligence’. Patterson concludes that mātauranga constitutes an 








Respect for life 
Collective responsibility.  
 
Māori values are not like Pākehā values. ... the differences are not only 
differences of content – there are also differences of structure. The recent 
development by philosophers of the idea of a virtue ethics – as opposed to 
the predominantly rule-based ethics more familiar to the Pākeha – is a 
valuable aid to understanding. Māori values can fruitfully be conceived as 
being concerned in the first instance with what you are, as opposed to what 
you do, as concerned with character, as opposed to action. Rather than 
provide a list of rules to follow (or break at your peril), they can be seen as 
providing a range of models of ideal persons. These are the famous 
ancestors. ... Although the details of the model may vary from tribe to tribe 
and from time to time, the basic ingredient is the same, at least for free males 
– the rangatira. At its highest level, Māori ethics consists in displaying the 
values of a great chief. (Patterson, 1992, p.115) 
 
This conclusion aligns with that of indigenous American scholar Leroy Little Bear 
(2000, p.83): ‘Aboriginal cultures attempt to mould their members into ideal 
personalities’.  
 
In the later book, Patterson (2000) extends his analysis to the level of metaphor, 
shown by selected chapter headings, below, in developing a model of mātauranga 
relevant to non-Māori: 
People of the Land (Ch. 1) 
Cousins of the Trees (Ch. 2) 
The Unity of Life (Ch. 4) 
Making Mana (Ch. 6). 
 
The mihi/waiata format of this book is a personal and metaphorical way of 
adopting Māori cultural forms. The analogous appropriation/abstraction at the 
philosophical level is Patterson’s ‘development’ of the ‘philosophy of mana’ so as 
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to differentiate between ‘soft mana’, acquired by cooperation, and ‘hard mana’, 
acquired by competition. While this is an extrapolation of Māori traditions, it is 
cogently based on the same general understanding of Māori cosmological 
oppositions as that expounded by Salmond (1978). Patterson concludes: 
In a world in which the way of hard mana has become the norm, the scope 
for personal growth through soft mana is enormous. In turning to this way of 
soft mana we can benefit not only ourselves but also many of the creatures 
with whom we share the planet. The way of soft mana can and should be at 
the heart of our environmental philosophy, for the sake of the planet and for 
our own sakes as well. (Patterson, 2000, p.109) 
 
Patterson’s conclusion thus also aligns with that of Firth (1972), discussed above, 
insofar as cooperation-competition (Patterson) and communalism-individualism 
(Firth) can be taken as closely related pairs. 
 
5.3 Mātauranga, Science, and Pūtaiao 
The previous section examined two approaches to representing mātauranga and its 
relationship to science: first, what I termed the ‘set diagram’ approach, used by 
Roberts and Simon, where two intersecting circles represent areas of overlap and 
difference between the two systems of knowledge. A second prominent approach, 
used by Patterson and Salmond, is to list, define and discuss central Māori 
concepts or notions (such as mana, tapu, etc), which allows for the analysis of 
mātauranga on its own terms, or as philosophy rather than science.  
 
This section starts with a variation on the ‘set diagram’ model, in which W-
science is represented as a subset, or smaller circle, encompassed by the superset 
or larger circle of mātauranga. This visualization is consistent with the 
observation (at the beginning of this chapter) concerning the holistic nature of 
mātauranga compared with the ‘defended territory’ (C. Smith, 2000) of science, 
although this was not the reasoning behind my original construction of it, in 1992-
3, in preparation for teaching Pūtaiao at Te Wharekura o Hoani Waititi Marae. 
Following most contemporary writers on mātauranga (e.g. Roberts, Norman et al., 
1996), I took as organising philosophy the Māori cosmogonic accounts that begin 
with Te Kore, leading through many godly generations to the major atua or 
‘departmental gods’ of the natural world. Since science restricts itself to the 
phenomenal world and cuts out the other worlds or states of existence 
acknowledged within Māori cultural texts, this can be thought of in Māori terms 
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as dealing only with these atua and their domains, focusing on the whakapapa 
from Rangi and Papa downwards, and hence dealing with a subset of mātauranga. 
In the Pūtaiao document (M.O.E., 1996), members of this ‘whānau atua’ are 
assigned as kaitiaki (guardians) in each ‘contextual strand’, as follows: 
O Mataora:   Tānemahuta, Tangaroa, Rongomātāne,  
    Tūmatauenga, Haumiatiketike, Papatūānuku 
O Ahupūngao:   Ranginui, Tāwhirimātea 
O Kawekawe:   Papatūānuku, Rūaumoko 
 
Although my ‘superset’ model was developed for the specific purpose of 
enframing science knowledge within the Kura Kaupapa Māori curriculum, it may 
be compared with that of Roberts/Simon above, in that both models contain two 
circles to represent the ‘bodies of knowledge’ of W-science and IK. The strength 
of the ‘superset’ model for curriculum policy is that all domains of science 
become relevant and appropriate to include in Pūtaiao programmes. 
 
In line with previous suggestions (McKinley, 1998, p.56), the following 
discussion attempts to gain insight into the question of incorporating mātauranga 
into the Pūtaiao curriculum, by analysing discourses of mātauranga/IK relating to 
two basic, meta-cultural notions, namely those of space-time, and classification 
of natural phenomena. To explain the choice of these notions: space-time is 
fundamental, as noted above in the discussion of canons of literature and science 
(p.97); and 
humans are classifying beings who create order at the symbolic and social 
levels by distinguishing between kinds or classes of phenomena. 
Classification is a kind of native theory whereby the infinite complexity of 
the experienced world is reduced to a finite number of categories. (Eriksen, 
2002, p.60) 
Māori Concepts of Space, Time and Classification 
Mātauranga/IK has frequently been asserted to hold different notions of space and 
time from those of modern science/Western philosophy, although published 
details of the exact differences are more difficult to find. For instance, according 
to T. Smith (2000), ‘whakapapa kōrero [tangata whenua discourse] belongs to a 
different spatial and temporal reality than the lineal temporal sequence of 
European ideas of history and myth’ (p.54), but this is supported only by the 
assertion: ‘Western thinking divorces the notions of time and space’ (p.53)43. 
                                                 
43 A precise contradiction appears in Prigogine and Stengers (1984, p.62): ‘... space and time are 
inextricably tied together in the world of classical dynamics’. 
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Related statements in North American indigenous scholarship include the 
following:  
In Aboriginal philosophy, existence consists of energy. All things are 
animate, imbued with spirit, and in constant motion. In this realm of energy 
and spirit, interrelationships between all entities are of paramount 
importance, and space is a more important referent than time. (Little Bear, 
2000, p.77) 
 
Aboriginal languages ... treat time as being continuous ... in contrast, the 
English language ... has a fragmented and objectified (three-dimensional) 
concept of time. (Youngblood Henderson, 2000, p.263) 
 
Aboriginal knowledge has developed a privileged place for space and all its 
energies instead of time as the most important ordering concept of reality. 
(ibid p.264) 
 
These examples rely on weak Sapir-Whorf (W1) or language relativity (p.117), in 
arguing that mātauranga/IK philosophies or central concepts are built into 
indigenous languages, while Eurocentric philosophies are built into English. 
Describing her experience of Māori Studies at Auckland University ‘during the 
time of “revival” [1989 onwards]’, learning ‘te reo Māori and the culture’, Cherryl 
Smith reflects how 
conceptual shifts were required in order for you to fully understand what [the 
lecturers] were saying. Even simple words such as ‘mai’ and ‘atu’ which 
appear in English to be just ‘directional particles’, but nonetheless position 
you into the fold of the speaker, or position you into ‘degrees of otherness’ 
by subtle changes of use and tone. They are not only directional in terms of 
space but also in terms of time. (C. Smith, 2000, p.44) 
 
This powerful underlying rationale for indigenous language revitalisation 
programmes once again highlights issues of authenticity and translatability as key 
problematics in mātauranga/IK research and education (Jocks, 1998). It is a 
compelling argument in favour of the ‘semantic’ methodology (Salmond, 1978) 
for studying mātauranga, based on ‘the Māori language itself’ and ‘early Māori 
texts’ (p.5). Salmond spells out the link to critical epistemology: ‘[G]aps in 
translatability make room for political thought to enter discussions of Māori 
thought’ (Salmond, 1985, p.260). 
 
Salmond’s research pointed towards 
a spatial understanding of genealogy [as a double spiral marked by chevrons 
to show successive epochs] which is quite unlike our own representation of 
descending vertical lines. The genealogical description language of the 
cosmological chants, then, cannot be simply assumed to fall in parallel with 
our notion of historical time, and our conceptions of Māori theories of 




In this case, observed differences between mātauranga and Western knowledge 
become the ground for Salmond’s reflexive critique, as noted above. Later, 
Salmond (1997) summarised the differences between the worldviews of Māori 
and Pākehā at the time of contact, providing particularly clear descriptions of the 
philosophical differences in both notions (space-time and classification) between 
first, science, and second, Māori knowledge: 
Emergent modern science supposed that all bodies are alike. No motion is 
special. Every place is like every other, each moment like any other . . . The 
natural process is nothing but the space-time determination of the motion of 
points of mass. The cosmos, so defined, was framed in standard grids and 
measured, processes made visible in the instruments, tables, charts and logs 
of the explorers. At the same time, those aspects of the world that resisted 
measurement - for instance plants, animals and people - were brought under 
other kinds of standardised description (particularly the languages of 
taxonomy).  
 
According to the cosmological accounts of Māori kin groups, the universe 
had emerged in genealogical stages, from a surge of energy to states of 
potential pattern, including thought, memory, the mind-heart and desire. 
Once earth and sky were formed, ancestor gods generated various forms of 
life, including plants, animals and people. Ancestors could collapse space-
time to become co-present with their descendants, moving from an invisible 
dimension of experience variously described (as Hawaiki, Poo, Tawhiti, etc) 
into the being of their descendants. A contemporary self as the 'living face' 
of their ancestor could share their experiences, or act with them in Te Ao 
Marama (The World of Light). 
These genealogical nets joined people to each other and to other kinds of 
being in relations of various kinds. Utu (the principle of balance) was the 
stuff of life, where relationships were constantly being negotiated in 
reciprocal exchanges. Tapu (the power of the gods) marked out those people, 
places and things where ancestors were present in the world. Mana, or 
efficacy, was a sign that relations with ancestors were working well, 
allowing transactions with others to succeed. Mate, or ill-being, showed that 
relationships were out of kilter, while ora was well-being, when all relations 
were in balance and of good heart. (Salmond, 1997, p.32-3, my emphases).  
 
The following corresponding comments by Patterson, from his first book, form an 
important step in his overall thesis concerning the ways Māori philosophy can be 
useful for, and used by, all: 
As well as giving an account of the origins of the various natural and 
supernatural kinds, the creation stories also give an account of the value-
relationships between the various elements of the natural world. For 
example, Tū-mata-uenga, one of the sons of Rangi and Papa and an ancestor 
of man, holds his brothers collectively responsible for not defending him 
against the attacks of their brother Tāwhiri-matea, thus setting down the 
principle of whanaungatanga in which the members of a whānau or family 
are collectively responsible for supporting each other. So even if we find it 
difficult to accept that, literally, the elements of the universe came into being 
as stated in the creation stories, we can still accept the value-relationships 
built into the stories.  
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These relationships consist of a network of responsibilities between kin, like 
the responsibilities found amongst groups of human kin. Interpreted in this 
way the creation stories are not about a space-time causal order, but are 
about the ways in which the constituents of the world depend upon each 
other for their wellbeing. (Patterson, 1992, p.144, my emphasis) 
Liminal Zones of Science 
But a contradiction seems implied by Patterson’s last sentence (or at least, a 
movement outside the boundary of ‘science’). How can the world’s inhabitants be 
interdependent for wellbeing in a way that does not involve space or time? This 
could be an example of the point ‘that even robust moral realists have come to 
expect that they must accommodate belief in the inevitability of fundamental 
moral conflicts’ (Moody-Adams, 1997, p.33). It arises from an influence of the 
contemporary position by which morals are conveniently deemed irrational. By 
accepting that moral disagreements are incommensurable, sociopolitical writing is 
enabled to ignore moral disagreements and refuse to take them seriously. Thus, 
while Patterson’s analysis retains much explanatory value, the fatal result is that 
‘Māori values’, being irrational, lack power. As Roberts (1998) notes: 
Because of their specificity to place and to culture, the explanatory power of 
IK systems appears to be of limited heuristic potential compared with the 
explanatory power of WS [Western science]. (p.66) 
 
Examples of the results of this power imbalance abound in institutions like the 
Environment Court and the Waitangi Tribunal, since the relationships of 
‘wellbeing’ asserted by mātauranga/IK will always be found (by the legal system, 
and ultimately by technocratic rationality) to be based on non-science. In terms of 
my ‘superset’ model (outlined above) this equates to dealing with a part of 
mātauranga that lies outside the smaller circle representing W-science.  
 
Nevertheless, as Roberts also notes (in terms markedly similar to the descriptions 
of CDA and Kaupapa Māori research in Wāhanga Tuatahi, see p.18 above), 
many areas of science, including modern ecosystem theory, have moved 
towards a more holistic methodology which emphasises interrelationships. 
Acknowledgement is also made of an emerging scientific paradigm in which 
planet Earth is conceived of holistically, as an organism called Gaia ... the 
concept of Gaia is most useful as a way of guiding our thinking about what 
we study, why we study it, and what hypotheses to test. Gaia is not a 
hypothesis in itself; it suggests things that are hypotheses. (Roberts, 1998, 
p.68) 
 
In my set diagram, this trend could be visualised as the boundary of the science 
circle moving, or becoming porous. Similarly, Bill Barton (1993, p.47) observed 
that mathematics, ‘like a wide-angle lens’, is ‘blurry at the edges’.  
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Thus, in philosophical discourses of truth, there is often slippage between the two 
meanings of tika (i.e. factually and morally correct) - the ‘link between thought 
and morality’ (Morris, 1992, p.242). This is used in the arguments of both  T. 
Smith (2000) and Salmond (1985), where metaphysical incommensurability is 
held to effect or facilitate Eurocentric distortions of mātauranga. Salmond notes: 
‘Power claims in English often slip insensibly into claims of moral advantage.’ 
(p.261 n.14). This slippage relates to the boundary between science and ethics. A 
distinction is commonly made between ‘moral values’ and ‘cognitive values’ 
(Laudan, 1984) in discussing this boundary – a distinction that often goes unstated 
in comparisons of mātauranga/IK and science, including many of those discussed 
in Wāhanga Tuatoru. Attention to the boundaries of science would be a fitting 
function for Pūtaiao, given the importance of ‘border thinking’ in postcolonial 
scholarship (Carter, 2006). This is the territory occupied by critical discourses 
such as Kaupapa Māori or the Gaia hypothesis, discourses which aim to extend 
the boundary of science by claiming status as epistemologies or ‘whare 
mātauranga’ (houses of knowledge44), and simultaneously to keep W-science ‘in 
its place’.  
 
Considering all the arguments presented above on various sides of the debate over 
science, mātauranga, knowledge, philosophy and values, it is clear that rationality, 
in the sense of logic, agency and morality, is universal (Gaita, 2002; Moody-
Adams, 1997, Siegel, 2006). This reflects the fact that all humans are of common 
biological and (unevenly) shared historical heritage, on one planet. To ‘offer 
mankind as the [epistemological] relativization’ as Protagoras suggested 
(Honderich, 1995, p.757) becomes obvious as processes of globalisation approach 
completion. Based on the ethics of Levinas, David Blades extends the scope of 
universal morality to include the non-human Other, and explores the implications 
of this for science education (Blades, 2006), in an analysis similar to that 
presented here. If science is in the control of scientists, there is no excuse for 
science to refuse to take ethical responsibilities seriously. If not, who or what is in 
control of science? To repeat Young’s answer (see p.49): 
...the advertising industry, [those] who manage political campaigns and [an] 
increasingly research-guided entertainment industry. (Young, 1989, (p.20) 
                                                 
44 ‘Whare’ in Whare Wānanga is a metaphorical reference to a particular type of knowledge 
(Salmond, 1985, p.260 fn.7). 
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Māori Marsden [1924–1993], nō Ngāi Takoto, nō Patukoraha45, was among the 
final attendees of the traditional Taitokerau wānanga (traditional learning 
institutions). This is his account of a conversation concerning mātauranga, science 
and politics: 
After the war, I returned to the Wānanga and was questioned by the elders of 
the Wānanga about my war experiences. In the course of my sharing our 
experiences I mentioned the atom bomb. One of the elders who had of 
course heard of the atom bomb asked me to explain the difference between 
an atom bomb and an explosive bomb. I took the word hihiri which in 
Maoridom means ‘pure energy’. Here I recalled Einstein’s concept of the 
real world behind the natural world as being comprised of ‘rhythmical 
patterns of pure energy’ and said to him that this was essentially the same 
concept. He then exclaimed “Do you mean to tell me that the Pākehā 
scientists (tohunga Pākehā) have managed to rend the fabric (kahu) of the 
universe?” I said “Yes” “I suppose they shared their knowledge with the 
tūtūā (politicians)?” “Yes” “But do they know how to sew (tuitui) it back 
together again?” “No!” “That's the trouble with sharing such ‘tapu’ 
knowledge. Tūtūā will always abuse it.” (Marsden and Henare, 2003, p.57) 
 
As the above discussions have indicated, there is every reason to discard the 
notion of moral relativism (Moody-Adams, 1997). A critical perspective on 
knowledge, and therefore on science, demands that each person be held 
accountable to each other person (Gaita, 2002). What, then, of cultural 
incommensurability, which is, after all, the basis of postcolonial scholarship in 
general, and Kaupapa Māori research in particular? 
 
The shared key conclusion of many scholars, including Patterson, Roberts, 
Salmond and Simon, is that mātauranga Māori/IK has much to offer mainstream 
philosophy and/or science, as yet overlooked. One reason for this is the ongoing 
influence of systemic societal racism, more common nowadays in more concealed 
guises such as ‘evolutionism’ (Salmond, 1985; Wetherell and Potter, 1992). It is 
on these grounds that the globalised indigenous academy has recently emerged 
(Stewart-Harawira, 2005; Semali and Kinchloe, 1999). So what, exactly, are the 
advantages of mātauranga over science? The following discussion explores this 
question, and its implications. 
 
The Western notion of humanity as ‘outside’ nature has led to totalitarian 
commodification and economistic thinking, with its endemic (and ultimately self-
destructive) refusal to engage rationally with values (Putnam, 2004), and hence 
                                                 
45 The word ‘nō’, here followed by a kingroup name, means ‘belonging to’, as discussed on p.170. 
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with knowledge (Moody-Adams, 1997). Canguilhem noted: ‘Mankind makes 
mistakes when it places itself in the wrong place, in the wrong relationship to the 
environment, in the wrong place to receive the information needed to survive, to 
act, to flourish’ (Delaporte, 1994, p.20). This is the basis of the multiculturalist 
(feminist, postcolonial) charge that science is not fully rational (Harding, 1993) 
while the influence of such ‘unconsciousnesses’ (Gough, 1998) remains. Sandra 
Harding terms the current dominant paradigm ‘weak objectivism’, labelling 
‘epistemological relativism’ as its ‘mirror-linked twin’ (also see p.193). The 
concept that constitutes the most relevant science/mātauranga knowledge dipole 
(pou) is the notion of whakapapa underpinning the Māori worldview, which is 
incommensurable with W-science’s construction of nature as standing-reserve 
(Heidegger, 1977). 
 
Support for this notion is suggested in a recent important chapter on Pūtaiao by 
Mason  Durie (2005), which contains a model showing ‘IK’ and ‘science’ at either 
end of a double-headed arrow, with what Durie labels ‘research at the interface’ 
(the chapter’s main focus) occurring in between (Figure 6, p.141). According to 
contemporary arguments, which recognise processes of cultural hybridity as 
inevitable and ubiquitous, Kaupapa Māori research would be located in the 
heterogeneous area labelled ‘research at the interface’. On this reading, Durie’s 
model is consistent with mine. We diverge however, when Durie states: 
‘research at the interface’ should be differentiated from mātauranga Māori 
research – that is research that is conducted entirely within the context of 
Māori knowledge and Māori methodological approaches.  
 
But from my reading of Kaupapa Māori theory (Smith, 1997; Tuhiwai Smith, 
1999), such ‘mātauranga Māori research’ is deemed impossible in principle. This 
divergence widens when Durie discusses a typology of research developed by 
Chris Cunningham (below). First, Durie states that ‘interface research typically 
involves the second and third types’: 
1: research not especially relevant to Māori (e.g. quantum chemistry) 
2: research involving Māori (as participants or possibly junior members of a 
research team) (e.g. analysis of ethnic differentials in disease rates) 
3: Māori-centred research (Māori participants, largely Māori researchers, 
methods of analysis using mainstream standards for research) 
4: kaupapa Māori research (Māori researchers and participants, analysis based 
on Māori knowledge systems).  (Durie, 2005, p.144) 
 
Identifying kaupapa Māori research as ‘purely’ ‘Māori only’ (and eliding it with 
mātauranga Māori research, as Durie appears to, in these two models) appears to 
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conflict with important understandings of Kaupapa Māori research in the literature 
(Tuhiwai Smith, 1999; Smith, 2002). A case in point is the ‘Te Kotahitanga’ 
report which claims to be based on Kaupapa Māori research principles (Bishop, 
Berryman et al., 2003, p.4), yet would clearly fall into Type 2 or 3 in the 
Cunningham typology above. 
 
Secondly, issue can be taken with Type 1 itself, which is at odds with the 
dominant theme in such discussions of ‘more Māori involvement in science’ 
(Durie, 2005, p.146), despite the qualification by ‘especially’. The whole point of 
increasing Māori participation in science is that ALL of science is relevant to 
Māori citizens of the contemporary world. 
 
Durie also discusses a recent MoRST (2003) policy framework concerning Māori 
and science, which, in addition to ‘more Māori in science’, expresses a second 
aim: 
advancing mātauranga Māori (and particularly its potential contribution to 
the sciences and innovation) ... (Durie, 2005, p.146). 
 
The problem here is how to interpret words such as ‘advancing’ and 
‘contribution’. While Durie expounds a strongly pro-mātauranga stance, the above 
comment can also be read as paraphrasing earlier scientistic ‘knowledge 
economy’ conclusions (MORST, 1995; Lomax, 1996). In other words, this 
argument can be interpreted as (covertly) bringing mātauranga within the ‘Māori 
branding’ notion of economistic thinking (Young, 1999). Mātauranga indeed does 
have a ‘potential contribution’ to make to science - that of correcting its 
underlying premise towards the object of knowledge - but this must be explicitly 
distinguished from other possible (mis)interpretations. 
Spiral Whakapapa Kōrero  
There is another level at which mātauranga can be considered incommensurable 
with Western thought, in the sense discussed by T. Smith (2000) and C. Smith 
(2000), which is discursive structure, as Salmond (1982) argues. While this 
difference may be encompassed in general claims for IK, such as those discussed 
above, it is seldom closely examined in terms of its relationship to the 
anthropological debates on ‘primitive rationality’ and science. Discussions often 
adopt a poetic (Graveline, 2000) or mystical perspective (‘misty-eyed discourse’, 
(Tuhiwai Smith, 1999, p.12), which can be confusing in discussions about 
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knowledge. Generally speaking, this is a weakness in many presentations of 
‘indigenous science’ (Cajete, 1999).  
 
Salmond (1982) explores cross-cultural descriptions of knowledge, and concludes 
that different ‘theoretical landscapes’, composed of argumentative structures, 
habits of thought, cultural metaphors and values, in addition to lexemic 
differences, offer ‘support for a position of limited relativism’ (ibid p.85). This 
conclusion supports weak Whorfian language-mediated cognitive diversity (W1), 
and relates to the liminal zones of science: 
The neatly worked inner stretches of science are an open space in the 
tropical jungle, created by clearing tropes away. (W. V. O. Quine, cited in 
Salmond, 1982, p.66) 
 
Clearly, discursive incommensurability is relative, rather than deterministic, as is 
implied by the ‘windowless monad’ notion of culture (Moody-Adams, 1997), 
promulgated by earlier structuralist and functionalist paradigms of anthropology. 
As cited above (p.175), Salmond described a Māori ‘spatial conception of 
geneaology’ ‘as a double spiral marked by chevrons to show successive epochs’, 
‘quite unlike our own [!] representation of descending vertical lines’ (Salmond, 
1985, p.247). As this implies, carving design was also a physical mnemonic from 
which whakapapa could be read (recited). Hence the discursive form, the 
philosophical metaphor, and the value concepts each inform and reinforce each 
other in contributing to the ‘cultural filter’ (Roberts, 1998; cf. the ‘web of belief’ 
of classical anthropologists such as Evans-Pritchard, described in Moody-Adams, 
1997, p.45).  
 
It therefore seems reasonable to regard Māori discourse as preferring spiral 
structures, rather than the typical linear structure favoured by Western notions of 
knowledge, particularly in logic, mathematics and science46. In this way, the 
‘spiral’ trope, metaphorical for and of the great family of Rangi and Papa, fits 
with the notion of ‘whakapapa’ itself, as a ‘way of thinking’ (Barton, 1993, p.59), 
a value and a concept (‘both a noun and a verb’, McKinley, 2003, p.21), together 
with the notion of ‘pou’, each holding apart one of the primal dichotomies, and 
                                                 
46 Although Salmond (1985) recalled Shortland’s note on the best way to convince Māori: ‘Only 
get him to assert that your proposition is “tika” or straight, and you will soon obtain his consent to 
it’ (p.251). Also: ‘The subject had been thoroughly discussed by [the Māori chiefs], and every 
knotty point argued according to principles recognized by Māori law, till they had arrived at 
conclusions which, as [the informant] quaintly expressed it, were as straight and even as a board 
planed by a carpenter’ (p.254).  
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collectively structuring both taiao and hinengaro, in the process forming the ‘pae’ 
or liminal zones where actual moral discourse occurs. These elements combine to 
form a coherent value concept structure, which is both part of and also represents 
(i.e. models) te reo me ōna tikanga, through which mātauranga engages the 
phenomenological world. ‘In other words, language is related to culture in both a 
metonymical and a metaphorical way’ (Hastrup, 1982, p.153). From this 
engagement arise the ‘Māori values’ (Patterson, 1992) frequently rehearsed 
(Durie, 2005). In combination, these ideas provide a reasonably robust overall 
sense of how mātauranga differs from Western rationality, accounting for the 
sense in which linguistic relativity (W1) is often experienced as valid through 
contact with a non-Western language and culture such as Māori. As noted by 
Roberts, Haami et al. (2004), ‘Māori use of whakapapa and narrative creates a 
“metaphysical gestalt” or whole, integrated pattern, for the oral communication of 
knowledge’ (p.1). 
 
According to Robert Kaplan (2005), ‘Contrastive Rhetorics has, over the past 40 
years, tried to look at language from a more multidimensional perspective and 
also to look across languages’. Here Kaplan cites his own ‘Doodles Paper of 
1966’ as foundational in this branch of linguistics, of which the following diagram 
and explanatory paragraph support the above argument, and in so doing, help 
clarify the grounds of the knowledge/language/culture debate: 
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Whika 9: Kaplan’s Contrastive Rhetoric Doodles 
 
English           Semitic               Oriental          Romance            Russian 
 
When the Doodles were first published in 1966 (Kaplan, 1966), they were 
intended to demonstrate a variety of paragraph movements that exist in writing 
in different languages, such as English, Semitic (e.g. Arabic), Asian, Romance, 
or Russian. The purpose of highlighting the various types of paragraph 
structures and movements was to educate the teachers of L2 writing who have to 
be aware of the differences in rhetoric in different languages in order to point 
out differences in English rhetoric to their students. (Kaplan, 2005) p.387). 
[Footnote 12 p.389: Reprinted from Kaplan, R. B. (1966): Cultural thought 
patterns in intercultural education. Language Learning, 16, 1-20, with 
permission from Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, U.K.] 
 
It is tempting to explain the depiction of ‘English’ as a straight line (over and 
above the Eurocentrism of taking English as the ‘yardstick’ of comparison) in 
terms of Halliday’s (2004) description of the step-by-step grammatical metaphor 
of science discourse (see p.131). The similarity to Salmond’s previously cited 
description of notions of genealogy (p.182) in terms of ‘descending vertical lines’ 
versus a ‘double spiral’ is also intriguing. Speculatively, the comparison between 
‘English’ and ‘Oriental’ can perhaps be extended to the language/knowledge 
debates between English and te reo Māori. Supporting points in favour of this 
analogy include similarities between Māori and Chinese philosophy (J. Patterson, 
personal communication, 2006), and the contention that Taiwan is the original 
homeland of the Polynesian diaspora. This ‘spiral whakapapa kōrero’ notion 
connects together the discussions of mātauranga and Māori discourse, as 
encapsulated in te reo me ōna tikanga, reviewed above (C. Smith, 2000; T. Smith, 
2000; Salmond, 1985). It also links to other ‘spiral’ appearances, such as in 
Stewart-Harawira (2005), who uses it as an organising metaphor (a ‘hermeneutic 
spiral of understanding’, p.24) in her research on indigenous politics and 
globalisation, and the spiral from chaos theory (the Lorenz Attractor, see Whika 
10 below) used to represent the critical postmodern perspective on curriculum 
(Doll, 1993). This in turn echoes Jerome Bruner’s ‘famous’ “spiral curriculum” 
model (ibid p.124) and Dewey’s idea of the education of experience, which he 
described as ‘a continuous spiral’ (Dewey, 1938, p.79). 
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 Whika 10: The Lorenz Attractor 
 
A phase space diagram of a nonlinear system, a 
common symbol for chaos, named for Edward 
Lorenz, who first used this type of graph for weather 





Although not a conceptual incommensurability, therefore, in the same sense as the 
whakapapa/standing-reserve conflictual notion of humanity’s relationship with 
nature, this spiral versus linear discourse idea can still be understood as a 
‘thinking differend’ that contributes to epistemic and epistemological diversity 
(Siegel, 2006). If disparate discursive structures, such as te reo me ōna tikanga, 
are lost in displacement by English, humanity loses diversity of thinking, in the 
sense of cognitive tools. This is the connection between the debates in knowledge 
and language. This version of the ‘incommensurability thesis’ (Hoyningen-Huene 
and Sankey, 2001) was the object of Joshua Fishman’s (1982) extension of the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis to include ‘W3’, or ethnolinguistic diversity as global 
resource. (In this regard, it is interesting to speculate on ‘Kaplan’s doodles’ as a 
visual representation of W3.) 
 
Nevertheless, this recognition also provides an imperative to the effect that the 
traditional forms of language and discourse must be retained. Recognition that 
these forms, both in lexicon and in syntax, are unsuited to the translation of 
science (see Wāhanga 4.2), provides logical grounds for arguing that the activity 
of translating science into Māori either does not contribute, or is actually hostile, 
to the aims for the retention and revitalisation of original forms of te reo me ōna 
tikanga. This conclusion is in line with that of Siguan (2001) for translating 
science into Tagalog (p.127 above). 
A Role for Kaupapa Māori Science?  
How might the overall notion of mātauranga, developed above, be put to work for 
Kaupapa Māori science?  
 
First, by discussing the key incommensurability between W-science and 
mātauranga, which is the question of the role of humanity on the planet. This is a 
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question which can be considered in diverse legitimate ways, in various domains 
of science and philosophy. Mātauranga has been shown by philosophical analysis 
to be an ‘environmental virtue ethic’ (Patterson, 2000). Mātauranga is therefore 
useful in environmental science to provide guidance to research questions and 
strategies (Lacey, 2001). It is vital to note that his stance differs from the ‘usual’ 
understanding of claims for mātauranga as (or to contribute to) science, in which 
science knowledge is ‘abstracted’ (or extrapolated) from mātauranga, such as in 
pharmaceutical research on rongoā. 
 
Roberts, Haami et al. (2004) present another application of mātauranga to science, 
in this case in the domain of biotechnology, where the implications of ‘whakapapa 
as a Māori mental construct’ are being researched in terms of the GMO 
(genetically modified organism) debate current in Aotearoa New Zealand and 
globally. 
 
These suggestions point towards an epistemic role for Kaupapa Māori science. 
This assertion responds to Graham Smith’s call (for pro-/Kaupapa Māori scholars) 
to engage with Matthews’ claims concerning Māori forms of knowledge (Smith, 
1995, p.105). A key claim by Matthews is that the notion of Māori science is not 
only invalid but harmful, because ‘Western science and indigenous knowledge are 
in different categories of human endeavour’ (Matthews, 1995, p.147, original 
emphasis). One might, in reply, point out that they are not entirely in different 
categories, in the sense that mātauranga does claim to inform science, in certain 
areas. As a Kaupapa Māori scientist, while I do not look to traditional Māori 
knowledge to inform the central canons of chemistry, physics, biology or 
mathematics,47 I accept, in principle, the validity of research in the human 
sciences and in ecology that draws on mātauranga (e.g. Roberts, Haami, et. al., 
2004). In accordance with the role of ‘consensus’ in the Standard Account of 
science (p.48 above), the existence of contemporary international scholarship in 
support of this view, such as Boyd (2001) and Lacey (2001), suggests this is a 
scientifically ‘legitimate’ position to take, according to the contemporary canons 
of post-positivist science. This demonstrates that Matthews, in this argument, falls 
prey to the trap of science ideology, if not scientism (see p.54). 
                                                 
47 This is a different point from that imputed to Durie and Cunningham (p.180 above), to the effect 
that ‘much of science is irrelevant to Māori’. 
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At a fundamental, ontological level, since evolutionary processes can be 
expressed only through succeeding generations, evolution can be conceptualised, 
from a Kaupapa Māori perspective on mātauranga, as ‘whakapapa writ large’ (to 
use a Platonic phrase). Since evolution is a central biological theory to explain the 
origin and development of life on this planet, this conceptualisation carries the 
logical implication that the ‘whakapapa’ notion attributed to mātauranga 
(Patterson, 1992) - or more generally, to IK - is a more rational, scientifically 
valid concept of the role of humanity in the natural world, in comparison with the 
W-science and technology concept of nature as ‘standing-reserve’ (Heidegger, 
1977). To put this idea into a scientist’s words, ‘The evolutionary unity of humans 
with all other organisms is the cardinal message of Darwin’s revolution for 
nature’s most arrogant species’ (Gould, 1997, p.354).  
 
This highlights another way to understand the intended meaning of the notion of 
‘Kaupapa Māori science’. Kaupapa Māori research has established a position in 
opposition to ethnocentric social science (see Wāhanga 1.3). Analogously, 
Kaupapa Māori science takes a position against scientistic natural science. The 
key scientistic areas of concern occur in two main domains: those concerned with 
ecology, and evolutionism. 
Malignant Darwinism: Doctrines of Evolutionism 
The analogy between whakapapa and evolution suggests that the critical, 
politicised epistemology of Kaupapa Māori science may be especially useful in 
relation to uses and misuses of evolutionary theory. Evolutionary debates are 
many and varied, and include a range of extreme positions along the scientism-
anti-science spectrum. Examples include ‘creation science’ at one pole, and 
‘selfish gene’ theories at the other, both occurring in the same social context of 
the contemporary US. The roles of both lay and academic evolutionary ideology, 
or ‘evolutionism’, have already been noted in several debates examined above 
(Salmond, 1985; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), relating to the socio-historical 
context out of which Kaupapa Māori theory and Pūtaiao have arisen. It seems 
likely that a science-internal Kaupapa Māori critique would be most useful in 
those research traditions where evolutionary theory is central.  
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This suggestion is supported by Boyd’s (2001) detailed examination of the 
incoherence and lack of scientific rigour in ‘the emerging but highly influential 
tradition of research in “evolutionary psychology”’ (p.3), which is an offshoot of 
sociobiology. Boyd demonstrates this incoherence is embedded, and hence 
invisible to practitioners, within ‘malign meanings’ that constitute key concepts in 
the research paradigm. Such meaning malignancy as this, argues Boyd, causes 
incommensurability between two or more research traditions taking the same 
object, ‘indicative of a sort of relativism about scientific rationality’ (p.57). 
Boyd’s conclusion 
is that there are important cases in which the operation of scientific 
methodology - even when practiced conscientiously and rationally by smart 
people - is inadequate, in the absence of political transformation, to 
overcome the ways in which social ideology introduces malignancy into 
findings, methods, and even concepts and meanings in the sciences. (p.55, 
my emphasis).  
 
Boyd extends his analysis to ethics, arguing that moral inquiry is even more likely 
than the human sciences to suffer from (non-permanent) incommensurability 
brought about by ideological forces. Boyd connects the debates on 
epistemological and moral relativism to each other (also Moody-Adams, 1997), 
and also to a consideration of ‘the proper understanding of the notion of 
objectivity’, which, he argues, is used ideologically to support political 
rationalisations. 
 
Boyd makes the key point that the objectivity (and hence, reliability and epistemic 
success) of scientific methods is dependent on freedom from political influence, 
not the other way round, as is held by stereotypical conceptions. ‘Scientific 
objectivity, when it obtains, is thus always a (partly) political achievement’ 
(Boyd, 2001, p.58). From this perspective, he argues that the postmodern critique 
of science’s claims to objectivity (and associated notions of truth and knowledge) 
is correct, insofar as the concept of objectivity, as manifest in contemporary 
intellectual discourse, is primarily ideological, and hence used as a ‘tool of 
oppressors’ (p.59) in politics and in the human sciences. He then states: 
On the other hand, the phenomenon of objectivity - the epistemically reliable 
deployment of scientific methods - is essential to projects of social criticism 
and ideology critique. In the human sciences and related domains, scientific 
objectivity cannot - absent wholesale political and economic change - be 
achieved within the normal workings of institutional science, except in rare 
contexts of sustained political struggle. It can be obtained outside the normal 
workings of institutional science only in the contexts provided by 
oppositional movements. (ibid, original emphasis) 
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This perspective largely reconciles the position on the epistemological 
universality of science, defended by Matthews (1995) and Siegel (2006), with the 
postcolonial critique of science offered by Haraway (1989) and Harding (1998), 
as Siegel notes (see p.193). Boyd’s concluding comments offer support for the 
notion of Kaupapa Māori science outlined above: 
It is probably also true that only in the contexts provided by political 
struggle can the concept of objectivity be freed from its malignant meanings. 
In almost every respect the critics of scientific objectivity are thus correct 
about the depth of the ideological association between the concept of 
scientific objectivity and processes of economic and political oppression. 
They are right as well to think that the situation can only be remedied 
politically. But they need not - and indeed must not, if they are to succeed, 
abandon the projects of criticism to which concepts of objectivity, 
knowledge, and truth are essential. (Boyd, 2001, p.59) 
 
This position clarifies the role of Kaupapa Māori science as a counter to 
scientism, in the interests of objectivity, knowledge and truth (the characteristic 
claims of science). As we have seen, examples of scientism cited in the literature 
(Boyd, Salmond, Stenmark) frequently involve the doctrine of ‘evolutionism’ 
(Delaporte, 1994, p.38), which can also be described as the misuse of evolutionary 
theory. Canguilhem discussed the work of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) on 
evolutionism as an ‘instructive [example of the] genesis of a scientific ideology’ 
(ibid). This aligns with Gould’s (1999, p.146) description of Spencer as ‘the 
apostle of social Darwinism’.  
[Spencer] used von Baer’s and, later, Darwin’s biology to lend scientific 
support to his views on social engineering in nineteenth-century English 
industrial society, in particular, his advocacy of free enterprise, political 
individualism and competition. (Delaporte, 1994, p.39) 
 
Canguilhem reflects on the boundaries of science violated by Spencer for political 
gain: 
The laws of mechanics, embryology and evolution cannot validly be 
extended beyond the domain proper to each of these sciences. To what end 
are specific theoretical conclusions severed from their premises and applied 
out of context to human experience in general, particularly social 
experience? To a practical end. Evolutionist ideology was used to justify 
industrial society as against traditional society, on the one hand, and the 
demands of workers, on the other.  
 
Canguilhem emphasised the relevance of this discussion to the debates considered 
above: 
Spencer’s views had a lasting effect on linguists and anthropologists. His 
ideology gave meaning to the word primitive and salved the conscience of 
colonialists. A remnant of its legacy can still be found in the behavior of 
advanced societies towards so-called underdeveloped countries, even though 
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anthropology has long since recognized the plurality of cultures, presumably 
making it illegitimate for any one culture to set itself up as the yardstick by 
which all others are measured.  
Canguilhem considers the trajectory of such an ideology, compared with that of 
the science on which it draws:  
In freeing themselves from their evolutionist origins, contemporary 
linguistics, ethnology and sociology have shown that an ideology disappears 
when historical conditions cease to be compatible with its existence. The 
theory of evolution has changed since Darwin, but Darwinism is an integral 
part of the history of the science of evolution. By contrast, evolutionist 
ideology is merely an inoperative residue in the history of the human 
sciences. (p.40) 
 
More recent perspectives (Boyd, 2001; Stenmark, 2001) indicate that, while 
evolutionism may have disappeared from the social sciences named above by 
Canguilhem, it still survives under various guises in the disciplines of human 
science. On both political and epistemological grounds, therefore, attention to 
such ‘incompatible’ traditions is likely to be important, in both the development 
and the deployment of Kaupapa Māori science. 
Te ‘Whakapapa’ o Pūtaiao 
This section recapitulates the complex philosophical heritage of Pūtaiao, ready to 
return from the liminal zones of science to the pragmatics of curriculum policy. 
While cognisant of global philosophical history from the time of Ancient Greece, 
a useful starting point is Logical Empiricism (p.49), which was the dominant form 
of philosophy of W-science up until recently (Benson, 1989). One attitude under 
this paradigm held that: Science is objective and value-free. Science is 
concerned with facts, which are meaningful true statements about the world 
(sub-branches of the paradigm, such as Logical Positivism, advanced the most 
extreme scientistic versions of this view). The Incommensurability thesis, often 
attributed jointly to Kuhn and Feyerabend (Hoyningen-Huene and Sankey, 2001), 
has been important, over the past few decades, in the process of shifting the 
philosophy of science from positivism to post-positivism.  
Incommensurability provides a serious challenge to the form of logical 
empiricism that was dominant in the 1950s. But to take this as a challenge to 
science is to make the dubious assumption that science must operate in 
accordance with logical empiricist methodological strictures if it is to be a 
genuine source of knowledge ... we are thus engaged in a process of 
philosophical reconstruction [which] should include a genuine break with 
two of the foundation stones of traditional empiricism: its theory of concepts 
and its theory of evidence. Together, these moves away from the empiricist 
tradition open the way for a view that ... the development of 
incommensurable concept systems is one important tool for the advancement 
of science. (Brown, 2001, p.138-9, my emphasis) 
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In another branch of the philosophical family tree, incommensurability also 
contributed to the recent rise of the anti-realist philosophy of constructivism, 
which has been described as beginning from the Kantian ideas of ‘the phenomenal 
world’ and ‘the noumenal world’, and the separation between them. To these are 
added the idea of relativism, which depends on the concept of 
incommensurability. The types of ‘group’ listed in the following explanation 
highlight the relevance of this issue for Pūtaiao: 
Constructivism: The only independent reality is beyond the reach of our 
knowledge and language. A known world is partly constructed by the 
imposition of concepts. These concepts differ from (linguistic, social, 
scientific, etc) group to group and hence the worlds of groups differ. Each 
such world exists only relative to an imposition of concepts (Devitt, 2001, 
p.145). 
 
On this account, Whorf, Putnam, and the ‘structuralists and poststructuralists’, as 
well as Kuhn and Feyerabend, are all listed as adhering to some form of 
constructivism. At the strongest, ‘incommensurability’ is applied here in a far 
more comprehensive sense than in the epistemological account above. 
 
Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s incommensurability thesis accounted for epistemic 
breaks in the history of science, while Popper’s idea of falsifiability sought to 
explain human dimensions of the steady accumulation of knowledge within a 
paradigm. Both were important in deconstructing the classical ‘pure knowledge’ 
conceptions of science and bringing forth the contemporary (realist post-
positivist) philosophy of science. The central role of falsifiability and critique in 
Popperian science links it to critical theory (in Habermasian terms), as does the 
concern with democracy, with both of these aspects reflected in the ‘education of 
experience’ called for by John Dewey (1938).  
 
Incommensurable ways of thinking contribute to liminality near the boundaries of 
science, and in the face of the homogenising tendencies of global culture, IK and 
indigenous languages hold out the promise of ‘real’ epistemological diversity, or 
W3 (Fishman, 1982). The same goal is sought by critical theory (at the 
philosophical level), and by the related standpoint epistemologies, including 
Kaupapa Māori, in particular socio-historical contexts. In such contexts, 
productive tension is produced by the interaction between local and global, 
relative and universal perspectives. In Kura Kaupapa Māori, for example, strong 
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local identities can complement and enrich the development of students’ self-
perception as global citizens (McKinley, Stewart et al., 2004). 
 
An influential development in the philosophy of education, reflecting the 
emphasis on the notion of paradigms, in seeking to rationally organise the 
curriculum (in the face of the knowledge explosion and the ‘science crisis’ of the 
late 1950s), was the ‘structure of knowledge’ approach (associated with the 1959 
Woods Hole conference and the names of Joseph Schwab, Paul Hirst and R. S. 
Peters (1977). This influenced a pseudo-scientific approach to education 
(curriculum and pedagogy), which has retained relatively more influence in 
science and mathematics, compared with other subjects (Pinar, Reynolds et al., 
1995) - hence the difficulty of science education reform, dubbed a ‘double nexus’ 
(Blades, 1997).  
 
Prevailing views on philosophy of science have also been important to 
understandings of the science status of social science disciplines, including that of 
education. ‘In the domains of social science and educational research, 
epistemological confusion reigns’ (Phillips, 1992, p.80). Those who claim that 
social science is a scientific domain do so either on a traditional view of science 
(such as behaviourists), or by adopting (to varying degrees) a ‘softer’,  less 
positivistic view of the nature of science. Opposing views hold that social science 
is more like philosophy or the humanities, and that ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ is not a 
valid aim of social inquiry. The stronger views of this type result from anti-realist, 
relativist, and/or constructivist notions that have been shown to be incoherent, 
self-undermining, and based on distortion or exaggeration of notions attributable 
to Hanson, Kuhn, and Polyani (Phillips, 1987). As Phillips points out, for 
example, relativist ideas overlap, in their anti-realism, with logical positivism, 
which is ironic, since positivism is a favourite target of relativists (p.97).  
 
Recognition of the centrality of hypothetico-deductive reasoning, moderate 
ontological realism, and universal morality forms the basis for all ‘authentic’ 
science (taking as object either the non-human or human worlds). In Popper’s 
words, ‘if you are interested in the problem which I tried to solve by my tentative 
assertion, you may help me by criticizing it as severely as you can...’ (Karl 
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, cited in Phillips, 1987, frontispiece), one 
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hears the ‘moral moment’ of science, which is closely linked to the concept of 
liminality (metaphorised above as the notion of ‘pae’ in traditional Māori 
cosmology). Here Popper also highlights the betrayal of science, philosophy and 
morality (Moody-Adams, 1997) that results when acceptance of ‘epistemological 
diversity’ slips from plurality to relativity (Siegel, 2006), in regarding the 
perspectives of ‘groups’ immune to criticism (‘unchallengeable’ p.10). This is the 
major point made by Matthews (1995) and Siegel (2006) in arguments against the 
existence of ‘Māori science’, which nevertheless fail to take full account of the 
complex of ideas to which the term refers, according to its supporters. Thus, while 
weak (W1) relativism may be called for in comparing languages, psychological 
states, or the ‘texts’ of symbolic culture, strong universalism is required in science 
and epistemology, with obvious ethical and political implications.  
The standpoint epistemologies call for recognition of a historical or 
sociological or cultural relativism - but not for a judgmental or 
epistemological relativism... They require, as judgmental relativism does 
not, a scientific account of the relationships between historically located 
belief and maximally objective belief. So they demand what I shall call 
strong objectivity in contrast to the weak objectivity of objectivism and its 
mirror-linked twin, judgmental relativism. (Harding, 1991, original 
emphasis, cited in Siegel, 2006, p.8) 
 
The first sentence also demonstrates two distinct ways ‘epistemology’ is used in 
this discussion, equating firstly to ‘research paradigm’, and secondly with its more 
strictly philosophical meaning, ‘theory of knowledge’. 
 
Another school of thought still influential in education (although now largely 
abandoned in the academy) is behaviourism, an approach closely linked to 
positivism. Such influences as behaviourism, and the ‘structure of knowledge’ 
approach to curriculum, interact to produce a ‘scientific’ approach to science 
education, which has been widely criticised as being scientistic rather than 
realistic, exclusionary rather than empowering. Constructivist science education 
can be viewed as an approach which attempts to move beyond these pedagogical 
influences, while not necessarily reforming the outdated views on the nature of 
science reflected in the traditional science curriculum. Smith (1995) argued such 
reform could be achieved by developing Kura Kaupapa Māori science curriculum, 
although this requires objectivity to be strengthened, rather than weakened by 
further moves towards relativism or constructivism. A conception of Kaupapa 
Māori science, as attempted in the previous section, must be developed through its 
relationship with compatible accounts and areas of science, such as the Gaia 
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hypothesis, and detailed critique of incompatible areas of science, such as those 
based on evolutionist doctrines. 
 
A key step in the move towards strong objectivity is for science to stop ‘evading 
the issue’ that ‘knowledge of facts presupposes knowledge of values’ (Putnam, 
2004, p.145). The following passage encapsulates much of the philosophical 
heritage of Pūtaiao, highlighting several of the major issues discussed above, and 
relating them to curriculum development: 
I believe the Tyler rationale, Frederick Taylor’s scientific-efficiency 
movement on which the rationale is based, and the behavioral curriculum 
movement both have spawned, have all ‘misconceived the problem.’ And 
from this misconception of what education is about and how development 
occurs, we have adopted an inappropriate concept of curriculum - one firmly 
rooted in modernism. The Tyler, Taylor, and behavioral movements have 
not dealt with the ferment, but rather have denied, bypassed, or overlooked 
it. However, in this ferment, or in Schon’s messes, Prigogine’s chaos, 
Dewey’s problems, Piaget’s disequilibrium, or Kuhn’s anomalies lie the 
seeds not only of development and transformation but of life itself. To deal 
with curriculum as a transformative process means to utilize the ferment to 
develop both precision (discipline) and generalization (abstraction). How we 
will handle this issue of creative development is by no means clear; it is a 
problematic we will need to live with for generations. Only through the 
intimate contact of living with this idea, though, will we be able to frame the 
issue. As we worked for centuries developing the modernist paradigm, so 
will we need (at least) generations to develop a post-modern paradigm. 
However, I agree with Whitehead that the beginning lies in recognizing ‘the 
radically untidy, ill-adjusted character’ of actual experience. ‘To grasp this 
fundamental truth’ - the nerve center of Whitehead’s epistemology, the 
keystone of his cosmology, and the central tenet of his sense of process - ‘is 
the first step in wisdom’ (1933, pp. 157-158). From this it follows, I believe, 
that an essential criterion in the examination of a post-modern curriculum is 
the richness of its quality, not the precision with which its goals are stated or 
met. (Doll, 1993, p.148) 
 
From the perspective of a Māori-medium science curriculum developer, this 
passage is heartening, since it suggests the lack of a tradition (the ‘vacuum of 
professional practice’ referred to earlier) may actually be advantageous, rather 
than a formidable handicap, as is generally assumed. It also serves as a reminder 
and a warning (like the ‘wrong way’ sign on a motorway offramp) not to chase 
headlong after the Science curriculum. The task of Pūtaiao development demands 
something other than simply re-producing (translating) mainstream science 
education. 
An Analogy and a Qualified Notion of Science 
An analogy with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in the debates on language (see 
p.117)  clarifies the contested notion of ‘multicultural science’ in the knowledge 
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debates. Here, the ‘knowledge incommensurability’ between science and 
mātauranga is likened to (but not elided with) the ‘language incommensurability’ 
between English and te reo.  
 
Fishman (1960) systematized the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis into three distinct parts 
or ideas that he labelled W1, W2, and W348 (Fishman, 1980; 1982). A 
corresponding argumentative structure can be made out for multicultural science, 
arising from and related to these three Whorfian ideas. The analogy is presented in 
Whika 11 below, using strikethrough text for the discredited concepts: 
Whika 11: Multicultural Science and the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis 
Fishman’s systematization of 
Sapir-Whorf:  
Multicultural Science: 
W1 - linguistic relativity - different 
languages embody different 
worldviews. Collapse of Eurocentric 
views on language 
MS1 - different worldviews entail 
different value concept structures - 
liminal science. Collapse of 
Eurocentric views on science 
W2 - linguistic determinism-i.e. 
language determines thought 
MS2 - alternative rationality or 
‘primitive logic’ (e.g. posited as L3) 
W3 - ‘ethnolinguistic diversity as a 
worldwide societal asset’ (Fishman, 
1982) 
MS3 - epistemological (strategic) 
diversity in science as a ‘worldwide 
societal asset’  
  
As argued earlier, a critical view of linguistic and cultural diversity entails an 
acceptance of W1, from which W3 arises; and the rejection of W2 as fallacious. 
Similarly, I have argued for what is termed MS1, in the notion of Kaupapa Māori 
Science, on which rests MS3, while rejecting MS2. I think this is one (not the 
only) route to or version of ‘critical science’, although in contemporary 
postpositivist understandings of epistemology, this qualifier for ‘science’ verges 
on tautology, more-or-less synonomous with ‘anti-scientism’ (Geertz’s ‘anti anti-
relativism’?), or in Harding’s terms, ‘strong objectivity’ (p.193).  
 
It is in this vein that I advocate for the adoption of a novel qualifier for science, in 
the notion of ‘poststructural science’. In this view it acts as a ‘universalisation’ of 
the notion I have developed above of ‘Kaupapa Māori science’. In other words, 
‘poststructural science’ is a qualified notion of science which may help to resolve 
the longstanding problems with the notion of ‘multicultural science’. This notion 
of ‘poststructural science’ is similar to that of ‘postmodern science’ as argued for 
                                                 
48 W3 was added later (Fishman, 1982), which is why the W1, W2, W3 codes are non-sequential. 
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by Peters (1993), but which has run into problems elsewhere, problems possibly 
caused or exacerbated by the nature of science education itself. Poststructural 
science aligns with ‘postpositivist science’ (as discussed above), but has a wider 
philosophical compass, since poststructuralism (along with postmodernism) has 
been influential in wider domains, including education. At an epistemological 
level (argued above to be universal), the notion of poststructural science is the 
global version of Kaupapa Māori science, which is a local, perspectival notion of 
science. 
 
Recent publications (e.g. Siegel, 2006; Mercier and Harris, 2006) suggest a move 
is underway towards reconciliation between universalist and multiculturalist 
views on science and science education, from a range of perspectives, but along 
these lines. This is a positive sign, since a stronger level of consensus and 
resolution will be helpful for all, not least those teaching, and researching how 




Pūtaiao as Kaupapa Māori Science Education 
 
He mea hanga tōku whare, ko Papatūānuku e takoto nei te paparahi, 
ko Ranginui e titiro iho nei, te tuanui. Ko ngā poupou o te Whare ko 
ngā rārangi maunga [my house is constructed with Papatūānuku as the 
floor, and Ranginui the roof. The posts of the House are the 
mountains]. 
 
Thus begins ‘Te Whare Tapu o Ngāpuhi’ (The Sacred House of 
Ngāpuhi), which appears in full as the Kupu Whakamutunga/Epilogue 
below (p.219). As a paradigm Ngāpuhi text, it is a key identity 
marker. The rest of the kōrero traces the maunga (mountains) 
encircling Tai Tokerau. The inclusion here of ‘whare’, ‘hanga’ and 




This Ngāpuhi text exemplifies a Māori worldview ‘built’ around the ‘pou taiao’ or 
cosmic houseposts, also envisaged as ‘pou hinengaro’ (psychological poles), since 
the traditional narratives are replete with images of cosmos and psyche, reflected 
one in the other (Salmond, 1978). It provides a metaphor for the dialectical nexus 
of Pūtaiao, where these ‘pou hinengaro’ represent the various dialectics 
(argumentative polarities and/or continua), reviewed above, in language, 
knowledge, and culture. Each maunga (or pou) has different characteristics, which 
can be, and often are, misrecognised, particularly by those from other ‘territories’ 
or disciplines. This thesis has been concerned, firstly, to identify, examine and 
describe these dialectics, and secondly, to make suggestions about addressing 
these dialectics in future Pūtaiao curriculum policy, in the interests of students and 
teachers, whānau and iwi. What has been achieved is to answer some of the initial 
questions, while opening others up for further exploration. Some of these further 
questions are of a fundamental philosophical nature, while others offer the 
                                                 
49 ‘Whare’ was used as a metaphor for Kaupapa Māori research in Wāhanga Tuatahi, and again in 
Wāhanga Tuarima in ‘whare mātauranga’ as a notion of epistemology. ‘Hanga’ (make, construct) 
appears in the C. Smith (2000) quote for the process of bringing Māori thinking and mātauranga 
into academic work, and is also implied in the earlier references to the constructedness of identity, 
language and knowledge. ‘Poupou’ (or ‘pou’) are found in Salmond’s (1978) semantic mātauranga 
analysis, discussed in Wāhanga Tuarima, as the ‘orientational opposites’ that structure ‘the 
traditional Māori cosmos’ in both the physical and metaphysical sense. The threshold (paepae or 
pae) that mediates them is associated with the ‘institution of an intermediary zone of utu’ 
(Salmond, 1978, p.25), or balance, where life occurs.  
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possibility of fresh directions for future developments in Pūtaiao praxis, such as 
those associated with the national Curriculum Marautanga Project.50 
 
The issue for Kura Kaupapa Māori curriculum development, of which Pūtaiao is 
part, is to carry the challenge to Eurocentric stories about Māori past the level of 
identity - to engage in epistemological critique. A Kaupapa Māori perspective on 
science is necessarily concerned with scientism, over and above the more generic 
tripartite concerns of racism, ‘classism’ and sexism, so a Kaupapa Māori 
perspective on science curriculum requires the philosophical ‘differend’ (Lyotard, 
1988) between science and mātauranga to be negotiated. 
 
To see the issue of Māori science curriculum as one of science/English/Pākehā 
versus mātauranga/te reo/Māori is to seriously oversimplify the debates, and to 
veer towards unconstructive ‘oppositional politics’ (McLaren, 1995). What is 
needed is a Māori way of ‘how’ to regard science that moves beyond an 
understanding of the ‘what’ of Māori science either as traditional knowledge, or 
as translated modern science (McKinley, 1995). Developing Pūtaiao curriculum 
along these lines (as a Kaupapa Māori science curriculum) would aim to produce 
a local, critical science curriculum, not based on ‘indigenous’ or ‘postmodern’ 
science, but informed by multicultural and postcolonial analyses of society and 
education, and sociology of science (Doll, 1993). One way to do this is to re-
articulate the notion of Pūtaiao education as Kaupapa Māori Science education, 
based on a notion of science education with the following characteristics: 
• a critical perspective on W-science - a critical science for Aotearoa New 
Zealand, which remains aware of its own limitations, and includes history and 
philosophy of science, while rejecting ‘final form’ (Duschl, 1990) and other 
scientistic representations of science in the curriculum; 
• an awareness of processes of cultural hybridity and interdependence, and of 
science as a product of (multi)cultural knowledge, while rejecting the 
‘windowless monad’ notion of culture (Moody-Adams, 1997); 
• an acknowledgement of the validity of science knowledge found within 
mātauranga Māori, i.e. a pluralist perspective on knowledge while rejecting 
radical epistemological relativism (Siegel, 2006); 
• an awareness of the importance of Māori philosophy, principles and practices 
including language and culture; 
• an awareness of the position of Pūtaiao curriculum within language shift and 
change processes, and of the balance between aims in language planning and 
in science education; and  
                                                 
50 www.cmp.ac.nz, accessed 28/11/06. 
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• a political stance mandated by the Treaty of Waitangi to underpin its 
legitimacy and entitlement to state resources (Smith, 1997). 
  
Critical theorists of education have emphasised (Young, 1989), however, that in 
order to critique a discipline it is first necessary to ‘master’ it. What this means in 
each of the domains of the curriculum is likely to vary widely. For Pūtaiao, I 
believe it is valid to ask: is construction of a parallel science lexicon past Level 4-
5 the best way to help achieve the required increase in participation of Māori in 
the world of science? The vocabulary issue in Pāngarau is considerably less of a 
problem than in Pūtaiao. Since mathematics ‘is’ a science, the comparison 
between the two is relevant. If the answer to the above question turns out to be 
‘No’, much work for Pūtaiao educators still remains to be done, as this thesis has 
attempted to indicate. For other curriculum areas, other considerations are likely 
to lead to different questions they would like to address in their development 
processes.  
 
Following the analysis of science language by  Halliday  (2004), I surmise that, 
for a number of reasons, including the influence of language purism (Harlow, 
2003), the characteristic science discourse associated with senior secondary 
science curricula has not yet emerged in Pūtaiao, or Māori-medium science, 
classrooms. This suggests the question of whether, or when, such discourse will 
develop, if current policy trajectories continue unchanged. 
 
We want, therefore, to avoid, while developing the capacity to critique, scientism 
and science ideology,51 but not to do away with science. This approach can be 
characterised as follows: 
1. The best possible W-science education in a strong kaupapa Māori school 
environment, cognisant of the need to ‘master’ the discipline in order to 
critique it, while continuing to support Māori student identity as tūranga 
(standpoint) of critique. 
2. Relaxation of the ‘Māori-only’ language policy for senior science classes, 
possibly by viewing te reo Pūtaiao (the language of science) as international 
rather than ‘English’. 
3. Recognition of the requirement to develop a science register of te reo, in order 
to express complex science situations, processes, etc, with the required 
precision and unambiguity - going beyond that of the current ‘word-list’ 
approach to lexical expansion in Pūtaiao. 
                                                 
51 See p.54 for the distinction between scientism and science ideology. 
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4. Inclusion of the critical perspective where possible throughout the curriculum: 
‘ngā kete e rua’ (the two kits, or systems of knowledge) approach. Explore the 
possibility of using narrative pedagogy for teaching about the nature of 
science (Barker, 2004), including the history and philosophy of science (not 
canonical science content; Gilbert, Hipkins et al., 2005). 
Summary 
The first chapter introduced the topic and outlined the research question, which 
can be stated as follows: 
How does Māori knowledge and language articulate with current discourses 
of Pūtaiao education? Are there alternative articulations? 
 
Discussion of Kaupapa Māori research, drawing primarily on Smith (1997), 
Tuhiwai Smith (1999) and Bishop (1998), included the theoretical issue of 
ethnicity, for which May’s model based on the ‘habitus’ notion (Bourdieu) is 
adopted, and later updated with a postmodernist view on dialectical polarities, 
using the metaphor of eclectic ‘bricolage’ of elements from both sides of an 
argument. The thesis research methodology of ‘Kaupapa Māori discourse 
analysis’ is developed as a synthesis of ‘Kaupapa Māori theory’ and ‘critical 
discourse analysis’, with reference to Habermasian traditions of critical theory, 
particularly as applied to education (Young, 1989).  
 
This methodology was applied in exploratory analyses of two contrasting 'texts' of 
relevance to the knowledge/power nexus of Pūtaiao: first, results of three years 
(2002-4) of translated NCEA L1 examinations in Mathematics/Pāngarau and 
Science/Pūtaiao. The analysis indicates that current Pūtaiao teaching strategies 
have not moved far, if at all, beyond ‘bilingual science’ as defined by Jesson 
(1991) to be the teaching of the mainstream science curriculum in te reo Māori. 
The NCEA data indicate greater disparity in science outcomes between Māori-
medium and non-Māori candidatures, compared with mainstream Māori. 
Speculations concerning language and science knowledge, to account for these 
negative results, are proposed. Secondly, some traditional oral texts are analysed 
as examples of ‘authentic’ Māori knowledge. 
 
Wāhanga Tuarua begins by examining how science is linked with economics, 
politics, scientism, and philosophy. Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of the 
‘essence’ of W-technology, together with the work of Canguilhem on philosophy 
of science, leads to the identification of a central ‘differend’ between W-science 
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and mātauranga/IK discourses as the conflicting notions of humanity’s rightful 
relationship to the natural world, termed ‘whakapapa’ versus ‘standing-reserve’.  
 
The second section of this chapter reviews past phases of Pūtaiao curriculum 
discourse, from the 1980s (Science Aotearoa) and 1990s (Pūtaiao i roto i te 
Marautanga o Aotearoa). These two sections together inform the final section, 
which situates Pūtaiao curriculum development within the wider debates in 
science education and critical science.  
 
Wāhanga Tuatoru reviews the literature of multicultural science education 
research, from 1981 to the present state of the debate. The trenchant and 
longstanding nature of the debate between multiculturalists and universalists in 
this literature appears to relate to several lacunae, which conflate science and 
philosophy, science and IK, or sociological versus psychological views on 
ethnicity, culture and the curriculum. Suggestions in the literature for 
multicultural science curriculum are classified into five different types, of which 
three are matched with the border-crossing pedagogies recently identified in a 
national science education review (Hipkins, Bolstad et al., 2002). The lack of 
progress in multicultural science education is situated in relation to the ‘failure’ of 
science curriculum reform in general, given the inevitable role played by political 
(i.e. socio-economic) power.  
 
Wāhanga Tuawhā extends the theoretical background in language and knowledge 
with an examination, firstly, of the important role played by identity in the topic 
of Pūtaiao, leading to the conclusion that Pūtaiao provides one route whereby 
ethics may be re-integrated into science, as part of wide-ranging reform of science 
and science education; whilst remaining sceptically cognisant of the impact of 
discourses of cultural commodification in terms of enhancing the policy 
environment for Māori-medium curriculum development.  
 
The second section examines language purism (and its link to values) and the 
Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (and its link to culture), relating these linguistic debates 
to Māori language revitalisation processes. The history of language planning 
policy discourses for te reo Māori, and international debates concerning languages 
of science, are briefly reviewed, before examining Halliday’s (2004) linguistic 
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analysis of the English lexico-grammar that co-evolved with science, in the 
centuries after Latin was overturned as ‘the’ language of science. This suggests 
that successful teaching of senior secondary Pūtaiao requires the development not 
only of science vocabulary but also grammatical innovations to produce a 
scientific register of te reo Māori.   
 
Comparison with international analogies reveals the effect of two conflicting 
ideologies of translation (of W-science into Māori), which follow from the 
dialectic between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism, in current 
discourses of Pūtaiao. These are the romantic ideology, which implicitly accepts 
W1 or linguistic relativity, while (ironically) favouring vocabulary purism; and 
the instrumentalist ideology, which tends towards producing (problematical) 
translations of mainstream educational endpoints.  
 
Wāhanga Tuarima turns to a reading of the historical and contemporary 
discourses relating to mātauranga. The Eurocentric origins of one prominent 
(arguably incoherent) account of ‘Māori science’ are investigated, as is the 
question of ‘alternative rationality’ in classical anthropology, debates of which 
multicultural science education research is a present-day inheritor. The strategic 
adoption, in the 1990s, of the notion of ‘Māori science’ as a way to problematise 
‘Western science’ is surmised to have contributed towards support in the KKM 
community (and more widely, that of education in general) for the suggestion that 
science can and should be replaced by mātauranga in the Pūtaiao curriculum. 
 
An original model of mātauranga and science for the Pūtaiao curriculum is 
outlined, in which mātauranga is represented as a superset of science. In 
mātauranga terms, science restricts itself to the final layers of whakapapa atua 
(‘cosmogenesis’), so science is a subset of mātauranga. All of science is therefore 
validly included in the Pūtaiao curriculum, which avoids the pitfall of the current 
dominant notion of ‘Māori science’ as consisting of one or both of the following: 
• only those parts of mātauranga involving W-science-like praxis 
• only those parts of science involving ‘nature study’. 
 
The literature on mātauranga is used to investigate the cross-cultural notions of 
space-time and classification. This reveals the important (covert) role of the 
following issues in notions of mātauranga: 
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• the implicit acceptance of W1, or linguistic relativity (weak Sapir-Whorf) 
• the opposition between cultural relativism and cultural imperialism  
• the ‘knowledge economy’ notion of mātauranga as a resource for science 
• scientism, in the form of partisan discourses masquerading as science. 
 
This leads to the conclusion that epistemological relativism is not valid, since 
logic, agency and morality demand to be acknowledged as universal. The 
adoption of such ‘unconsciousnesses’ in science has resulted in the current 
dominance of ‘weak objectivism’, ultimately based on limited (compromised) 
rationality. Objectivity, as an aim and claim of science, depends on freedom from 
political influence, not the reverse, as is often claimed. On the other hand, the 
literature supports the validity of weak relativism with respect to patterns or 
structures of discourse, which can be understood as encapsulating particular 
cultural perspectives.   
 
This is where the debates in language and knowledge collide: in the realm of 
discourse. Accordingly, an analogy can be drawn between the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis for language and multicultural science for knowledge. Because values 
always involve knowledge, and vice versa, different cultural values can and do 
affect the direction of science. Incommensurable cultural discourses concerning 
the natural world represent one of humanity’s better options for maintaining 
knowledge of ways of thought other than those founded on economistic 
rationality. These considerations occur in what may be termed science’s ‘liminal 
zone’, between the central canon and the boundary of science, which is the 
epistemic and epistemological home of Kaupapa Māori science (and other forms 
of critical science). Thus, the two main roles for Kaupapa Māori science are: 
• Extending the range of strategies available to science, by providing 
different underlying philosophical assumptions. 
• Challenging scientism, and maintaining the boundary between scientism 
and science. 
Key Findings 
1. The contemporary post-positivist understanding of the nature of science 
allows science to be differentiated from anti-science on one side, and 
scientism on the other. This dialectic aligns with that of cultural relativism 
versus cultural imperialism, and in both cases, neither of the extreme positions 
is helpful for the interests of Māori students, teachers or iwi. Cultural relativist 
approaches to the science curriculum quickly collapse into ‘soft options’ 
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which do not overcome the disparity in science achievement. Cultural 
imperialist approaches, on the other hand, are prone to Eurocentric and 
scientistic assumptions.  
2. Even strongly pro-Māori views on mātauranga can be unhelpful by failing to 
explicitly reject scientistic ‘knowledge economy’ objectives and processes. 
The strategic usage in recent decades of ‘Māori science’ for political purposes 
is asserted to be problematic, given its potential to cause confusion, such as 
when it migrates from the academy into the education community. 
3. The Pūtaiao curriculum paradox has two aspects, one linguistic, the other 
philosophical. The language irony is the increased difficulty of teaching and 
learning mainstream science in te reo Māori, exacerbated by the policy against 
borrowing from English, which leads to an extra barrier to international 
science language. The philosophical irony is that, currently, Pūtaiao education 
does not allow critique or reform of scientism (or racism, sexism, etc) in 
mainstream science or science education. 
4. Given the political role of the Māori-medium curriculum as part of the 
symbolic representation of the Māori identity, it is vital that Pūtaiao policy is 
informed by an adequate sociopolitical analysis, in order to meet the needs of 
Māori students for better science teaching, learning and achievement. 
5. There is a need for science teacher training to include the history and 
philosophy of science (and of education), in order for teachers to be able to 
present science realistically to their pupils. This is in line with recent calls 
from mainstream science educators for better teaching of the nature of science, 
including the suggestion that stories from science can be useful to achieve this 
(Barker, 2004), ideas which are equally as relevant and applicable in Māori-
medium science education. 
6. Successful teaching of senior secondary science in Māori is likely to require 
the development, not only of science terminology, but of a scientific register 
in te reo Māori. This issue is important for KKM because this aim is likely to 
conflict with that of retaining traditional Māori patterns of thought and 
language. 
Conclusion 
The conundrum of Pūtaiao within my own professional life was the original 
reason why I enrolled in the doctoral degree, for the opportunity to come to better 
understand why a teacher/learner’s experience of Pūtaiao is so dominated by 
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‘kupu hou’. Initial understanding of my research topic as a problem in science 
education deepened into viewing it as a topic in philosophy, particularly the 
philosophies of science, language and education, all of which are connected to 
basic notions of mind, identity, and society. As well as an understanding of these 
ideas and debates, in order to think about the problem of Pūtaiao curriculum, I had 
to formulate a position for myself in relation not only to the notion of ‘Māori 
science’ but also ‘social science’. In what way could this research itself claim the 
status of ‘science’? Hence the reference to an ‘epistemological journey’ in 
Wāhanga Tuatahi.  
 
Analogy and metaphor (despite my initial positivist suspicions) have proved their 
rightful place in this work in two ways. Firstly, because of their role in the 
philosophies of language, mind and culture (‘symbolic power’ Bourdieu, 1991), 
particularly in the grammatical metaphor of the language of science (Halliday, 
2004), and secondly in heuristic worth, in constructing the argument – helping to 
organise and update my thinking, and see the complex issues concerning Pūtaiao 
in different lights or patterns. Indeed, this recognition is itself analogous (!) to the 
role of Kaupapa Māori science qua science, argued for above, which is to widen 
the range of ‘strategies’ through which the methods of science are applied (Lacey, 
2001) in the pursuit of knowledge. This is also expressed as a ‘variety of 
metaphors as cultural openness to the future’, attributed to symbolic 
anthropologist Victor Witter Turner (1920-1983) by Moody-Adams (1997, p.71).  
 
The notion of ‘mataora’ (living face) as the power attributed to tūpuna (ancestors) 
to collapse space-time, and become co-present with their descendants, was 
highlighted by Salmond in her description of the traditional Māori world-view, 
discussed above on p.176. In my research, this idea came to stand for the notion of 
authenticity in mātauranga, as distinct from translated Western knowledge, linked 
to ‘the power of language to connect us through time and space with the 
traditional thinking of our ancestors’ (Yamane, 2001).  
 
This chapter began with a Ngāpuhi metaphor for the ‘theoretical landscape’ 
(Salmond, 1982) of the Māori cosmos, both physical and symbolic, where these 
elemental pou are represented as maunga, which in the metaphor form the posts of 
a cultural construction to ‘house’ the iwi. The complementary notion of ‘paepae’ 
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or ‘pae’, as ‘thresholds’ or ‘liminal zones’ in these cosmic/symbolic dipoles, was 
explained (Salmond, 1978) as the zone of utu, of human life and real moral 
conflict. As well as linking into the mataora notion above, it seems reasonable to 
connect this with Turner’s idea of ‘liminality’ or cultural marginality (Moody-
Adams, 1997, p.69) as one important source of human openness to the future, 
critical spaces of diversity and change in paradigm and metaphor. Hence, 
marginality is an important Cultural Studies theme (Edgerton, 1993). Following 
Salmond (1985), recognising this ‘liminoid’ tendency in mātauranga provides 
another reason to contest the ‘closed’ versus ‘open’ analysis made by Eurocentric 
anthropology about Māori versus European thought/society (Winch, 1970), which 
has influenced important contemporary pro-Māori analyses of mātauranga 
(Roberts, 1998). 
 
The centrality of whakapapa, as the key differend between mātauranga and 
science, at the symbolic level as a primary trope of mātauranga, and at the 
personal level in Māori identities, underscores the particular relevance of Kaupapa 
Māori theory (which synergistically combines these levels of tangata whenua 
discourse) in Pūtaiao curriculum development. This research has turned out to be 
concerned with identity as well as science in the Pūtaiao curriculum. Identity 
forms perspective, which links knowledge/science (epistemology) with ethics 
(values), both in our lives, and in its representation (or not) in the curriculum. This 
thesis has examined the consequences of a focus on maintaining integrity with the 
Kaupapa Māori identity in developing Māori-medium science curriculum. This 
either matters only to me personally, or it is important for all of us - I am no 
longer sure there is any other possibility.  
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KUPU WHAKAMUTUNGA/EPILOGUE 
Te Whare Tapu o Ngāpuhi 
 
He mea hanga tōku whare, ko Papatūānuku e takoto nei te paparahi, 
ko Ranginui e titiro iho nei, te tuanui, 
Ko ngā poupou o te Whare ko ngā rārangi maunga; 
Whakarārā titiro ki Tokerau, 
Tokerau titiro ki Rākaumangamanga, 
Rākaumangamanga titiro ki Manaia e tū kohatu mai rā i te ākau, 
Manaia titiro ki Tūtemoi, 
Tūtemoi titiro ki Maunganui, 
Maunganui titiro ki Pūhanga-tohorā,  
Pūhanga-tohorā titiro ki Te Ramaroa e whakakurupae ake rā i runga, 
Te Ramaroa titiro ki Whiria, ki Te-Paiaka-o-Te Riri, ki Te Kawa-o-
Rahiri. 
Whiria titiro ki Panguru, ki Papata, ki Te Rākau-patapata e tū ana ki 
Te Hauāuru; 
Panguru, Papata titiro ki Maungataniwha, 
Maungataniwha titiro ki Tokerau, 
Tokerau titiro ki Whakarārā. 
Ēhara aku maunga i te maunga nekeneke, 
ērangi he maunga tū tonu, tū te ao, tū te pō. 
Ko te Whare Tapu o Ngāpuhi tēnei, 

















2002 All 90147 13634 11511 11136 1988 
2003 All 90147 19576 12873 4974 1713 
2004 All 90147 14301 14382 10223 570 
2002 Māori 90147 2206 1276 627 54 
2003 Māori 90147 2693 908 171 34 
2004 Māori 90147 2627 1452 465 5 
2002 Translated 90147 34 4 1 0 
2003 Translated 90147 46 7 1 0 
2004 Translated 90147 47 18 2 0 
2002 All 90148 15391 17530 3746 1201 
2003 All 90148 18660 10794 8528 494 
2004 All 90148 18854 16425 1789 1163 
2002 Māori 90148 2281 1556 179 36 
2003 Māori 90148 2629 777 335 4 
2004 Māori 90148 3108 1187 48 20 
2002 Translated 90148 34 5 0 0 
2003 Translated 90148 41 7 3 0 
2004 Translated 90148 56 4 0 0 
2002 All 90151 9230 17150 12810 1288 
2003 All 90151 13247 14687 8829 3897 
2004 All 90151 9082 15590 15283 853 
2002 Māori 90151 1708 1977 845 29 
2003 Māori 90151 2079 1457 492 113 
2004 Māori 90151 1936 1902 1020 22 
2002 Translated 90151 27 10 2 0 
2003 Translated 90151 41 21 3 0 
2004 Translated 90151 52 16 3 0 
2002 All 90152 11837 15508 7557 5110 
2003 All 90152 14500 12455 13465 96 
2004 All 90152 15505 17764 6487 655 
2002 Māori 90152 2047 1681 488 230 
2003 Māori 90152 2214 1151 731 1 
2004 Māori 90152 2783 1642 345 8 
2002 Translated 90152 23 10 4 0 
2003 Translated 90152 14 15 7 0 
2004 Translated 90152 43 24 0 0 
2002 All 90153 10487 12182 13299 1662 
2003 All 90153 11925 18784 6026 818 
2004 All 90153 6735 20057 7713 682 
2002 Māori 90153 1778 1342 900 62 
2003 Māori 90153 1797 1640 276 8 
2004 Māori 90153 1379 2223 409 11 
2002 Translated 90153 24 10 2 0 
2003 Translated 90153 34 18 5 0 
2004 Translated 90153 34 20 4 0 
2002 All 90188 13785 9826 3107 474 
2003 All 90188 11767 10736 3552 1243 
2004 All 90188 12587 11582 2230 191 
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2002 Māori 90188 2029 766 138 14 
2003 Māori 90188 1693 881 170 53 
2004 Māori 90188 2050 980 88 4 
2002 Translated 90188 12 0 0 0 
2003 Translated 90188 18 10 1 0 
2004 Translated 90188 34 5 0 0 
2002 All 90189 11373 14182 7864 2011 
2003 All 90189 13535 13083 8551 1347 
2004 All 90189 15785 11957 4779 1304 
2002 Māori 90189 1801 1335 382 45 
2003 Māori 90189 1962 1082 368 25 
2004 Māori 90189 2513 1027 217 36 
2002 Translated 90189 13 0 0 0 
2003 Translated 90189 22 8 0 0 
2004 Translated 90189 34 4 0 0 
2002 All 90190 15231 11489 1960 53 
2003 All 90190 8494 14218 1682 59 
2004 All 90190 10806 8549 2879 1226 
2002 Māori 90190 2226 821 78 2 
2003 Māori 90190 1285 1166 72 1 
2004 Māori 90190 1740 749 159 48 
2002 Translated 90190 11 2 0 0 
2003 Translated 90190 26 7 0 0 
2004 Translated 90190 22 5 2 0 
2002 All 90191 8916 19442 4343 767 
2003 All 90191 17382 12740 3761 826 
2004 All 90191 9289 17563 5712 810 
2002 Māori 90191 1422 1828 199 20 
2003 Māori 90191 2350 830 143 31 
2004 Māori 90191 1710 1752 258 11 
2002 Translated 90191 6 7 0 0 
2003 Translated 90191 22 6 0 0 
2004 Translated 90191 22 12 0 0 
2002 All 90192 7558 12341 4046 310 
2003 All 90192 7697 10575 3248 575 
2004 All 90192 6655 9519 1223 569 
2002 Māori 90192 1147 1127 195 6 
2003 Māori 90192 1064 894 142 18 
2004 Māori 90192 1087 814 50 17 
2002 Translated 90192 11 2 0 0 
2003 Translated 90192 16 6 0 0 
2004 Translated 90192 22 8 0 0 
2002 All 90194 18902 13025 5132 1476 
2003 All 90194 15025 12735 9915 996 
2004 All 90194 16758 12036 7876 1272 
2002 Māori 90194 2800 1172 237 34 
2003 Māori 90194 2214 1157 484 13 
2004 Māori 90194 2857 1171 369 39 
2002 Translated 90194 37 2 0 0 
2003 Translated 90194 48 11 0 0 





CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
CSSE Culture Studies in Science Education 
IK Indigenous Knowledge 
ISS Ideal speech situation (Habermas) 
KAWM Kaupapa Ara Whakawhiti Mātauranga (video conferencing 
distance education initiative) 
KKM Kura Kaupapa Māori 
MOE Ministry of Education 
NCEA National Certificate of Educational Achievement 
NZCER New Zealand Council of Educational Research 
NZQA New Zealand Qualifications Authority 
TEK Traditional Ecological Knowledge 





Note: Meanings given are as used in this thesis; there may be others. Major 
place names only are listed; kingroup names and smaller place names are not. 
a (particle used before a proper noun), of 
akomanga classroom 
anake only 
anga shell, skeleton, framework 
anō also, again 
ao world, daytime 
Aotearoa New Zealand (North Island in some accounts) 
ara path 
atua god  
au/ahau I, me 
e ... ana (verbal particle for continuous condition/action) 
haka dance (in common usage, ‘war dance’) 
hanga make, build 
Hangarau Technology 
hapū ‘sub-tribe’ 
harirū shake hands 
Hauora (marautanga) Health and Physical Wellbeing (curriculum) 
he (indefinite particle) a/some 
he aha? what (is/are)? 
hei as, in order to 
heitiki carved necklace ornament  
heke descent line (in genealogy) 
hinengaro mind, ‘psyche’ 
hou new 
hui meeting, tribal gathering 
hui mate tangi, tangihanga, funeral 
i (transitive particle), in, at, from 
i roto i in, inside 
iwi ‘tribe’ 
ka (verbal particle indicating change of action) 
kai consume, food, contents 
kaiako teacher 
kaitiaki(tanga) guardian(ship) 
kapa haka performing arts group 
karakia prayer, incantation  
katoa all 
kau just (adverb) 
kaumātua male elder  
kaupapa policy, philosophy, cause 
ki (transitive/directional particle) at, to, with, for 
ko (definite particle) 
koha gift, contribution 
kōrero speak, speech, text 
koutou you (3+) 
kupu word, saying 
kura school 
Kura Kaupapa Māori schools based on principles of Te Aho Matua 
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manu bird, kite 
māori ordinary, normal 
Māori indigenous people of Aotearoa New Zealand 
marae community meeting place 
marautanga curriculum 
mātāpono principle 
mātauranga knowledge, education 
mātua parents 
mātua tupuna ancestors 
maunga mountain 
mauri vital essence 
me and 
mea thing (person, object, action, statement)  
me pēhea? how? 
mihi greeting, acknowledgement 
mō for, concerning 
moana ocean 
moe sleep, ‘marry’ 
mokopuna grandchild, young child(ren) in general 
motuhake unique, original 
ngā the (plural) 
nō belonging to, of, from 
o of 
ōku my (plural)  
ōrite same, equal 
pae horizon, horizontal beam 
pakari matured, strong, hard 
Pākehā non-Māori  
Pāngarau Mathematics 
pēpi baby 
pou, poupou post, housepost 
pounamu greenstone, jade (nephrite) 
pōwhiri formal welcome 
pukapuka book 




rangatiratanga kingdom, aristocracy 
rārangi list 
reo voice, language 
rongoā medicine, plant remedy 
taha side 
tai sea coast 
taiao environment (modern) =ao (traditional) 
Taitokerau, Tai Tokerau Northland 
takahē  moho, Notornis hochstetteri (flightless bird) 
takoto lie down 
tamariki children 
taonga treasured possession 
tātou we, us (3+ inclusive) 
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tauiwi alien, foreign(er) 
taumata paepae, seating for tribal speakers in marae 
te the (singular) 
Te Aho Matua philosophy/policy of Kura Kaupapa Māori 
Te Kohanga Reo Māori Language Nest pre-school movement 
te reo (me ōna tikanga) the language (and its customs) 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi The Treaty of Waitangi 
tēnā that 
tēnei this 
Tikanga-a-Iwi Social Science 
tino rangatiratanga Māori sovereignty 
tohunga expert in traditional Māori knowledge 
Toi Art 







tuku iho inherited 
tūrangawaewae ancestral home (lit. place to stand) 
tūtūā person of low status (trad.) 
wā time 
wāhanga section, chapter 
wāhi place 
wai water 
waiata-a-ringa action song 
waka canoe, ‘confederation of tribes’ 
wānanga live-in, professional development course 
whaikōrero oratory 
whakaaro think, thought 





whakawhanaungatanga mutual introductions, with genealogical links 
whakawhiti cross, transfer 
whānau family (extended) 
Whānui Vega, a star (Alpha Lyrae) 
whare house, building 
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